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Abstract 
 
This thesis re-evaluates the concept of autonomy and the possibilities for trans racialized 
youth to practice it in current health care decision making contexts. After discussing access to 
health care in Ontario for this demographic using diverse research, an analytical foundation is 
laid using legal pluralism, relational autonomy, transgender theory and disidentification theory.  
The study uses Photovoice with trans racialized youth to produce visual texts analysed using 
thematic network analysis. Secondly, the study considers how together, law and medicine 
discursively work to encourage law-makers and health care providers to undermine the 
autonomy of trans racialized youth. Authoritative diagnostic and clinical texts are examined 
alongside decisions from courts and tribunals where trans racialized youth are present. 
Despite the autonomy granted in Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act, structural vulnerability, 
judicial paternalism, failure to mandate youth awareness of health care rights and professional 
ignorance restrict the autonomy practice of trans racialized youth. 
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Chapter 1: Searching for Trans Racialized Youth 
 
Introduction 
 
A timeline of the events that propelled me to research the autonomy experiences of trans 
racialized youth in health care will give you, the reader, some perspective.1 In 2014, North 
Americans were stunned when Leela Alcorn, a 16-year-old trans teen, walked in front of a truck 
on the Ohio Interstate, because she could not bear her parents’ refusal to consent to her 
transition. Her suicide note, posted to her Tumblr page, described the bleakness of her future as a 
“man in drag”.2 Only one year before her suicide, the American Psychiatric Association 
officially renamed Alcorn’s diagnosis of “gender identity disorder of childhood” as the less 
pathologizing “Gender Dysphoria” in the latest version of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM-V).3 In the same year as Alcorn’s death, Ontario added gender 
identity and gender expression to its Human Rights Code as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination in response to years of litigation and activism by trans communities.4 Then in 
                                                 
1 Since race is constructed socially, I use race as a process, the Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the 
Ontario Criminal Justice System defined racialization “as the process by which societies construct races as real, 
different and unequal in ways that matter to economic, political and social life.” Ontario Human Rights Commission 
& Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy and guidelines on racism and racial discrimination. (Toronto: 
Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2005) at 11. 
2 Alcorn’s original Tumblr was deleted at her parents' request but was retrieved and posted on Leela Alcorn, “Leelah 
Alcorn’s Blog (Lost 2014 Tumblr Webpage)”, (30 December 2014), online: Lost Media Arch 
<http://lostmediaarchive.wikia.com/wiki/Leelah_Alcorn%27s_Blog_(Lost_2014_Tumblr_Webpage)>. 
3 American Psychiatric Association & American Psychiatric Association: DSM-5 Task Force, Diagnostic and 
statistical manual of mental disorders: DSM-V, 5th ed. (Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association, 2013); 
American Psychiatric Association, DSM V Update Supplement to Diagnostic and Statistical Manual Of Mental 
Disorders, Fifth Edition (American Psychiatric Association Publishing, 2016) at 19. 
4 An Act to amend the Human Rights Code with respect to gender identity and gender expression, 20120619, 2012 
2012 C 7 [Toby’s Act (Right to be Free from Discrimination and Harassment Because of Gender Identity or Gender 
Expression)]; Ontario Human Rights Code, RSO 1990 [Ontario Human Rights Code]. 
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2015, Ontario passed a statute banning the use of conversion therapy by mental health 
professionals on LGBTTQ and questioning minors in Ontario.5 Later that year, Toronto’s Centre 
for Addictions and Mental Health (CAMH) closed the youth wing of its Gender Identity Clinic 
(GIC) to new patients after an independent review was conducted amidst a trans community 
outcry over conversion therapeutic practices deployed against gender questioning youth.6 The 
Clinic had built its international research reputation through treating over 650 patients.7 Then in 
2016, the amended Regulation 552 of the Health Insurance Act improved OHIP delivery to 
allow more classes of healthcare practitioners to recommend trans people for gender affirming 
surgeries thus reducing the years long wait lists at the CAMH GIC.8 Taken collectively, these 
were considerable legal and social policy reforms that would ostensibly improve conditions for 
Ontario trans youth in the same situation as Leela Alcorn. 
Indeed, mainstream LGBTTQ activists and allies celebrated provincial and federal human 
rights recognition for gender identity and gender expression and the availability of punitive 
sanctions for hate crimes.9 Yet, critical trans scholars and activists called these reforms symbolic 
                                                 
5 An Act to amend the Health Insurance Act and the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 regarding efforts to 
change sexual orientation or gender identity SO 2015 C.18. 
6 While CAMH’s External Review was removed from their website, Emily Colero, “CAMH removes external 
review of Gender Identity Clinic from website”, The Varsity (8 February 2016), online: 
<https://thevarsity.ca/2016/02/08/camh-removes-external-review-of-gender-identity-clinic-from-website/>; the 
archived copy of the External Review was accessed through Cristan Williams, “The Rise and Fall of Disco 
Sexology Part 1”, (2016), online: Rise Fall Disco Sexol <transdvocate.com/part-i-the-rise-and-fall-of-disco-
sexology-dr-zucker-camh-conversion-therapy_n_19556.html> [Williams]. 
7 Erin Anderssen, “Gender identity debate swirls over CAMH psychologist, transgender program”, Globe Mail (14 
February 2016), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/gender-identity-debate-swirls-over-camh-
psychologist -transgender-program/article28758828/>. 
8 Health Insurance Act, 1990, RSO 1990 C H6 [Health Insurance Act], RRO 1990, 552. 
9 An Act to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Criminal Code, 19 2017, 2017 C 13 [An Act to amend 
the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Criminal Code]; John Ibbitson, “With gender identity bill, Canada shows 
leadership in advancing human rights”, online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/with-gender-
identity-bill-canada-shows-leadership-in-advancing-humanrights/article35323583/>; Phil Heidenreich, “Senate 
passes Bill C-16 which defends transgender rights”, (16 June 2017), online: Global News 
<https://globalnews.ca/news/3532824/senate-passes-bill-c-16-which-defends-transgender-rights/>; “Bill C-16 more 
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and even detrimental to marginalized segments of trans communities.10 Similarly, since the mid-
90s enactment of its health consent statute, Ontario celebrated the autonomy of the individual to 
make decisions about their health, yet it seemed, from anecdotal evidence, that trans racialized 
youth do not actually enjoy this autonomy.11 This is because they are not accessing gender-
affirming treatments at the same rate as their white youth counterparts. My broad research 
project is firstly to verify and understand the reasons behind this inequitable phenomenon by 
examining the law and policy undergirding the medico-legal regulation of care to trans racialized 
youth and secondly, to undertake to learn from their experiences about health care decision 
making firsthand in their own words and photographs. 
I began by mapping the terrain of existing academic literature about trans racialized youth. 
Two challenges characterized this initial review: Firstly, the group at the heart of this research 
embodies specificities of race, gender identity, ability and age simultaneously. Their lives are 
constituted throughout these intersections and yet the literature concerning trans youth is 
anything but intersectional. Research mostly pertains to white youth but is presented as 
universal. Secondly, my research question compelled me to straddle several disciplines that 
produce different and contesting knowledges about trans people and youth. Thus, with 
intersectionality and interdisciplinarity in mind, I searched for overlaps through health and social 
science research, legal theory, trans studies and medical history for information about trans 
                                                 
reason to celebrate for Toronto trans marchers”, (23 June 2017), online: CBC 
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/toronto-trans-march-pride-bill-c-16-1.4176011>. 
10 Viviane Namaste, Sex Change, Social Change: Reflections on Identity, Institutions, and Imperialism (Canadian 
Scholars’ Press, 2011); Dean Spade, “What’s Wrong with Trans Rights” in Anne Enke, ed, Transfeminist Perspect 
Transgender Gend Stud (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2012). 
11 Health Care Consent Act, 1996, SO 1996, c. 2, Sched. A, Government of Ontario, 24 July 2014 [Health Care 
Consent Act]. 
 
 4 
racialized youth’s material conditions, health needs and autonomy practices.12 Furthermore, from 
the outset of this project I affirmed the importance of using as much literature as possible by 
trans racialized scholars and where that was not available, white trans scholars. Deliberately 
then, my review begins with the work of a group of critical trans scholars who research how 
sexual and gender difference is absorbed and mobilized by discourse producing institutions such 
as medicine and law into Foucauldian “technologies of control”.13 Trans of colour critique seeks 
to articulate the voices and interests of Black, Indigenous queer and trans communities of colour 
(BIPOC). My project is necessitated by the ongoing dismissal of trans BIPOC lives from within 
mainstream trans activisms, clinical research, and trans archives.14 
My work is unique as it speaks across often disparate fields and does so in a coherent way that 
shares new data and advances the thinking in each individual field. Specifically, my work 
intersects Children and Youth Studies, Queer and Trans Studies, Critical Race Theory, Legal 
Philosophy, and Health Equity Law, within overarching paradigms of Legal Pluralism 
and qualitative research using arts-based/Photovoice methodology. 
Defining “Youth” 
 
There are many different terms that are used to discuss the age-ranges of the participants in 
this research. Categories such as “children”, “adolescent”, “youth”, and “young adult” are 
                                                 
12 Kristin Luker, Salsa Dancing into the Social Sciences (Harvard University Press, 2009) at 81–83 describes the 
bedraggled daisy method for conducting interdisciplinary literature reviews. 
13 Jin Haritaworn, Adi Kuntsman & Silvia Posocco, eds, Queer Necropolitics (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014) at 
3. 
14 C Riley Snorton & Jin Haritaworn, “Trans Necropolitics: A Transnational Reflection on Violence, Death and the 
Trans of Color Afterlife” in Susan Stryker & Aren Z Aizura, eds, Transgender Studies Reader (New York: 
Routledge, 2013) 66 at 67-69. 
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commonly used in law, medicine and social services to refer to, treat and govern young people.15 
The way institutions and academic fields discursively deploy age categories and developmental 
life stages reveals a lot about each institution’s prevailing values and practical goals. As I will 
explain, these terms are not mutually exclusive nor are they standardized in provincial, national, 
and international contexts.  
Statutory law uses categories to make an age-based distinction between people. For example, 
the term “minor" distinguishes younger people from those who have reached the age of the 
“majority” which was once synonymous with attaining adulthood. In Ontario the Age Of 
Majority And Accountability Act states the age of majority as 18.16 Interestingly, while 18 year 
olds are allowed to vote they may not purchase cigarettes, alcohol or marijuana until they are 
19.17 In the federal realm of criminal law the Youth Criminal Justice Act defines a “young 
person” and a “youth” as between the ages of 12 and 17.18 Age of majority and health care 
consent legislation in Canada varies across each province. The words "infant" and "child" and 
“minor” are used interchangeably to refer to people under the age of majority for each province. 
For example, in British Columbia, anyone under the age of 19 is a minor and the Infancy Act 
regulates their health care consent.19 
At the international level the United Nations has defined the term “youth” since 1985 as 
people aged 15-24 years in its research, documentation and advocacy.20 However this does not 
                                                 
15 Soo Ah Kwon, Uncivil youth: race, activism, and affirmative governmentality (Durham; London: Duke University 
Press, 2013) at 27–29. 
16 Age of Majority and Accountability Act, RSO 1990, c. A.7, s.1. 
17 Canada Elections Act SC 2000, c. 9 s.3; Liquor Licence Act, RSO 1990, c. L.19 s. 30; Smoke-Free Ontario Act, 
2017, SO 2017, c. 26, Sched. 3 s. 3(1); Cannabis Control Act, 2017, SO 2017, c. 26, Sched. 1 ss. 7 and 10. 
18 Youth Criminal Justice Act (SC 2002, c. 1 s 2(1). 
19 Age of Majority Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter7 Ss. 1 And 4; Infants Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 223 S.17. 
20 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, “Youth - Definition”, (2017), online: What We 
Mean Youth <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/youth/youth-definition/>. 
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align with the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) where the category of “children” 
extends up to, but not including, 18 years of age.21 This range is much wider than domestic 
definitions of children, that stop at age 12, and is most likely deployed as a strategy to protect as 
many young people as possible under the CRC’s provisions. 
At the turn of the 20th century, psychology as a field led the move to establish adolescence as 
a category denoting a physical and emotional stage of human development.22 By white/Western 
externally measured standards, emerging out of adolescence involves exhibiting: physical 
changes, developmental changes associated with values of independence, material independence, 
established peer social groups, and romantic relationships of permanence.23 Similarly, in the 
practice of pediatric medicine, the term “minor” is not used and paediatricians instead use the 
medical term "adolescents" who are defined by their physiological stage as 12-18 year olds.24 In 
medicine, “children” are people under the age of 12.25 The clinical term “adolescent” and the 
legal term “minor” carry outdated culturally-loaded connotations yet they remain prevalent in the 
medical and legal sources I examined for this thesis.26 The way both terms are used have limited 
capacity to capture the experiences of trans racialized youth, such as transphobia, and racism that 
                                                 
21 Convention on the Rights of the Child General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, Article 1. 
22 G Stanley Hall, Adolescence: its psychology and its relations to physiology, anthropology, sociology, sex, crime, 
religion and education (New York: Appleton, 1907). 
23 Ibid. 
24 D, Sacks, “Age limits and adolescents | Canadian Paediatric Society”, (reaffirmed 2016 2003), online: Can 
Paediatr Soc <https://www.cps.ca/en/documents/position/age-limits-and-adolescents>. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Marlis Buchmann, The Script of Life in Modern Society: Entry Into Adulthood in a Changing World (University 
of Chicago Press, 1989); James E Côté & Anton Allahar, Generation on hold: coming of age in the late twentieth 
century (Toronto, Ont: Stoddart, 1994); Johanna Wyn & R D White, Rethinking youth (London: Sage Publications, 
1997). Legal clinics serving people under 18 use the term youth not the value-laden term “minor” such as Justice 4 
Children and Youth. 
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are not bound by age or physiological parameters.27 Minor youth may encounter specific barriers 
related to parental consent to minor’s health care that overlap with the adolescent need for 
puberty-related care. Yet as this chapter demonstrates, parental controls and financial and social 
barriers to independent housing and secure employment extend to trans racialized and 
particularly Indigenous youth in early adulthood even more than their white or cis counterparts 
of the same generation.28  
In contrast, the term “youth” connotes a transitional social concept of age that encompasses 
both children and young adults, minors and people who have reached the age of majority.29 Yet, 
in the Canadian operational administrative context, usage of the category of "youth" has 
proliferated, and the category itself has broadened. For example, Employment and Social 
Development Canada (EDSC) did not define youth but canvassed thousands of young Canadians 
under 16 and over 30 years old for their 2018 Youth Policy. Older Statistics Canada surveys 
classified youth as 16-28 years old, and young adults as 20-24 years old,30 however in its 2018 
“Portrait of Canadian Youth” Statistics Canada considers youth to range from 15-34.31 These 
expansions to the categorization of youth perhaps reflects the economic and social challenges 
faced by a larger number of young adults in securing jobs, homes, and relationships that once 
                                                 
27 Carrie Davis, “Introduction to Practice” in Gerald P Mallon, ed, Soc Work Pract Transgender Gend Var Youth, 
2nd ed (London: Routledge, 2009) 1 at 11. 
28 Carrie Davis, supra note 27; see infra note Nicole Nussbaum, et al, Legal Problems Facing Trans People in 
Ontario, TransForming Justice: Legal Needs Assessment of Trans People in Ontario Summary Report 1 (Toronto, 
ON: Legal Aid Ontario, HALCO, Ryerson University, University of Western Ontario, University of Toronto, 2018) 
in Youth Data Set. 
29 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, supra note 20; Buchmann, supra note 26 at 82–
83. 
30 Statistics Canada, “Children and youth”, (November 2012), online: Can Yearb 
<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-402-x/2011000/chap/c-e/c-e-eng.htm>. 
31 Statistics Canada Government of Canada, “A Portrait of Canadian Youth”, (7 February 2018), online: 
<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-631-x/11-631-x2018001-eng.htm>. 
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signified adulthood.32 In the Ontario social services context, providers use similar broad age 
ranges in some cases with an upper limit of 29.33 This range allows health and social services 
providers to serve more trans people whose gender-affirming health needs do not end after the 
urgency of the initial pubertal stage has finished.34 In particular, trans racialized youth often 
access services later than white trans youth, due to these aforementioned socially determined 
barriers that will be discussed in detail below.35  
For my research I decided to employ the broad definition of youth because I wanted to focus 
on how trans racialized people were accessing health related services offered in private and 
public clinical sites regardless of being minors or not. I was trying to work less categorically and 
more relationally and intersectionally as I explain in Chapter 2.36 In these sites the term “youth” 
was used to refer to youth and adolescents over 18, perhaps because it is a term commonly used 
by young people themselves.37  
The presumption that Ontario minors have independent health care decision-making authority 
was one I wanted to trouble with respect to trans racialized youth. Secondly, I wanted to 
investigate whether trans racialized youth 18 and over were subjected to paternalistic and 
infantilizing attitudes by health care providers and legal practitioners despite not legally being 
minors.  
                                                 
32 James E Côté, Arrested adulthood: the changing nature of maturity and identity (New York: New York 
University Press, 2000) at 3–5, 29. 
33 Supporting Our Youth at the Sherbourne Health Centre http://soytoronto.org, and Planned Parenthood Toronto, 
http://www.ppt.on.ca/. Central Toronto Youth Services programs apply age cut-offs based on the age ranges applied 
by the Ministry which funds the program. 
34 Websites for Justice for Children and Youth who work only with minors 
35 Jake Pyne, The Temporality of Privilege: Trans Youth of Colour and the Trouble with Triage (PhD Dissertation, 
McMaster University, 2018) [unpublished]. 
36 Wyn & White, supra note 26 at 96. 
37 The Sick Kids Transgender Youth Clinic website uses the terms “youth” and “adolescent” interchangeably, see 
http://www.sickkids.ca/AdolescentMedicine/transgender-youth-clinic.html 
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Critical Trans Studies and Trans of Colour Critique 
 
Several ruptures exist between the swiftly growing field of critical trans studies and the 
mainstream trans and LGBQ movements. Some argue that mainstream successes in legal 
recognition of gender identity and social inclusion have not changed material circumstances for 
many communities.38 It is within this wave of resistances to material crises that I place my 
research on decision-making autonomy for trans racialized youth. I will first define and describe 
the foundational concept of “transnormativity”. I will then review the grouping of works that use 
‘trans’ necropolitics as a theoretical container for trans of colour critique. Transnormativity is a 
phenomenon through which the people who can most successfully be absorbed into existing 
social power relations are recognized in law, dominate media discourses, and direct advocacy 
choices while universalizing their experiences on to those who are deemed insoluble.39  
The slow regulated death of the insoluble others is at the heart of Mbembe’s concept of 
necropower.40 His was both a critique of and an extension of Foucault’s concept of biopower and 
his theory of racism. Racism is a technology of biopower that categorizes populations into 
scientifically determined subdivisions across which life and death outcomes are unevenly 
allocated. This is an alternative way of understanding power in late modern societies.41 I will 
                                                 
38 Florence Ashley, “Don’t be so Hateful: The Insufficiency of Anti-Discrimination and Hate Crime Laws in 
Improving Trans Well-Being” (2018) 68:1 Univ Tor Law J 1; Ido Katri, “Transgender Intrasectionality: Rethinking 
Anti-Discrimination Law and Litigation” (2017) 20 Univ Pa J Law Soc Change [i]. 
39 Dan Irving, “Normalized Transgressions: Legitimizing the transsexual body as productive” (2008) 100: Special 
Radic Hist Rev 38; Jena McGill & Kyle Kirkup, “Locating the Trans Legal Subject in Canadian Law: XY v 
Ontario” (2013) 33 Windsor Rev Leg Soc Issues 96; Snorton & Haritaworn, supra note 14. 
40 Achilles Mbembe, “Necropolitics” (2003) 15:1 Public Cult 11. 
41 “Becoming subject therefore supposes upholding the work of death” at 14. Foucault Il Faut défendre la société at 
228; Mbembe identifies the Atlantic slave trade and slavery as one of the first examples of biopolitical 
experimentation and he calls plantations and colonies repressed topographies of cruelty Achilles Mbembe, 
“Necropolitics” (2003) 15:1 Public Cult 11 at 21, 40. 
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describe below how population level controls were supported by eugenics studies in Europe and 
the United States based on “scientific” ontologies of race and sex.42 
In Queer Necropolitics Haritaworn et al. inquire into what conditions make trans normative 
political strategies, such as the expansion of hate crimes legislation, desirable.43 The editors also 
follow the implications of inclusion-seeking strategies for trans people of colour.44 Queer 
Necropolitics takes up Mbembe’s claim that new technologies of necropower continue to be 
adapted and utilized.45 They push the practice of trans studies to “focus less on the grand 
moments or processes of commemoration and more on the everyday and the ordinary.”46 Their 
critical turn to the daily material realities of trans racialized youth guided my research. 
Trans activists and academics remind cis feminists of the historical and current material 
differences between them as women.47 They look beyond interpersonal experiences of 
transphobia and racism to the institutional contexts in which those differences arise, for example 
through the intersections of criminalization of trans status, citizenship status, sex workers’ rights 
                                                 
42 M. Foucault, Il Faut défendre la société, 58-70. 
43 Haritaworn et al supra note 13; See Jasbir Puar’s earlier use of term “queer necropolitics” in Jasbir K Puar, 
Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times, unknown edition ed (Durham: Duke Univ Pr, 2007) at 
36. 
44 Dean Spade, Morgan Bassichis & Alexander Lee, “Building an Abolitionist Trans and Queer Movement with 
Everything We’ve Got” in Eric Stanley & Nat Smith, eds, Captive Genders Trans Embodiment Prison Ind Complex, 
2nd ed (Oakland California: AK Press, 2015) 21 is an example of such a multi-issue exploration. 
45 Snorton and Haritaworn supra note 39 at 71 concluding that the deaths of trans women of colour provide raw 
materials for trans social movements that advance the lives of privileged white gay, queer and trans people. Lastly, 
there is a thematic linkage between Mbembe, the project of Queer Necropolitics, and an earlier essay by Snorton and 
Haritaworn titled “Trans Necropolitics” 45. 
46 Haritaworn et al 2014 supra note 43 at 2. 
47 Trans scholars in feminist studies and sociology have repeatedly asked for research and writing on transness to 
actually attempt to improve or at least note the material conditions of the lives of marginalized trans people rather 
than theorize post-structuralism and queer theory, see Viviane Namaste, “Undoing Theory: The ‘Transgender 
Question’ and the Epistemic Violence of Anglo-American Feminist Theory” (2009) 24:3 Hypatia 11; for a 
comparison of the work of Namaste and Judith Butler see also Trish Salah, “Undoing Trans Studies” (2007) 0:17 
TOPIA: Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies 150; and see Jake Pyne, “Queer and Trans Collisions in the 
Classroom: A Call to Throw Open Theoretical Doors in Social Work Education” in (2016) 54. 
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as workers, and the disabling of certain members of society.48 My research heeds this reminder 
by placing trans racialized youth who do not actually benefit from recent transnormative policy 
interventions and legislative reforms in the foreground of the picture. 
 
The “Newness” of Trans Youth of Colour 
 
What does race have to do with being trans?49 The obvious answer is that trans racialized 
people exist, and as I explain in Chapter 2, they lead intersectional lives.50 The longer answer is 
that trans racialized people only seem new to discourses that have so far erased them such as 
histories of science, LGBT cultural histories, and media coverage of trans lives. I can begin to 
answer that same question discursively if I look backwards for a medical history of 
transsexuality that integrates “scientific” theories of race. The field of sexology emerged out of 
endocrinology, eugenics, and the “psych” fields of study. Several scholars trace the development 
of the field from the late nineteenth century through to early twentieth medical history of 
transsexuality. They begin with European sexology and psychoanalysis and continue through 
American sexology, endocrinology and psychiatry. These medical histories are useful because 
they demonstrate how medical science laid the groundwork for the legal tendency I explicate in 
                                                 
48 Trish Salah, “Gender Struggles: Reflections on Trans Liberation, Trade Unionism, and the Limits of Solidarity” 
in Dan Irving & Rupert Raj, eds, Trans Activism in Canada: A Reader (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2014); 
and Nora Butler Burke, “Connecting the Dots: National Security, Crime Migration Nexus and Trans Women’s 
Survival” in Yolanda Martínez-San Miguel & Sarah Tobias, eds, Trans studies: the challenge to hetero/homo 
normativities (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2016) and also Nora Butler Burke, “Double 
Punishment: Immigration Penalty and Migrant Trans Women Who Sell Sex” in Emillie Durisin, ed, Sex/Work 
Regulation Agency and Resistance (British Columbia: UBC Press, 2018). 
49 Nael Bhanji, “Trans/scriptions: Homing Desires, (Trans)sexual Citizenship and Racialized Bodies.” in Stryker & 
Aizura, supra note 14, 512 at 519. 
50 Nova Gutierrez, “Resisting Fragmentation, Living Whole” (2004) 16:3–4 J Gay Lesbian Soc Serv 69; Anneliese 
Singh, “Transgender Youth of Colour and Resilience: Negotiating Oppression and Finding Support” (2013) 68 Sex 
Roles 690 [Singh 2013a]; Anneliese Singh, Sarah E Meng & Anthony W Hansen, “‘I am my Own Gender’: 
Resilience Strategies of Trans Youth” (2014) 92 J Couns Dev 208 [Singh et al 2014]. 
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Chapter 4, which is to normalize transsexualism by absorbing it into the established gender 
binary.51 All scholars however, failed to acknowledge the connection between scientific 
typologies of race and the creation of the category of transsexuality. Their related theories on law 
and political economy branch out from incomplete histories of transexuality.52 It is partly these 
selective research gaps that facilitate the framing of trans racialized youth as new entities despite 
their centuries-old existence.53 A parallel erasure in the official cultural history of transness has 
been met by Black scholars and cultural workers who demonstrate that BIPOCs are not recent 
add-ons to this current trans youth moment. In fact, Black and Latinx trans youth like Marsha P. 
Johnson and Sylvia Rivera led 20th century LGBTTQ activism in the cities of New York and 
Compton.54 This activism was necessitated by their structural vulnerability to the regulation of 
race, gender, citizenship status, and by being targeted by law enforcement.55 And thirdly, trans 
racialized youth have called attention to the media’s neglect of their lives as they responded to 
the media eruption over Alcorn’s death. They write this: “No offense to Leelah Alcorn, may her 
soul rest in peace, but where is the press coverage of the eight to 10 African-American 
transgender girls that have been murdered this year?"56 
                                                 
51 Andrew N Sharpe, Transgender jurisprudence: dysphoric bodies of law (London: Cavendish, 2002) at 519. 
52 Dean Spade, “Resisting medicine, re/modeling gender” (2003) 18 Berkeley Womens LJ 15; Irving 2008 supra 
note 39; Sharpe 2002 ibid.  
53 Singh 2013a, supra note 50; Syrus Marcus Ware, “All Power to All People?” (2017) 4:2 Transgender Stud Q 170 
at 171 and 172; Edward Ou Jin Lee, “Trans Youth of Color: Knowledges, Realities and Practice Strategies” in 
Elizabeth J Meyer & Annie Pullen-Sansfaçon, eds, Support Transgender Gend-Creat Youth Sch Fam Communities 
Action, Gender and sexualities in education; v 9, revised edition. ed (New York: Peter Lang, 2018) 87; Pyne 2018, 
supra note 35 at 105. 
54 Che Gossett, “Silhouettes of Defiance: Memorializing Historical Sites of Queer and Transgender Resistance in an 
Age of Neoliberal Inclusivity” in Stryker & Aizura, supra note 14, 580 at 582, 584–5; Ware, ibid at 172. 
55 Ware, supra note 53 at 172 Ware writes that “Our relationship to the law changes our relationships to space and 
organizing and creates a certain set of freedoms and also restrictions in our work.” 
56 Nicole Pasulka, “After Leelah Alcorn’s Suicide, Trans Youth Fight Broader Bias”, (8 January 2015), online: Code 
Switch Race Identity Remixed <https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/01/08/375203856/trans-teens-
respond-to-leelah-alcorns-death>. 
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Returning to the role of race in the creation of transness, notably, the work of Julien Gill-
Peterson uncovers the convergence of racial categories and sexological inquiries challenging 
previous academic omissions. Most relevant to this project is Gill-Peterson’s genealogy of trans 
children and youth. He also shows that racialized children have always been a focus for 
sexological and medical research in the United States for eugenic reasons.57 Scientific racism 
most obviously manifested itself in the study of eugenics throughout Europe and America.58 
Eugenics was the pursuit of racial improvement premised on white supremacy and ableism by 
normalizing deviant racial and sexual subgroups. And as Gill-Peterson concludes in his 
genealogy of trans children: 
 
The child’s body, then, is intrinsic to the genealogy of sex and race as bound by  
endocrinology, even if the children being treated by endocrinologists did not 
begin to be labeled as transsexual, like G.L., until the 1960s. The neglect of the 
developmental function of childhood and the child’s body to some extent explain the 
facile forgetting of the genealogy of the transgender child…It also accounts for  
the apparent exogenous quality of race to transgender studies and the transgender   child, 
where, if broached at all, race is merely a matter of minority identity  
and its intersection with sex and gender.59 
 
He concludes that while in the 21st century trans and gender independent kids are reported on 
as though they are a new phenomenon, the control of adolescence as a key developmental stage 
in the life of the species was significant as early as the 1960s.60 Gill-Peterson’s earlier work also 
focused on trans youth, puberty suppression through the use of hormone blockers and the 
                                                 
57 Julian Gill-Peterson, Queer Theory is Kids Stuff: A Genealogy of the Gay and Transgender Child Rutgers, 2015) 
[unpublished] at 11, 24. 
58 Gill-Peterson ibid, see also Siobhan B Somerville, Queering the Color Line (Durham, N.C: Duke University 
Press, 2000), in which she argues that race and sexuality were intertwined in the medical and legal histories of 
homosexuality. 
59 Gill-Peterson ibid at 154. 
60 Gill-Peterson ibid at 11, 24. 
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discovery of the transsexual body’s plasticity from the study of hormones by endocrinologists 
steeped in scientific racism.61 He frames puberty suppression as an example of modern trans 
biopolitics developed from endocrinology’s interest in disrupting the body’s inherited racial and 
sexual characteristics.62 Nineteenth and 20th century endocrinologists were interested in what 
they termed “precocious puberty” associated with “tropical populations” i.e. racialized people of 
the Global South.63 Rather than being an add-on to gender identity, race is a technical capability 
of the body that can be manipulated to make it plastic and therefore to make it trans. Gill-
Peterson remarked on the irony of the high cost of Lupron, a puberty blocking drug, reasoning 
that cost functioned as a prohibitive barrier to trans and gender non-conforming pubertal age 
racialized youth who are less likely to have Medicaid or Medicare or private health insurance.64 
This is confirmed by U.S. research scrutinizing Medicare service claims data over 10 years.65 
The study found that when a puberty-blocking implant called Vantas was prescribed for the 
diagnosis of gender dysphoria the claimants were 74 per cent “white non-Hispanic” but when the 
same drug was prescribed for “precocious puberty”, which is the labelled purpose of the drug, 
the number of racialized recipients matched the number of white ones.66 This ratio indicates a 
disproportionately high number of racialized youth billing for a drug to delay precocious 
puberty, rather than to address gender dysphoria. 
                                                 
61 Julian Gill-Peterson. “The Technical Capacities of the Body: Assembling Race, Technology, and Transgender” 
(2014) 1:3 TSQ 402 [Gill-Peterson 2014]. 
62 Ibid at 408. 
63 Ibid at 413. The role of tropical colonial studies in the development of psychiatry is explored later in Chapter 4. 
64 Ibid at 414. 
65 CMD Lopez et al, “Trends in the use of Puberty Blockers among Transgender Children in the United States” 
(2017) 2:2 J Pediatr Encrinology 1. 
66 Ibid at 4. 
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In Toronto, anecdotal evidence of low to zero numbers of trans racialized youth using trans 
youth services and gender clinics prompted me to interview between 2016 and 2017 three 
doctors who work in southern Ontario clinics specializing in offering gender-affirming 
treatments to minors and older youth (12-25 years of age). I interviewed two pediatricians from 
the Transgender Youth Clinic at the Hospital for Sick Children in downtown Toronto, and one 
family doctor from Quest Community Health Care in Windsor who is a trans woman herself. 
One of the physicians was a racialized gay man. Both of the well-resourced clinics treat gender 
variance as a physical condition not a pathology, making them progressive clinics. All three 
doctors described the importance of access to gender-affirming treatments for trans youth. All 
three emphasized the life-saving effect that puberty blockers can have for youth between 10-15 
years. Both clinics have long waiting lists and describe high volumes of patients demonstrating 
need.67 All three told me however, that most of their patients were white, middle to upper-class 
and most attended the clinic with families possessing employee health benefits. They could not 
explain this racial disparity. Both white doctors surmised that it had to do with inadequate 
support or lack of consent from racialized parents perhaps due to cultural or religious reasons.  
The critical aim of this thesis then is to discover how and why, if race and transness are so 
intertwined, trans racialized youth are erased from media reports, from research, clinical access, 
and from jurisprudence. In the next section I will create a picture of trans racialized youth and 
access to health in Ontario. 
                                                 
67 Adam Carter, “Hamilton a desert for transgender healthcare, but hope is on the horizon”, CBC News (1 March 
2017), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/hamilton/transgender-healthcare-1.4003071>. 
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A Research Portrait of Trans Racialized Youth in Ontario 
 
Existing literature on access to health care for trans racialized youth is quite limited and the 
brushstrokes of research depict an environment of professional ignorance and discrimination.68 
The 2009 Trans PULSE study was the first Canadian research series about trans communities. 
Trans PULSE hired trans researchers and used mixed-methods. As a result, Trans PULSE was 
able to collect data about youth and racialized people and newcomers. Trans PULSE documented 
that out of approximately 53,500 trans people in Canada, one-quarter of them identify as 
racialized, while one out of 14 identify as Indigenous.69 Trans PULSE also found that 34 per cent 
of trans Ontarians are 24 years and under, and detailed the unique vulnerabilities experienced by 
trans youth compared to their LGBQ counterparts.70 For example, the study found that 67 per 
cent of trans youth experienced significant family rejection71, homelessness and distressed 
mental health resulting in much higher rates of suicidal ideation and actual attempts than both 
their cis straight and cis queer counterparts.72 Furthermore their results indicated the particular 
vulnerability of trans youth compared to trans adults. Trans youth (up to 24 years) were almost 
                                                 
68 Shanna K Kattari et al, “Racial and Ethnic Differences in Experiences of Discrimination in Accessing Health 
Services Among Transgender People in the United States” (2015) 16:2 Int J Transgenderism 68 at 72, 74–75. This 
study re-analyzed the 2010 National Discrimination Survey data for differences in health care experiences of 
discrimination between 4,879 White trans people and 1572 trans people of colour disaggregating data into 5 racial 
categories. It considered three health service areas: doctors and hospitals, emergency rooms, and in ambulances and 
emergency medical technicians. Their findings showed that Latinx trans and biracial/multiracial people experienced 
significantly higher rates of discrimination than white trans people in all three categories. 
69 Online Trans PULSE <http://transpulseproject.ca/research/intersecting-impacts-transphobia-racism-hiv-risk-
among-trans-persons-colour-ontario-canada/>. 
70 Greta Bauer et al, Impacts of Strong Parental Support for Trans Youth, TransPULSE (Toronto, Ontario: 
Children’s Aid Society of Toronto and Delisle Youth Services, 2012) at 3–4. 
71 Ibid, at 2. 
72 Bauer Greta, et al, “Suicidality among Trans People in Ontario/ La suicidabilité parmi les personnes trans en 
Ontario”, online: Trans PULSE <http://transpulseproject.ca/research/suicidality-among-trans-people-in-ontario-la-
suicidabilite-parmi-les-personnes-trans-en-ontario/>. 
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twice as likely to seriously consider suicide as those over 25, and almost three times as likely to 
have attempted suicide within the past year.73 Another key finding was that trans people avoided 
primary care and emergency health services due to a striking lack of competent and sensitive 
services.74 For example, Namaste’s pioneering research on trans people’s experiences with 
Canadian Gender Identity Clinics (GICs) showed that endocrinologists refused cross-sex 
hormone therapy for trans people when it was almost the same process as hormone replacement 
therapy for cis people. Endocrinologists who did prescribe hormones to trans people refused to 
monitor them or did not know how to dose trans people properly resulting in negative side 
effects.75 U.S. studies of how trans people relate to health care access noted patterns such as: 
concealing gender from health care providers and staff; educating health care providers about 
health care needs and issues; avoiding primary care and relying on emergency medical care; or 
avoiding health care services altogether.76 U.S. researchers also noted race as a correlate in 
increased emergency medical use and increased discrimination when trans people of colour use 
emergency services.77 
While not intentionally attending to race or ethnicity, Hammond’s study of the social 
organization of trans youth health care drew attention to the levels of autonomy of trans youth 
                                                 
73 Greta Bauer, et al, “Suicidality among Trans People in Ontario/ La suicidabilité parmi les personnes trans en 
Ontario”, online: Trans PULSE <http://transpulseproject.ca/research/suicidality-among-trans-people-in-ontario-la-
suicidabilite-parmi-les-personnes-trans-en-ontario/>; Kyle Scanlon et al, Ontario’s Trans Communities and Suicide: 
Transphobia is Bad for Our Health, Trans PULSE E-Bulletin Vol 1, Issue 1 (Toronto, Ontario, 2010). 
74 Ayden I. Scheim et al, “Reported Emergency Department Avoidance, Use, and Experiences of Transgender 
Persons in Ontario, Canada” (2013) Trans PULSE, online: <http://transpulseproject.ca/research/reported-
emergency-department-avoidance-use-and-experiences-of-transgender-persons-in-ontario-canada/>. 
75 Viviane K Namaste, “Access Denied: The Experiences of Transsexuals and Transgendered People with Health 
Care and Social Services in Toronto” in Invisible Lives Erasure Transsexual Transgendered People (Chicago, 
Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 2000) 157 at 168. 
76 Kattari et al. supra note 68 at 68. 
77 J Grant et al, Injustice at Every Turn: A report of the National Transgender Discrimination Survey (Washington, 
DC: National Center for Transgender Equality and National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, 2011) at 73. 
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within the two types of service delivery systems at The Centre for Addiction and Mental Health 
(CAMH) and Sherbourne Health Centre (SHC).78 Secondly, her work explored how trans youth 
identity formation defied categories imposed by the medical model of transness.79 Youth from 
across Ontario detail the painful impacts of experiencing delays for appointments and treatment, 
paying out of pocket for sexual deviance testing, having to participate in research to access 
services, receiving transphobic and/or incompetent services or being denied services altogether.80 
Youth discussed avoiding the CAMH GIC due in part to requirements to prove gender identity 
through the real life test.81 Disaggregated research showed that transfeminine, racialized and 
underhoused or homeless trans people in Ontario were more likely not to have a family physician 
than other trans people.82 In order to survive, trans youth worked tenaciously to secure housing, 
pool health information, share hormones, heal from family rejection or manage family 
expectations, actualize their gender expression, and make a living.83 Hammond’s attention to 
local resilience, agency and autonomy practices of trans youth influenced the direction of my 
research. I geared my specific inquiry towards the ways that statutes, policy and authoritative 
texts erode or foster agency and autonomy as forms of decision making in health. 
                                                 
78 Rebecca Hammond, The Social Organization of Health Care for Trans Youth in Ontario (Master of Science 
Public Health, Dalhousie University, 2010) [unpublished] at 6. 
79 Hammond used institutional ethnography and in-person interviews to describe the realities of 21 trans youth 
between the ages of 16-25 in Toronto as they accessed health care related to transitioning. Data on race/ethnicity 
was not collected. 
80 Hammond supra note 78 at 96, 97, 101, 102. 
81 Ibid at 86. 
82 Ayden I Scheim et al, “Disparities in access to family physicians among transgender people in Ontario, Canada” 
(2017) 18:3 Int J Transgenderism 343 at 350; For suggestion that self-reported transphobia and racism increased 
vulnerability to HIV infection. See also Roxanne Longman Marcellin, Greta R Bauer & Ayden I Scheim, 
“Intersecting impacts of transphobia and racism on HIV risk among trans persons of colour in Ontario, Canada” 
(2013) 6:4 Ethn Inequalities Health Soc Care 97 at 102–103. 
83 Hammond, supra note 78 at 1,5,130-131; See also Nooshin Khobzi Rotondi et al, “Nonprescribed Hormone Use 
and Self-Performed Surgeries: ‘Do-It-Yourself’ Transitions in Transgender Communities in Ontario, Canada” 
(2013) 103:10 Am J Public Health 1830 at 9–10 using the TransPULSE data set with 33 per cent youth and 12 per 
cent racialized participants. 
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Yan retrieved the voices and experiences of Toronto trans racialized youth in her secondary 
analysis of the 2008 Toronto Teen Sex Survey data, which had been disaggregated by race and 
gender identity.84 Eighty-five per cent of the 1216 participants were Black and South Asian and 
some of them were immigrant and newcomer youth whose voices are typically unrepresented in 
Canadian research. Yan’s work highlighted the impacts of racism, language barriers and 
conservative religious norms on newcomer and racialized youth who did not have the privilege 
of “coming” out into an LGBTQ community that reflected or welcomed them. Yan’s work filled 
in the picture of racialized youth who juggled religious and cultural expectations85 with meager 
financial resources for transitioning,86 complicated family supports and a desire for services in 
their languages that respected their confidentiality in sexual health decision making. Trans 
youth-specific findings were: they were not actually being served for trans specific health needs 
or in trans competent ways when aggregated with LGBQ youth (for example being 
misgendered), they were assumed to be gay/queer, and there was a lack of sensitivity to trans 
youth’s fear of being physically examined.87 It was significant that beyond simply enumerating 
the negative interpersonal attitudes of service providers and continuing the institutional analysis 
trend, Yan fleshed out institutional patterns in social services that created vulnerability to racism 
and transphobia.88 
                                                 
84 Shanshan Yan, Through an Intersectionality Lens: Service Provider Views On The Sexual Health Needs Of 
Racialized LGBTQ Youth In Toronto (Masters Thesis, Wilfred Laurier University, 2014) [Unpublished]. 
85 Ibid at 31–33. 
86 Ibid at 36. 
87 Ibid at 49–52. 
88 Namaste called for institutional research and change 19 years ago in Namaste 2000 supra note 75; see also Leslie 
Feinberg, “Trans health crisis: For us it’s life or death” (2001) 91:6 Am J Public Health Wash 897; the institutional 
neglect of trans health was taken up again by Greta R Bauer et al, ?“ I Don’t Think This Is Theoretical; This Is Our 
Lives?: How Erasure Impacts Health Care for Transgender People” (2009) 20:5 J Assoc Nurses AIDS Care 348. 
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While researchers continued to mine the same 2009 data set for intersectional nuances, 
subsequent national studies of trans youth were structured in ways that prevented the 
participation of trans racialized youth and did not attempt to disaggregate data by race and 
ethnicity.89 These oversights are troubling since research had suggested that trans racialized 
youth were more structurally vulnerable to health neglect and secondly they understood 
themselves to be phenomenologically different from white youth.90 Fortunately, more accurate 
data about trans racialized youth in Ontario is available from two very recent studies that I will 
discuss in turn. The Transforming Justice survey conducted identity-based focus groups between 
2016 and 2017 for trans youth, racialized trans people, and Two-spirit people.91 The survey 
found that medical problems were the second highest legal problem affecting 25 per cent of trans 
people, compared to 2.6 per cent of Canadians.92 The biggest legal problem for trans people was 
discrimination, which included discrimination in health care.93 Participants described multiple 
layers of transphobia starting in their youth with abusive families and parents who blocked them 
from getting name changes, hormone therapies and other trans specific medical procedures 
despite the lack of an age threshold for decision making in the HCCA.94 Youth participants also 
                                                 
89 Shauna M Lawlis et al, “Health Concerns of Transgender and Gender Nonconforming Youth and Their Parents 
Upon Presentation to a Transgender Clinic” (2017) 61:5 J Adolesc Health 642 at 643 This is the first published 
research on this topic, took place at a hospital clinic in the U.S. Midwest with no race/ethnicity or income/class data 
collected. J Veale, H Frohard-Dourlent & S Dobson, Being Safe, Being Me (Vancouver, BC: Stigma and Resilience 
among Vulnerable Youth Centre, University of British Columbia, 2015) was first Canadian trans youth specific 
survey on health and healthcare, the respondents were primarily white and urban. Aggregated quantitative study on 
discrimination in schools, EGALE surveyed 3700 LGBTQ students across Canada between 2007-2009 Catherine G 
Taylor & Tracey Peter, Every class in every school: Final report on the first national climate survey on homophobia, 
biphobia, and transphobia in Canadian schools (Egale Canada Human Rights Trust, 2011). 
90 Gutierrez, supra note 50; Singh 2013a, supra note 50; Singh et al 2014, supra note 50. 
91 Nicole Nussbaum, et al, supra note 28 Discussion questions asked about frequency and types of discrimination, 
justiciable legal problems and legal remedies sought. Findings were compared to the experiences of non-trans 
Canadians over the same 3 years time period.  . 
92 At 6 and 9. 
93 Nicole Nussbaum, et al, supra note 28, fig 1. 
94 At 8. 
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described systemic discrimination in schools, and in child welfare institutions.95 Housing and 
shelter systems were especially bad for example, because they are segregated by both natal sex 
and gender presentation.96 When violence occurred in the shelter, trans victims were blamed for 
it and staff held no one accountable.97 Trans youth, who have very high rates of homelessness in 
the Greater Toronto Area,98 spoke about using street-based means to obtain hormones, money, 
shelter and to build safety networks that replaced biological family support and protection.99  
Racialized trans participants from Transforming Justice revealed the challenges of surviving 
at the intersections of race and transness in the following ways: experiencing racism and 
transphobia within mainstream and LGBTQ mainstream social services; and a lack of trust in the 
legal system. They described making agentic choices to manage racism and transphobia such as: 
avoiding medical services within their own cultural communities; looking outside their own 
ethnocultural communities for housing and employment.100 In addition, Two-Spirit and trans 
Indigenous focus group participants emphasized the ongoing effects of colonization such as 
geographic and cultural dislocation. One example of colonialism and transphobia was the 
deployment of Christian settler ideologies against Two-spirit people in white adoptive homes, 
churches and through schooling. 
Across all health care contexts, trans youth in the Transforming Justice study had experiences 
of being outed as trans, being misgendered or dead-named. Delays in emergency medical 
                                                 
95 Lorraine Gale & Haley Syrja-McNally, “Expanding the Circle: Serving Children, Youth and Families by 
Integrating Gender Diversity and Affirming Gender-Independent Children” in Meyer, Pullen-Sansfaçon & Manning, 
supra note 53, 285 at 288. 
96 Nicole Nussbaum, et al, supra note 28 at 10. 
97 Ibid at 11. 
98 Alex Abramovich, “No Safe Place to Go - LGBTQ Youth Homelessness in Canada: Reviewing the Literature” 
(2012) 4:1 Canadian Journal of Family and Youth / Le Journal Canadien de Famille et de la Jeunesse. 
99 Nicole Nussbaum, et al, supra note 28 at 6, 8, 10, 12; Rotondi et al, supra note 84 at 9–10. 
100 Ibid at 9. 
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treatment and urgent care or outright refusals were common as was the experience of having all 
health issues viewed as trans-related or trans-caused all of which prompted trans people to avoid 
seeking urgent or primary care.101 With respect to medical treatment, participants related the 
following: denial of hormone replacement therapy and gender affirming surgeries and overall 
lack of trans competent healthcare. Almost no participant sought legal advice let alone taking 
legal action for any of the rights violations they experienced.102 Participants perceived legal 
information spaces and staff as inaccessible and daunting. It has been established that in Ontario, 
minors and older youth do not know their rights in terms of health law, often believing that 
doctors are required to consult their parents/guardians about serious health decisions.103 The 
stakes of ignorance of the law are higher for trans and gender-expansive youth who have more 
reason for medical interactions, because fear of their parents finding out or blocking their choices 
could result in delayed or missed care and severe mental health consequences as was established 
earlier in this chapter.104 Given the finding that youth relied on health care providers to share 
health rights information, rather than on school staff or peers, professional ignorance is troubling 
given Pyne’s current research results, discussed below, about racial disparities in access to health 
clinics serving youth. That even today, internet savvy trans racialized youth urgently need health 
                                                 
101 Ibid at 9. 
102 Ibid 10. 
103 K, Catton V, Farrer, W, Graham, University of Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, Child in the 
City Programme. Adolescent beliefs and practices regarding the law of minors’ medical consent: a pilot study. 
Toronto: The Child in the City Programme and The Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of 
Toronto; 1980. 100 p. (Child in the City report, no. 7) at 69. Catton interviewed 61 English-speaking 12-17-year 
olds, of which 20 per cent were born outside Canada, 57 per cent were between ages of 16-17 years old, and 80 per 
cent were female. Catton does not mention gender identity or race/ethnicity, Catton at 17. See also P. Alderson 
Every day and medical life choices: decision making among 8-15-year-old school students, in Michael Freeman, ed. 
Children, medicine and the law, 445 where the most common answers from minors about at what age they could 
consent to surgery were at 16 or 18 years old regardless of actual legal thresholds at 457. 
104 Ibid at 69. 
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consent law information will be borne out later on in the structural inadequacies of the HCCA in 
Chapter 4 and the focus groups’ findings from trans racialized youth in Chapter 5.  
The second recent study that focused on the attitudes of clinicians and community workers 
who provide services to trans youth confirms that it is predominantly white trans youth who 
benefit from the most progressive health services in Ontario.105 While Pyne specifically studied 
the disparities between minors accessing puberty-blockers, his data does bring to light two key 
generalizable findings about clinicians who treat trans youth: they do not integrate an anti-racist 
approach to their practice with trans youth, and they assumed that racialized and immigrant 
families’ communities were more transphobic than white communities.106 Both findings 
reinforced my rationale for an inquiry into the relationship between trans racialized youth and 
autonomy experiences in health care decision making. 
Similar to the informal interview results with my three southern Ontario doctors, Pyne’s 
analysis confirmed that “gender affirming” doctors treating youth did not notice the whiteness of 
their patient demographics and when asked specifically about demographics, 100 per cent of 
clinicians described their patients as “majority white”.107 Notably, clinicians attributed the 
absence of trans racialized youth to deficiencies in racialized, immigrant communities with an 
emphasis on those practicing Christian and Muslim faiths.108 In contrast to frontline youth 
workers, clinicians were ignorant to the ways in which the after effects of colonialism, and 
current consequences of globalization, war, immigration and migrant labour have affected the 
                                                 
105 Pyne 2018 supra note 34 at 19, Pyne interviewed 18 clinicians who he identified as “affirming” of gender 
expansiveness, at 16. 
106 Ibid at 20. 
107 Ibid at 19. 
108 Ibid at 20. 
 
 24 
kinship structures of racialized families and communities.109 Parents and families of trans 
racialized youth are more likely struggling to survive with far less time and financial resources to 
support their child’s questioning or transitioning than middle class and white families.110 
Now it is widely accepted that having supportive parents or even one supportive adult 
improves the life chances and outcomes for trans and gender expansive youth.111 Claims from 
the sparse and quantitative research about racialized and/or immigrant families’ attitudes towards 
trans and gender expansive children and youth are inconclusive. U.S. Latinx youth reported 
experiencing less acceptance from their families than white youth.112 While a national U.S. 
survey found Black, Latinx, Asian and American Indian respondents scoring higher for family 
acceptance of transness than white respondents.113  
As we have already seen, particularly but not solely in the U.S. context, parents have been 
documented as regularly preventing minors and youth from transitioning for a wide variety of 
reasons.114 Yet if the HCCA allows capable people of any age to determine their treatments, how 
have parents alone been able to prevent racialized youth from accessing transition services? 
Foregrounding Pyne’s second finding let us return to consider the knowledge and practices of 
                                                 
109 Lee, supra note 53 at 94. 
110 Ibid at 100 Lee explains structural conditions that thwart families of colour from supporting trans youth; 
Manning and Asano note that an overwhelming number of parents doing gender advocacy for trans youth are white 
middle-class mothers, in Manning and Asano at 186; for a first-person narrative on struggle of Black single mother 
with trans child see Wendall D. Glenn. “For colored girls only”: Reflections of an emerging male-to-female 
transgender and gender variant youth consciousness, in Mallon supra note 27, 104–14. 
111 C. Ryan, et al. (2010) ‘Family Acceptance in Adolescence and the Health of LGBT Young Adults’, Journal of 
Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Nursing, 23(4), pp. 205–213.T Young Adults’, Journal of Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatric Nursing, 23(4), pp. 205–213.Greta Bauer et al, Impacts of Strong Parental Support for Trans Youth, 
TransPULSE (Toronto, Ontario: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto and Delisle Youth Services, 2012). 
112 C. Ryan et al, “Family rejection as a predictor of negative health outcomes in white and Latino lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual young adults.” Pediatr 2009 Jan1231346 52. 
113 Grant et al, supra note 77 at 88, 94. 
114 Cole Thaler, Flor Bermudez & Susan Sommer, “Legal advocacy on behalf of transgender and gender 
nonconforming youth” in Mallon, supra note 27 at 151. 
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Ontario doctors, around consent law not just transness. Only two Ontario studies have examined 
Toronto doctors for awareness of the law regarding minor youth.115 The first found in 1979 that, 
of 29 surveyed, 41 per cent were unsure of the law, 14 per cent said they did not care about the 
law, 28 per cent said they could not treat a minor without a parent’s consent and only 7 per cent 
said they would treat a sufficiently capable minor.116 When asked to list and rank factors they 
consider when treating minors, 52 per cent misunderstood health consent law, citing the 
seriousness of the issue as the number one factor to consider, then age and then the dependency 
of the youth on their family.117 Notably, these doctors felt that law was irrelevant to their practice 
and their knowledge of law did not impact their delivery of services to youth.118 The study 
concluded that youth, especially legally capable minors, were prevented from making treatment 
decisions due to the ignorance of doctors, and resources were needed to teach doctors health 
consent law to support autonomy of minors.119  
If I connect these findings to the claims established in this chapter that trans racialized youth 
are not accessing specialized clinics or most LGBTQ services, that clinicians do not deliver 
services through an anti-racist lens, and that many local doctors serving minor youth do not 
understand the health consent legal rights of youth, it appears that trans racialized youth face a 
maze of obstacles on top of their structural vulnerability to poverty and being underhoused. They 
must first find the clinic, access the clinic, have a doctor find them capable of decision making, 
                                                 
115 Catton, K., Graham, W., Koulack, E. & Child in the City Programme. Doctors’ understanding of and practices 
regarding the law of minors’ medical consent: a pilot study. (The Child in the City Programme and the Centre for 
Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 1979), and Urman, R., Dickens, B. & Harrison, C. Pediatric 
Health Care Physicians’ and Surgeons’ Views of Ontario’s Health Care Consent Legislation Comments. Health 
L.J. 4, 135–150 (1996). I discuss the 1996 study in Chapter 4 in relation to the enactment of the HCCA. 
116 Catton 1979 ibid at 22. 
117 Catton 1979 ibid at 23 and 63. 
118 Catton 1979 ibid at 63-64. 
119 Catton 1979 ibid at 52. 
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and then convince a health care practitioner, most likely a psychiatrist, that they are “trans 
enough” to get diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria. Furthermore, as I will explicate through my 
analysis of authoritative clinical texts in Chapter 4, youth must prove that they are stable enough 
financially, emotionally, psychologically and logistically to medically transition in order for 
OHIP to cover the costs of drugs, hormones and surgeries. This final section below lays out the 
background of the medical model of transness upon which the authoritative texts rely and against 
which this research project positions itself.  
The Medical Model of Transness 
 
This house was never built for us, but we have been expected to abide by its rules.  
                                                                                            (Chang, 2016, pp. 45-52) 
 
While 19th century tropical medicine explicitly used racial ontologies to study the plasticity of 
sex, in the 20th century clinical psychiatry took over as the site for sex/gender knowledge 
production. The research-based GIC became the locus and the medical model of transness was 
the result of this shift.  
Trans historians have diligently chronicled the pathologization of transsexuality and 
transgenderism along with the rise and fall of North American gender identity clinics (GICs), 
including Toronto’s CAMH. The Clarke Institute of Psychiatry, which later became CAMH, 
opened a youth GIC in 1968 as part of the Toronto Project to study transexualism for the first 
time in Canada.120 Four hospitals took part in the Toronto Project including the Hospital for Sick 
Children. Denny provided extensive documentation of the clinical selection for “true” 
                                                 
120 Unknown. Ontario Report: Toronto Group to Study Trans-sexualism. Canadian Medical Association Journal. 
1969 Dec 27;101. 
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transsexuals that was cissexist and deeply misogynist. Denny documents how the hopeful, if not 
desperate, people of the 1960s onwards in the U.S. seeking treatment, mistook the GICs as 
treatment centres, not clinical research centres, and secondly, that the GIC staff (made up of 
psychiatrists, psychologists, internists and endocrinologists) did not recognize the needs of their 
patients and certainly did not center services around those needs.121 Williams chronicles the rise 
and fall of “disco sexology” – named for the outdated scientifically dubious and transphobic 
knowledges – produced by cissexual mental health professionals whose prolific publications 
influenced judges and policymakers.122 While they constitute rich sources of the interactions 
between TSTG people and GIC researchers, until recently, accounts of clinical encounters were 
presented as completely white and uncomplicated by racism.123 
Trans academic Sandy Stone published “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual 
Manifesto”.124 Stone critiques the term "wrong body", a term, she argues, doctors rely on to 
define transsexuality as a disorder not a state of being.125 Stone remarks on the phallocentric and 
gender binary fixation of physicians including American endocrinologist Harry Benjamin. 
                                                 
121 Dallas Denny, “The-Politics-of-Diagnosis and the Diagnosis of Politics: How the university-affiliated gender 
clinics failed to meet the needs of transsexual people” (1991) 1:3 Chrysal Q 9 at 12. 
122 Williams, supra note 6; on the uncritical reliance of judges on medical diagnoses see Paula J. Caplan, Lisa 
Cosgrove. Bias in Psychiatric Diagnosis in Paula J. Caplan, Lisa Cosgrove, eds. (Lanham, Md: Jason Aronson); 
2004. xix-xxxiii at xxv. 
123 Kusha Dadui, “Queer and Trans Migration and Canadian Border Imperialism” in Marvelous Grounds Queer 
Colour Hist Tor (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2018) 107. 
124 Sandy Stone. The Empire Strikes back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto. In: Julia Epstein, Kristina Straub, editors. 
Body guards: the cultural politics of gender ambiguity [Internet]. London: Routledge; 1991 [cited 2017 Aug 9] p. 
280–304. The first formal critique of the medical model of transsexuality was published in the late 70s, authored not 
by a dissatisfied patient, but ironically as a diatribe by radical feminist Janice G Raymond, in the transsexual empire: 
the making of the she-male (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979). Raymond and other writers on the sociology of medicine 
insisted that transsexuals were duped consumers who did not exist outside of the medical and surgical construction 
of their bodies. Raymond further accused trans women of colonizing women’s bodies and then colonizing women’s 
spaces. 
125 Stone ibid at 13. 
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Notably, Stone mentions the whitewashing explicit and implicit in the creation of the category 
“transsexual” and its accompanying discourse. 
Suddenly the old morality tale of the truth of gender, told by a kindly white patriarch in New 
York in 1966, becomes pancultural in the 1980s. Emergent polyvocalities of lived experience, 
never represented in the discourse but present at least in potential, disappear; the berdache and 
the stripper, the tweedy housewife and the mujerado, the mah'u and the rock star, are still the 
same story after all, if we only try hard enough.126 
Also remarking on race-privileged access to GICs, Black trans activist Ms. Major remembers 
Benjamin as someone who “didn’t like coloured girls”.127 Non-normative trans people 
embodying non-Western white stories countered the limited clinical representations familiar to 
cis doctors and researchers but were likely to be rejected from GICs.128 However as some 
conclude, the outcomes of the clinics should not be totally dismissed. The work of the clinics 
resulted in a diagnosis for Gender Identity Disorder in the DSM-V, the protocols of the Harry 
Benjamin Standards of Care and a base of medical scientific knowledge (still not widely shared 
or taught in medical schools) about gender-affirming treatments that had not existed before.129  
The debate over the merits and drawbacks of listing “gender dysphoria” in the DSM-V as the 
official diagnosis for transness turns on the pragmatic needs of marginalized trans people to 
                                                 
126 Stone ibid at 10. 
127 Ophelian A. Diagnosing Difference [Internet]. Floating Ophelia Productions; 2011. Avail Ophelian A. 
Diagnosing Difference [Internet]. Floating Ophelia Productions; 2011. Available from: 
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128 Stone was inspired by the work of Donna Haraway. Haraway authored the widely quoted 1985 "Manifesto for 
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Identities and Experiences (2004). 
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access government subsidized services which require diagnoses versus the desire to not be 
labelled with mental illnesses.130 The intricacies of the debate are beyond the scope of this paper. 
As I explore in Chapter 4, if meeting the diagnostic criteria from the DSM-V and other official 
clinical standards is the only way to get publicly funded treatment, then those rules determine 
who is trans and by extension who can live in their felt gender and more likely access 
identification and housing – but they also limit how a person might see themselves as trans. 
Numerous scholars and empirical researchers have said: TSTG people were actually quite 
well informed about the criteria in the Harry Benjamin/WPATH Standards of Care (SoC) and the 
ways primary and gender-affirming health care was administered in Toronto.131 It is not 
surprising then that studies reveal that transsexuals without employment-related health insurance 
or independent wealth, or those who did not want to go through the painful rigours of the GIC, 
which rarely conferred surgical recommendation, made agentic choices to achieve body 
modification using income derived from sex work and/or D.I.Y. methods.132  
In conclusion, from the literature, it appears that trans racialized youth feel unassisted and 
even directly oppressed by medicine and law, two normative institutions of public life, that are 
supposed to provide structure, support and avenues of healing and redress to members of society. 
                                                 
130 Namaste 2000, supra note 75; Pooja S Gehi & Gabriel Arkles, “Unraveling Injustice: Race and Class Impact of 
Medicaid Exclusions of Transition-Related Health Care for Transgender People, 4 SEXUALITY RES. & Soc. 
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in the Perioperative Period” (2016) 27 J Health Care Poor Underserved 386; Government of Ontario, “Gender 
confirming surgery”, (7 March 2016), online: Ontario.ca <https://www.ontario.ca/page/gender-confirming-surgery>. 
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Transgressive Gend Identities 39; Jay Prosser, Second Skins: The Body Narratives of Transsexuality (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998); Namaste 2000, supra note 75; Spade 2003, supra note 52; Kai Cheng Thom, 
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whom were sex workers and a few of whom were racialized). Rotondi et al, supra note 83. 
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There are holes in the knowledge of health care providers, especially physicians about gender 
affirming care and the health consent rights of minors and youth. Youth themselves seem 
uninformed of their rights under the HCCA, despite the high stakes of not accessing care at a 
pivotal transition time, which begs for an examination of the promises and mechanisms of the 
HCCA. And finally, in order to understand the relationship of trans racialized youth to autonomy 
in health care I need to create a space to hear from youth themselves. 
Roadmap of Thesis 
 
This chapter has provided the Canadian context for my research. There are barriers to being 
able to undergo physical changes for trans youth (if desired). There are social, legal and financial 
barriers to being able to live in one's gender identity and therefore fully actualize one's self - 
socially in particular. There are barriers to obtaining material independence due to high levels of 
discrimination. These barriers are heightened for racialized and Indigenous trans youth. 
Against this backdrop, my research question then is how do trans racialized youth experience 
autonomous and or agentic decision making in health care. To answer my research question, I 
juxtaposed visual and interview data from focus groups against an examination of a selection of 
legal materials. In Chapter 2 I explain the theoretical constructs I used including: 
intersectionality and structural vulnerability; examination of a relational theory of autonomy as 
well as the role of doctors, other health care providers and families with respect to that 
autonomy. Chapter 3 explains my methodology. I share my selection of data sources, collection 
and analytical methods for four categories of legal norms. I am committed to a pluralist 
epistemology where voices of trans racialized youth are heard. This is because a focus solely on 
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jurisprudence or statutes as sources, paints a picture of the lives of white mostly straight, adult, 
educated professional trans people, and tells us nothing about the law’s effects on marginalized 
groups like trans racialized minors or youth who rarely litigate. In Chapter 4 I examine the 
attitudes of judges and decision makers towards autonomy in health care for trans minors and 
youth through their interpretation of common law and the HCCA. I also analyse authoritative 
diagnostic and clinical texts that determine who gets to be trans and assign the gatekeeping role 
for trans care to mental health professionals instead of primary care providers. In Chapter 5 I 
share the findings from my qualitative research with trans racialized youth between the ages of 
18-25 years. Trans racialized youth have their own responses and strategies for navigating health 
care in Ontario, some of which could be protective reactions and some that could enable 
autonomous supported decision making. Chapter 6 contains my conclusions and policy 
recommendations for future change. 
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Chapter 2: Theory Frameworks and Analytical Tools 
 
In this research project I rely upon theories that grapple with identity formation, visual 
expression and social locations that are relative, temporal and contextual. This chapter also 
investigates the concepts of selfhood, autonomy and agency that are central to my project, as 
they have been developed by selective writers in the fields of philosophy, feminist legal theory, 
social theory, anthropology and applied ethics. First, I begin with a brief discussion of 
intersectionality theory as an approach to coalesce trans racialized youth’s multiple identities, 
experiences and responses to health care inequities. I then connect intersectionality to the related 
theory of structural vulnerability as a way to understand how institutions and systems relegate 
trans racialized youth to subordinate positions. In the second section, I lay out the conceptual 
groundwork for my argument about how to understand the decision-making experiences of trans 
racialized youth by contrasting the ideas of autonomy and agency. I specifically focus on a 
relational theory of autonomy. I consider how scholarship on relational autonomy accounts for 
selfhood, collective identity, race/ethnicity and gender that are situated in sociopolitical 
dynamics and also embodied. In the third section, I lay out Muñoz’s disidentification, a theory 
for the artistic practices, products and interpretations by marginalized queers in response to lack 
of cultural representation or misrepresentation.133 Disidentification will be used to analyze the 
photographic essays created by trans racialized youth in Chapter 5. Lastly, in the fourth section I 
describe Transgender Theory, developed by Nagoshi and Brzuzy in 2010.134 This theory builds 
                                                 
133 Jose Esteban Muñoz, Disidentifications: Queers of Colour and the Performance of Politics, Cultural Studies of 
the Americas (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 
134 Julie L Nagoshi & Stephann/ie Brzuzy, “Transgender Theory: Embodying Research and Practice” (2010) 25:4 
Affia 431. 
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on and challenges feminist and queer theories of gender, integrating as key features: 
embodiment, socially-constructed gender, essentialism, and intersectional political solidarity. I 
use this gender theory to guide my qualitative research methods as required by Singh in her 
checklist for researchers which I explain in detail in Chapter 3. 
Intersectionality 
 
Patricia Collins, articulated the concept of  intersectionality to mean “particular forms of 
intersecting oppressions, for example, intersections of race and gender, or of sexuality and 
nation”.135 An intersectional framework can result in a more accurate analysis of how social 
factors determine health136 because it accounts for simultaneous as well as interacting 
experiences of oppression.137 Using an intersectional approach means that experiences linked to 
social identities can be understood as more than simply cumulative experiences.138 While an 
“add-on” view of multiple oppressions assumes that people with multiple marginalized group 
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 34 
identities experience oppression as a sum of the distinct discriminatory experiences, 
intersectionality theory instead says that they experience oppression uniquely.139 
Intersectionality as a hermeneutic has implications for methodology. As a theoretical 
framework it can lift methodology out of the pitfalls of victimhood and oversimplified identity 
politics.140 For example, rather than only comparing experiences of oppression or discrimination, 
intersectionality requires the consideration of privilege and fortunate circumstances.141 
Furthermore, intersectionality recognizes the qualitative differences between identities.142 To 
illustrate, a person can become disabled by an accident or by aging, similarly a person’s class 
might change through professional mobility, whereas their race and ethnicity will not change. 
Intersectional research design then must attend to the fact that participants may not be able to tell 
which of their characteristics is driving discrimination.143 Results of a national U.S. survey on 
transphobia showed that white trans people experienced higher rates of transphobia than black 
trans people in some healthcare contexts.144 The Trans Legal Needs survey is a local example of 
this phenomenon, where trans participants of colour expressed difficulty in separating out racism 
and transphobia when answering questions about experiences of transphobic discrimination.145 
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Although it is not practical or possible to consider an exhaustive list of intersecting identities, if 
research questions are designed and disseminated inclusively enough, all identity dimensions can 
be accessed, acknowledged and analyzed throughout the project.146 
Lastly, intersectionality is aware of the nuanced and shifting multiple identities of people, 
which is critical for working with trans racialized youth who might transition more than once and 
in more than one context (medical, social, legal).147 In conclusion, the theory of intersectionality 
captures how all of the dimensions of one’s identity shape one’s understanding and experience of 
a situation and affect the nature of the decisions and actions that follow. The conditions for 
autonomous behaviour are deeply connected to our multi-dimensional identities. We will see 
next how institutional, interpersonal and discursive structures produce vulnerability for trans 
racialized youth that affect their practice of autonomy. 
Structural Vulnerability  
 
Structural vulnerability is a concept derived from Galtung’s theory of “structural violence”.148 
It describes a subordinated position in a hierarchical society caused by being a member of more 
than one oppressed group, where multiple networks of power permeate social, personal, 
environmental, and legal realms causing stress and shortening one’s lifespan.149 According to 
medical anthropologists Quesada et al., cultural and social sources of stress  include “(1) social 
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hierarchies scaffolded by categories bestowing entitlement; (2) historically distinctive discourses 
of normativity and ethics; and (3) the intersection of individual medical pathology and biography 
with social exclusion.150 I will relate each of Quesada’s points to the structural vulnerability of 
trans racialized youth. Firstly, categories like gender/sex, and race exist in law and medicine and 
buttress sociopolitical hierarchies of capitalism, ableism and patriarchy by determining access to 
housing, education, and health care. Secondly, professional norms for dealing with trans 
racialized youth build on epistemologies of transsexuality and transness established discursively 
over centuries through medicine and law. Thirdly, Quesada et al. also include as structural 
vulnerabilities, the way a person’s individual appearance, affect, voice, medical conditions and 
cognitive abilities are “read”, i.e. by professionals within institutions and public spaces.151 This 
iterative and socially constructed element of an identity is extremely relevant for trans racialized 
youth as they move through the world, being assessed by cisgender health care providers who 
ultimately decide whether they can access the treatments they want. How the act of “reading”152 
or ascribing race/ethnicity and gender categories to others can contribute to social exclusion and 
divided selfhood, is explored in greater detail in the following section on relational selfhood. 
Incorporating intersectionality theory, Quesada et al. explain that “Experiences of 
vulnerability, however, are only partially shared across populations because they are shaped 
unevenly by specific status attributes (i.e., gender, age, ethnicity, etc.), conditions (i.e., legal 
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University Press, 2000); and Michel Foucault “The ethics of the concern for self as a practice of freedom”, in Michel 
Foucault, Paul Rabinow & Robert Hurley, Ethics: subjectivity and truth, Dits et écrits English Selections; v 1 (New 
York: New Press, 1997); João Guilherme Biehl, Vita: life in a zone of social abandonment (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005). 
151 Quesada et al, supra note 150 at 351. 
152 Serano describes the practice of “reading” or “gendering” and its impact on her sense of self in Serano, supra 
note 140 at 164. 
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status, economic and living conditions, etc.), and individual serendipity.”153 For example, some 
Black or Indigenous people may have grown up in foster care, and experienced different types of 
violence or racism than counterparts who grew up with their families of origin. On the other 
hand, someone who develops secondary sex characteristics that are closer to the gender 
presentation they desire will have less trouble being “read” by others as the gender they feel. A 
critical part of the intersectional approach is recognizing the heterogeneity of individual 
biographies of social exclusion and vulnerability within identity groups.  
Oppression is often internalized by multiply and historically oppressed people over 
generations.154 For example, they may understand themselves, or in other words, form their 
subjectivity, in relation to oppressive discourses that valorize productivity, heterosexuality, 
ability and whiteness. Their own narratives may reflect a sense of deficit or failure. And as a 
result, structurally vulnerable people often behave as though they deserve the ill health they 
experience especially where the discourse of neoliberalism has told members of society that they 
are responsible for all of their outcomes and that poverty or ill health is a result of their own 
deficiencies as entrepreneurs.155 Structural vulnerability then, situates the pressures felt by 
people addressing health and health care that may influence their choices. Understanding their 
health care decision making process requires us to deconstruct the notions of choice and 
voluntariness that are central to the now legislated practice of informed consent. To do this, in 
the next section I will first unpack the concept of “autonomy” or self-governance through the 
                                                 
153 Quesada supra note 150 at 346. 
154 Ibid at 352. 
155 Jennifer M Denbow, Governed through Choice: Autonomy, Technology, and the Politics of Reproduction (New 
York: NYU Press, 2015) at 104–105; Peter Miller & Nikolas S Rose, Governing the present: administering 
economic, social and personal life (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2008) at 92. 
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lens of relational theory. I will then apply it to the health care context where autonomy is 
presented by Ontario’s legislators and health care professionals as an animating principle.  
 Accounting for Autonomy   
 
The principle of autonomy continues to infuse the field of bioethics currently affirmed by 
Canadian statutes, jurisprudence and scholarship. Still, traditional theories of personal and 
political autonomy have been widely criticized by feminists resulting in the reshaping of 
autonomy by some who wish to retain it as a value.156 I map the development of a relational 
theory of autonomy arising from specific conceptions of the self, the collective and augment 
academic feminist relational theory with grounded theory by women of colour scholar activists 
from reproductive justice movements. This discussion includes a consideration of the 
relationship between reproductive autonomy and broader notions of autonomy for health care 
decision making, as well as Black women’s and women of colour’s critiques of reproductive 
autonomy in favour of reproductive justice. I use the reproductive justice movement as an 
example to demonstrate that in order to achieve autonomy producing conditions for structurally 
vulnerable people, we have to place equity and justice at the centre of autonomy struggles. In this 
way I consider autonomy as a practice that is socially and politically enabled, not a final 
destination for those with privilege.  
                                                 
156 Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities” (1989) 1:1 Yale J Law Fem 7 
at 8 [Nedelsky 1998]; it is worth noting that Roberts does not totally discard libertarian autonomy because she sees it 
as beneficial for Black women and women of colour in two ways: it emphasizes self-definition and it can offer 
protection from state incursions on bodily integrity. Both could be useful strategic avenues. Dorothy E Roberts, 
Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the meaning of Liberty, 1st ed. ed, Black women writers (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1997) at 297; Susan Sherwin, The politics of women’s health: exploring agency and 
autonomy (1998) at 32 [Sherwin 1998]. 
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 Traditional versions of autonomy are synonymous with either self-governance or liberty.157 
Roberts ascribes the subsequent North American libertarian reorientation of autonomy to 
Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy.158 For Kant, rational independent agents still only follow 
laws they have created themselves or that they judge to be acceptable, but preventing state 
intervention is the central theme.159 Liberty as a value and a practice did not guarantee equality 
for racialized and enslaved peoples. In this framework, rights act as negative liberty, in other 
words, freedom from undue democratic state limitations on their actions or property. The 
essential feature of personhood, in Kantian reasoning, was to be a rational, independent 
individual. In fact, if libertarian autonomy was elevated as an ideal, it served to valorize the 
choices of the most privileged who were white men with private property who constituted the 
government.160 
 I will be examining a different conceptualization of autonomy derived from relational theory. 
The liberal atomistic person, in theory, derives their sense of self purely from their individual 
experiences and interests and ignorant to benefits or liabilities caused by their membership in 
                                                 
157 Autonomy has its Western origin in the works of Jean Jacques Rousseau who used autonomy as the glue for the 
self-governing social contract made between man and society in which man sacrificed some of his individual liberty 
to become a member of a nation. Rousseau attempted to move from the goal of liberty as “freedom from 
interference” to political cohesion through the social concept of autonomy. Rousseau’s autonomy involved 
submitting to laws of one’s own creation in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The social contract, Great ideas (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2006); Frederick Neuhoser, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Origins of Autonomy” (2011) 54:5 
Interdiscip J Philos 478. 
158 Roberts cites Kant as foundational in the American Constitution, ensuring that white men of property could build 
a nation with minimal state intrusion on their ability to act since they themselves devised Constitutional law in 
Roberts, supra note 157 at 295. 
159 Immanuel Kant laid out this philosophy in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Kant was influenced 
by Jean Jacques Rousseau who focused less on morals and more on political formations, less on liberty as freedom 
and more on social autonomy. Immanuel Kant, The moral law: groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, translated 
by H. J. Paton (London: Routledge, 1997). 
160 Roberts, supra note 157 at 297. 
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social groups.161 The starting point for relational theory, on the other hand, is that humans are 
constituted by their relationships. This includes relationships to oneself, and to family, friends, 
society, institutions and nation. Relationships may foster or undermine autonomy. Because of its 
implications for rights and justice, I use relational theory as a lens through which to argue that 
gaps in the Health Care Consent Act and related policies block the formation and growth of 
relationships of autonomy for trans racialized youth. Nedelsky, who theorized a relational 
version of autonomy and later popularized the concept of rights as relationships, considers what 
positive rights would mean for autonomy.162 Positive rights require governments and private 
actors to do more than protect people from one another.163 For example if positive rights included 
the right to housing or the right to live in one’s felt gender, governments would need to support 
conditions that actualized those rights. This would require nourishing relations conducive to 
practices of autonomy. To determine what those conditions are, let’s look at what Nedelsky 
considers the ingredients for autonomy: self-determination, peace, security from oppression and 
power, confidence, dignity, efficacy, and respect.164 It is easy to see how structurally vulnerable 
people would struggle to practice autonomy given that they experience daily attacks on their 
peace, security and confidence to say the least. The next section will focus on the formation of 
selfhood as a critical ingredient of autonomy.  
 
The Relational Self 
                                                 
161 Stephanie J Kapusta, “Trans Authenticity and the ‘Feminist Legacy’ of Relationality” in Robert Scott Stewart, 
ed, Talk Sex Multidiscip Discuss (Sydney, NS: Cape Breton University Press, 2013) 146; Nedelsky 1989, supra 
note 157 at 8. 
162 Nedelsky 1989, supra note 157. 
163 Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving rights as relationship” (1993) 1:1 Rev Const Stud 1 at 14 [Nedelsky 1933]. 
164 Nedelsky 1989, supra note 157 at 11. 
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To govern oneself, one must be in a position to act competently in congruence with values, 
desires, goals and interests that are one’s own.165 Therefore an awareness of one’s self is crucial 
to the exercise of autonomy.166 A relational view of autonomy sees a person define their selfhood 
partly through the relationships they have with family members, professionals, institutions, 
cultural and political collectives and even non-human beings and also through their own internal 
essence.167 Relationships that foster autonomy require equity, information exchange and personal 
growth. And yet, many of our relationships are embedded in the systems of oppression that make 
us structurally vulnerable. Therefore, relationships can also impede autonomy.    
Selfhood also means being in touch with other building blocks of the self, such as by 
developing an awareness of one’s cultural history, and group cultural practices. These augment 
and sometimes conflict with one’s own individual values, needs, interests and goals.168 Yet 
another way that the self is constituted is through social interactions where central traits such as 
gender and race which, as Oshana argues, are mostly socially ascribed to us by others.169 Simply 
put, we are “read” by other people and this is how we are racialized or gendered. Oshana 
describes being alienated from a Blackness that is ascribed to her by others, and connects the 
experience to her biracial self-conception and her professional identity as an academic.170 
                                                 
165 Joel Anderson & John Christman, “Introduction” in John Christman & Joel Anderson, eds, Autonomy and the 
Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 1 at 3. 
166 Diana T Meyers, Self, society, and personal choice (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1989) [Meyers 
1989]; Sherwin 1998, supra note 157 at 35; In this later work, Meyers offers a five dimensional account of selfhood 
with elements of unitary, relational, social, divided and embodied selves, see Diana Tietjens Meyers, 
“Decentralizing Autonomy: Five Faces of Selfhood” in Christman and Anderson, supra note 166, 27 [Meyers 2005]. 
167 Nedelsky 1989, supra note 157 at 9. 
168 Andrew Sneddon, Autonomy (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, 2013) at 51–53; Diana Tietjens Meyers, 
supra note 167 at 29–31. 
169 Marina Oshana, “Autonomy and Self-Identity” in Christman and Anderson, supra note 166, 77 at 79; on how 
gender is read by cissexuals see Serano, supra note 140 at 164–165. 
170 Ibid at 92. 
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Primarily, she argues that anti-Black racism has limited her autonomy.171 And Serano speaks of 
her interrupted experiences of gender coherence and never taking her feminine gender for 
granted as a result of dysphoria and transphobia.172 With intersectional identities in mind, 
selfhood then, according to Oshana and Serano can be experienced as fragmented over race and 
gender respectively with impacts on autonomy. How trans racialized youth manage fragmented 
or cohesive selfhood in the context of health care is central to my analysis in Chapter 5. 
While Shotwell and Sangrey agree that the self is neither purely socially constructed nor 
emerging from a purely internal source, they go further.173 They theorize that while one’s self is 
impacted by other people’s ascriptions, similarly other people’s selfhoods are impacted by our 
expressions of ourselves.174 In other words, blackness shapes whiteness, and transness shapes 
cisgenderness. Selfhood can also then be understood as fluid and a process of self-awareness, 
rather than as a static state.175 Indeed the iterative dynamic between one’s self-conception (how 
one sees oneself) and how one is “read” or “labelled” is significant for the analysis of autonomy 
practices for structurally vulnerable trans racialized youth that I undertake in Chapter 5.  
The Relationship between Oppression and Autonomy in Health Care 
 
                                                 
171 Ibid. 
172 Serano, supra note 140 at 181. 
173 Alexis Shotwell & Trevor Sangrey, “Resisting Definition: Gendering through Interaction and Relational 
Selfhood” (2009) 24:3 Hypatia 56; for an author who views gender identity as internal and mostly pre-social and 
authenticity as necessary for autonomy see Lauren Bialystock, “Authenticity and Trans Identity” in Robert Scott 
Stewart, ed, Talk Sex Multidiscip Discuss (Sydney, NS: Cape Breton University Press, 2013) 122; and also Serano, 
supra note 140 at 6 who disagrees with Butler’s theory of gender as purely socially constructed. 
174 Baylis, Françoise, “The Self in Situ: A Relational Account of Personal Identity” in Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer J 
Llewellyn, eds, Relational Reflect Relational Theory Health Law, 1 edition ed (UBC Press, 2012). 
175 Other autonomy theorists who agree with this position are Sherwin 1998, supra note 157 at 35; and even liberal 
autonomy theorists, Joel Anderson & John Christman, supra note 166 at 7. 
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Relational autonomy requires certain conditions to flourish: freedom from coercion, distance 
from social expectations, and knowledge of self. How then does oppression176 impact one’s 
sense of self, the selfhood that is so central to the exercise of autonomy? Choices and actions do 
not exist in vacuums where judgments can be made through a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’.177 
This is because, as Serano and Nedelsky argue, people are situated in complex lived and 
embodied contexts.178 Without the conditions that enable one to pull away from normative roles 
and actions, it is challenging to make decisions that reflect one’s needs, wishes and desires.179 As 
I described earlier in this chapter, structural vulnerability leads to an erosion of confidence in self 
or self-trust which further undermines one's own autonomy.180 Sherwin insists that, “In both 
health care and ethics the details of oppression must be prominently addressed.”181 This 
statement is apt considering uneven power dynamics exist between health care providers and 
patients, manifested through bureaucratic policies, specialized education, language, income, 
social location and confidence.182 The earlier discussion of structural vulnerability illustrated 
                                                 
176 I am considering “oppression” to be systemic, multidirectional and intergenerational as opposed to 
“discrimination” that I would characterize as individual, discrete and legally defined, as argued by both Iris Marion 
Young, Justice and the politics of difference (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990) at 42–48; and Wendy 
Brown & Janet E Halley, “Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights” in Wendy Brown & Janet E Halley, eds, Left 
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177 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (New York: Harvard University Press, 1974) at 11. Rawls argues that if rational 
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principles about basic liberties that guarantee those liberties when they subsequently realize their real location in a 
hierarchical society. 
178 Serano supra note 140 at 224-27; See also Jennifer Nedelsky, “Embodied Diversity and the Challenges to Law” 
(1996) 42 McGill L J 91 at 103. 
179 Oshana, supra note 171. 
180 Susan Sherwin, and Carolyn McLeod, “Relational Autonomy, Self-Trust and Health Care for Patients who are 
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Jennifer J Llewellyn, eds, Relational Reflect Relational Theory Health Law, 1 edition ed (UBC Press, 2012) 13 at 
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182 Dorothy Roberts, “Reconstructing the Patient: Starting with Women of Colour” in Susan M Wolf, ed, Fem 
Bioeth Reprod (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) 116 at 136 [Roberts 1996]. 
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how oppression determines one’s experience of health, through access to services, information 
and treatment options.183 Multiply marginalized people often make choices that seem best given 
the circumstances but in the long-run only seem to comply with oppressive policies or leave 
oppressive systems in place.184  
To explain why structurally vulnerable people make contradictory choices against their own 
long-term interests or personal values, feminist theory has provided a helpful distinction between 
agency and autonomy.185 At a basic level, autonomy has been described as making choices that 
reflect your values and personal and collective interests.186 Whereas to exercise agency one need 
only receive adequate information, exercise reasonable choice without direct pressure. This lines 
up with bioethics requirements for informed consent, a discourse that equates agency (voluntary 
choice) with autonomy (self-governance).187 In terms of agency, structural vulnerability factors 
create parameters for the choices people are aware of, feel they deserve and ultimately make, 
even as those choices are often judged by health care practitioners, social workers and academic 
feminists to be faulty.188 Relational autonomy as I have explained it goes far beyond the 
voluntary choice to consent or refuse treatment suggested by one’s doctor. Therefore, as I explain 
                                                 
183 Commission on Social Determinants of Health, supra note 138 at 1. 
184 Sherwin and McLeod, supra note 181 at 268. 
185 Sherwin, supra note 158 at 17. 
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in more detail in Chapter 4, several feminist theorists argue that accepted bioethics procedures 
and policies of informed consent actually describe agency not autonomy.189  
From Autonomy to Justice 
 
Autonomy has been one of the most influential concepts for feminist legal theorists and 
feminist philosophers because of its implications for holistic health, personal wellness and 
collective struggles for equity.190 In autonomy scholarship, we see the tension between the 
individual and the collective.191 Social and political collectives can function as both nourishing 
and threatening to one’s autonomy.192 If there is minimal autonomy where there are unjust social 
conditions,193 Robert’s argument that autonomy must be achieved through justice, requiring 
collective efforts to win rights protection or compel government action seems apt. Indeed, 
Indigenous, Black and women of colour activists have written, agitated and organized 
extensively in order to create the conditions for their own autonomy notably in the area of 
reproduction.194 As Roberts emphasized, “the ‘choice’ rhetoric of the movement is problematic 
because it is based on a set of assumptions that applies only to a small group of women who are 
                                                 
189 Roberts 1996, supra note 183; Susan Sherwin, supra note 158 at 12; Linda Barclay, “Autonomy and the Social 
Self” in Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 181, 52 at 54. 
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privileged enough to have multiple choices.”195 The intersectional nature of BIPOC women’s 
struggles for reproductive autonomy compelled the creation of an alternative theory and 
movement that could simultaneously account for the differences made by racism, classism, 
homophobia, and ableism.  
Similarly, the constitutive and iterative relation between the self and others with respect to 
gender, has been used by some legal feminists to support the need for gender affirming surgeries 
for trans people who desire body modification for internal and external gender congruence.196 
Shotwell and Sangrey dispute the idea that trans people are the only ones who have a gender 
identity, and argue that both cis and trans people interact with each other’s gendered self-
formation.197 Shotwell and Sangrey stress the point that the current research focus on the gender 
identities of trans people flatten trans people’s experiences into a single dimension. Furthermore, 
the mainstream trans movement’s single-issue quest for individual rights to gender identity and 
gender expression rely on the libertarian atomistic view of autonomy.198 This individualism is 
not the fault of individual trans people. Indeed, structurally vulnerable transsexuals are forced to 
engage with medicine and its coercive pathology to achieve gender affirmation. Furthermore, as 
we saw in the previous chapter, legal avenues for trans people to obtain identity documents, 
marital benefits, parental rights and so on all force them to squeeze into individualistic rights-
based frameworks. However, I argue a relational theory of self, embedded in a relational 
                                                 
195 Black women reproductive health scholar-activists, for example, coined the term “reproductive justice” in the 
early 1990s to call attention to and better address the ways Black women’s struggles for reproductive autonomy and 
freedom needed more than access to abortion and birth control.  
196 Dianne Pothier, “Relational Theory and Resource Allocation in Health Care: Accounting for Difference” in 
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understanding of autonomy would instead lead to a relational theory of rights. According to 
Nedelsky, rights recognize and define relationships that foster certain values beyond democracy 
and beyond autonomy. In Chapter 4 we return to rights as relationships as a useful concept for 
health care autonomy for trans racialized youth.  
There are ways to resist the impact of oppression on one’s health, and to minimize its 
influence. Indeed, several feminists have framed autonomy as a set of skills to be practiced in 
enabling circumstances and within supportive relationships.199 BIPOC trans health activists have 
benefitted from the lessons shared by BIPOC feminist activists in the arena of reproductive 
justice. The critical parallel lesson is that autonomy will not flourish without equitable living 
conditions, and those conditions are partly achieved through collective struggle for justice. Now 
returning to the question of how queer and trans people of colour navigate between autonomy 
and agency through self-awareness practices and performance that critique culture, I will look at 
the theory of disidentification. 
Disidentification Theory 
 
I use disidentification theory as a tool to analyse the meaning of the photographic essays 
produced by youth in my focus groups. I needed an appropriate analytical tool for visual data 
sources created by multiply marginalized youth whose autonomy is situated in a structurally 
vulnerable position vis à vis society. As Lowe says, “Aesthetic representation is always…a 
                                                 
199 Meyers 1989, supra note 167 at 76, 250–251; Shauna Van Praagh, “Adolescence, autonomy and Harry Potter: 
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debate about political representation.”200 In Disidentification, performance studies scholar José 
Esteban Muñoz presented: a strategy, a hermeneutic and a cultural product acted out by queer 
people of colour in public.201 Identification is a way of relating to one’s social and political 
environments.202 To disidentify is not just to simply counter identify which is to see oneself as 
the opposite or to totally reject available identity labels. To disidentify is to manipulate and 
evoke themes without announcing oneself or one’s representation in the dominant culture’s 
images and narratives.203 One example is flagging, whereby one dons a suit but has an undercut 
hairstyle to mark one’s queerness. Muñoz defines disidentification as “descriptive of the survival 
strategies the minority subject practices in order to negotiate a phobic majoritarian public sphere 
that continuously elides or punishes the existence of subjects who do not conform to the 
phantasm of normative citizenship.”204 Muñoz argues that queer people of colour are 
marginalized and culturally invisible. This experience of invisibility and/or negative 
representation increases the importance and the burden of visual representation.205 Margo 
Machida says this about the importance of visual art by immigrant people of colour in the West, 
“The symbolic assertion of presence through strategic acts of visual representations...provide a 
previously neglected people with a powerful claim to place in a society where their images are 
not the norm.”206 Therefore as performers, trans racialized youth disidentify in order to 
                                                 
200 Lisa Lowe, Immigrant acts: on Asian American cultural politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996) at 4; see 
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“[scramble] and [reconstruct] the encoded message of a cultural text in a fashion that both 
exposes the encoded message’s universalizing and exclusionary machinations and recircuits its 
workings to account for, include, and empower minority identities and identifications.”207 
In addition to being a hermeneutic strategy, Muñoz also describes disidentification as a 
process of cultural production.208 He sees disidentifying cultural production occurring between 
the reception of dominant cultural codes and the opposition to them.209 Muñoz is careful to 
acknowledge that as a counter-hegemonic strategy, disidentification is imperfect because of its 
indirectness and ambivalence towards oppressive and dominant structures.210 Part of why 
disidentification is so accurate as a theory however, is because it can hold the tension between 
being inextricably part of late-stage capitalist society and resisting being defined by those who 
hold power in our society.211 Judith Butler described agency as making voluntary decisions based 
on circumstances even where they are embedded in subordination. Butler writes, “Where 
conditions of subordination make possible the assumption of power, the power assumed remains 
tied to those conditions but in an ambivalent way.” 212 
Trans racialized youth can be and may have to be ambivalent about using pathologizing 
diagnostic terms in institutional settings. They may have to be ambivalent about norms to take up 
or discard in order to obtain gender and life supportive services. There are downsides to this. 
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Once you identify with something you lose other possibilities in an attempt for stability. This is 
what Butler calls the “cost of identification”.213 Butler in her theorizing of drag queen culture 
also suggests that drag queens engage with unstable axes of power214 in terms of gender and 
sexuality. Butler observes that drag queens perform tropes of femininity and oppression to mean 
something different from white straight able-bodied cis femininity – something that might be 
subversive. I would also add that drag interprets race, class and many other identities. For 
example, the Toronto queer drag performer Patrick Salvani uses the horror genre to create anti-
racist revenge performances out of the histories and experiences of Filipinx people in the 
caregiver role who flip the script on their sponsors in kitchen and cooking based scenarios about 
servitude gone amok.215 This notion of ambivalence – which I use to describe the act of adopting 
or amplifying stereotypes in an attempt to challenge dominant ideologies about race, gender and 
sexuality from within dominant culture – is a core element of disidentification. Disidentification 
is necessary for survival and it offers critiques, just not in predictable forms.216  
The significance I take from Muñoz’s theory in application to my participants’ works is their 
potential to re-make “real” worlds using their own values and references. The practice of 
worldmaking establishes critiques and even suggests futures for “minoritarian” youth. As Muñoz 
puts it, “Worldmaking produces creative perspectives by slicing into the facade of the ‘real’ that 
is the majoritarian public sphere.”217 The components of the majority public sphere become the 
                                                 
213 Judith Butler, Bodies that matter: on the discursive limits of “sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993). Judith Butler 
1993 at 126 [Butler 1993]. 
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215 Patrick Salvani, “Dragging Filipinx: A Series of Performative Vignettes”, in Robert Diaz, Marissa Largo and 
Fritz Pinto eds, Diasporic Intimacies: Queer Filipino and Canadian Imaginaries (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press, 2018) 198. 
216 Muñoz supra note 134 at 166-167. 
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source materials for queer world reconstruction. So, while the state through its actors must 
perform state power, marginalized or minoritarian artists build power through performance. 
Muñoz emphasizes the doing as the important part of the disidentification method, not so much 
the being or knowing.218 One example of doing disidentification is the youth of colour drag 
performance culture in Toronto centered around the annual Asian Arts Freedom School Drag 
Musical. The Drag Musical uses drag as a vehicle for intersectional critique by queer and trans 
racialized youth of mainstream gay normativity through comedy and musicality.219 The Drag 
Musical performers take on very familiar pop culture themes like “Christmas Holidays”, 
“Requiem for a Dream” and “Eat Pray Love” and turn them into comedic and nuanced 
commentary on modern life.220 
Another way of attacking the “real” comes through Muñoz’s concept of “tactical 
misrecognition”.221 Misrecognition entails, strategically, and often humorously, taking a position 
as one's own and that one is not seen to own.222 This concept is related to the key disidentifying 
act of connoting identity rather than demonstrating it through recognizable symbols. Those who 
disidentify eschew familiar and acceptable forms of racial, ethnic, and gender representation. 
They also avoid the familiar economy of resistance through positive or sanctioned multicultural 
representations of their race or gender.223 They negotiate something else. Here is where 
intersectionality is so key for queer people of colour and for trans people of colour as well: since 
they exist in multiple identity positions, they focus on related differences within identities not 
                                                 
218 Ibid at 200. 
219 Email correspondence with Drag Musical Director Patrick Salvani March 4th, 2018. 
220 http://marvellousgrounds.com/blog/the-drag-musical/ 
221 Muñoz, supra note 134 at 165, 167–169. 
222 On feminist use of misrecognition see Butler 1993 supra note 214 at 219. 
223 Muñoz, supra note 134 at 165 and 167-169. 
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just difference between identities. To return to tactical misrecognition, you might refuse to see 
yourself in something coded as emblematic of your identity box, or you might insist on reading 
yourself into materials not meant for your subject position. The works of the Femme Fatales 
Burlesque Company offer several local examples of disidentification and tactical misrecognition. 
The Company produces several themed shows each year featuring primarily racialized and Black 
performers of a variety of body types, abilities, sexual orientations and genders.224 In a trilogy 
titled Triple Goddess, “Virgin, Mother, Crone” performers complicated and disrupted these 
universal female life stages. Furthermore, the poster cover girl for the Virgin show featured a 
dark-skinned Black woman with floral attire and an innocent look. This is a role that dark Black 
women are not typically allowed to perform. The cover girl was neither sexualized, lightened nor 
mainstreamed. For the Crone section of the trilogy, Femme Fatales performer Betsy Spoon, 
appears completely naked with rolling carry-on suitcase filled with Dollar Store plastic bags lip-
synching to the song Bag Lady, as she returned to herself by giving away her baggage. A third 
example appears in the poster for the Church-themed show where the concept of worship was 
twisted by cover girl Axl Blows pictured as a stripper against a stripper pole as an icon of 
holiness. Overall, I apply disidentification theory to trans racialized youth participants’ 
expressions to understand how they foster autonomy skills and deploy agency in the context of 
their health. Next, we look at how intersectional identities, individual lived experience, collective 
resistance and embodied gender all intertwine in transgender theory, the theoretical gender 
foundation for this thesis. 
                                                 
224 Phone Conversation with Dainty Smith of Femme Fatales, March 9th, 2018. 
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Transgender Theory  
 
Over three decades of academic and non-academic theorizing about the nature of gender, 
sexuality, sexual orientation and race have resulted in much polarizing debate.225 Despite the 
difficulty of committing to a position, for a research project about trans racialized youth, I 
needed a gender theory nuanced and robust enough to hold life experiences, embodiment, 
intersectional identities and collective political associations. Furthermore, my methodology 
explained in detail in Chapter 3, required that I integrate a theory of gender into my qualitative 
methods. Ultimately, I chose transgender theory, developed by social work graduate students, to 
use as a pluralist container for my research. To set the context for transgender theory, I briefly 
summarize previous debates on the nature of gender from feminist and queer theory. 
Through the 1970s and 1980s Western essentialist theories of gender locked our gender 
identities and expressions onto our biological selves.226 Genital anatomy at birth defined one’s 
sex with gender following from the natal sexed body.227 Only two oppositely sexed bodies were 
accepted as normal.228 For some time science affirmed this view calling it “sexual 
                                                 
225 Emi Koyama, “Whose Feminism is it Anyway? The Unspoken Racism of the Trans Inclusion Debate” in Susan 
Stryker & Stephen Whittle, eds, Mutilating Gender (New York: Routledge, 2006) at 704; Pyne 2016, supra note 47; 
Talia Mae Bettcher, “Trapped in the Wrong Theory: Rethinking Trans Oppression and Resistance” (2014) 39:2 
Signs 383. 
226 Mary Daly, Gyn/ecology: the metaethics of radical feminism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978); Janice G Raymond, 
The transsexual empire: the making of the she-male (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979); Julia Kristeva, The Kristeva 
reader, Toril Moi, ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Germaine Greer, The whole woman (New York, NY: 
Doubleday, 1999); For critiques of gender essentialism see Bernice Louise Hausman, Changing sex: transsexualism, 
technology, and the idea of gender (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1995). 
227 J. Green, 2004 Becoming a Visible Man. In Chapter 4 I connect this belief to the legal category of gender/sex 
using Sharpe’s term “the (bio)logic” in Sharpe 2002 supra note 51. 
228 Harold Garfinkel, Studies in ethnomethodology. -- (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1967). 
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dimorphism”.229 This meant that if a baby was born intersexed then its body was surgically 
“converted” to anatomically match one of the binary sexes. Some feminists agreed with this 
binary biology because it allowed them to claim that cissexual women possessed unique powers 
and qualities.230 Masculinity was associated with the autonomy-enhancing behaviors of men and 
femininity was either romanticized or denigrated. Through the 90s feminist and queer theorists 
challenged the essentialism231 of sex determining gender, and gender as a a stable ideology and 
an epistemology232 that predicted everything about one’s life.233 Instead of being “natural”, 
gender could be theorized as socially constructed. If gender was socially constructed and a 
product of hegemonic discourses, then it could be deconstructed and disembodied. In academic 
feminist critiques of biological essentialism, heterosexuality and reproductive roles were 
challenged, yet the universal category of “woman” was tacitly understood to be cisgendered, 
able-bodied and white and often middle class. Anti-racist women of colour feminists and lesbian 
feminists critiqued this universalized “woman”.234 Another strand of feminism also deployed 
biological determinism to reject gender identity and in effect reject or block transsexual women 
                                                 
229 Science has now debunked the theory of sexual dimorphism although surgeries to “fix” intersex babies still occur 
see see Julie A Greenberg, “Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision between Law and Biology 
Symposium--Therapeutic Jurisprudence” (1999) 41 Ariz Law Rev 265. 
230 For example, see Cixous 1986, Irigaray 1991, Kristeva 1986. 
231 I use Grillo’s definition of essentialism: An essentialist outlook assumes that the experience of being a member of 
the group under discussion is a stable one, one with a clear meaning, a meaning constant through time, space and 
different historical, socio political, and personal contexts Trina Grillo, “Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: 
Tools to Dismantle the Master’s House” in Elizabeth Hackett & Sally Anne Haslanger, eds, Theor Fem Read (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 30 at 32. 
232 Hausman, supra note 227. 
233 Butler 1993, supra note 214; Kate Bornstein, Gender outlaw: on men, women, and the rest of us (New York: 
Routledge, 1994); Riki Anne Wilchins, Read my lips: sexual subversion and the end of gender (Ithaca, NY: 
Firebrand Books, 1997). 
234 Moraga & Anzaldua, supra note 136; Hull et al, supra note 136; Audre Lorde, “Age, Race, Class and Sex: 
Women Redefining Difference” in Sister Outsider: Essays Speeches, Crossing Press feminist series (Trumansburg, 
NY: Crossing Press, 1984) 114; bell hooks, Feminist theory: from margin to center (Boston, MA: South End Press, 
1984). 
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and non-binary people from women’s spaces and women’s movements, while still attempting to 
resist their version of an oppressive patriarchal construction of gender.235  
Nagoshi and Brzuzy’s Transgender theory considers that some feminists and queer theorists 
separated gender from sex while many trans people experience the two as a whole.236 
Transfeminist Kate Bornstein argued that sex was made up of more than genital and reproductive 
factors and preferred to refer to “sex” instead as “biological gender”.237 Nagoshi and Brzuzy also 
attend to the problems with disembodying gender. For example, if gender is merely a series of 
performative gestures and social artifice238, then the transsexual need to modify one’s body to 
match one’s internal sense of gender can be framed as wallowing in old fashioned biological 
determinism. This tendency to elide the specific medical needs of transsexuals and portray them 
as backwards or unfeminist has been heightened in queer and transgender theorizing.239 In their 
Transgender Theory, Nagoshi and Brzuzy however incorporate a sense of gender that is indeed 
felt and lived through the body.240 
While one of the hallmarks of the poststructuralist brand of queer theory is fluidity of 
categories and the absence of a true self, this has been critiqued by trans and queer scholars of 
colour as a privileged position and a dangerous analytical method.241 If there is no central self 
how do we understand the uniqueness of individual lived experience? On the other hand, there 
are difficult implications of deconstructing all social identities, for collective social movements 
                                                 
235 Koyama, supra note 226.  
236 Nagoshi and Brzuzy supra note 135 at 434. 
237 Kate Bornstein, supra note 234.  
238 Butler 1990, supra note 215 at 24-25. 
239 Riki Lane, “Trans as Bodily Becoming: Rethinking the Biological as Diversity, Not Dichotomy” (2009) 24:3 
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and also for the formation of a cohesive sense of self for oppressed people. Identity can be the 
foundation for self-empowerment that can propel anti-oppression movements.242 Single identity 
movements are indeed problematic and therefore an intersectional theory of transgenderism is 
necessary to recognize the leadership of racialized trans people and trans people who embody 
more than just transness.243 
Nagoshi and Brzuzy’s Transgender theory maintains a place for gender fluidity, non-binary 
identities and positions of masculinity and femininity. They orient themselves to incorporate the 
body as a social actor not just a container, the self and societal norms as shaping gender 
identity.244 They refine feminist relational theory where embodiment is considered a crucial part 
of self-awareness to express a dynamism between the self, the body and its lived experiences 
within its social environment including social norms and material conditions.245 Nagoshi and 
Brzuzy would consider this dynamism the basis for the autonomous self existing in relation to 
these sources.246 Intersectionality energizes this theory of gender because of its insistence on 
what we experience through our bodies and how we identify or disidentify with social 
constructions of our identities. Namaste, for example, asks for scholars to consider how 
narratives of criminalization, sex work and labour are told through the bodies of transsexual 
women in Quebec.247 Salah emphasizes Namaste’s critique of the use of “citizenship” and 
“personhood” in Salah’s comparison of Butler and Namaste.248 Namaste is clear that use of such 
                                                 
242 Nagoshi and Brzuzy supra note 135 at 439–440. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid at 435; Kapusta, supra note 162 at 151. 
245 Shotwell and Sangrey supra note 174. 
246 Nagoshi and Brzuzy supra note 135 at 437. 
247 Namaste 2009 supra note 49. 
248 Salah, supra note 47 at xi and see Namaste 2011 supra note 10. 
 
 57 
terms to ground trans “liberation” entrenches trans struggles in imperialist and capitalist modes 
of production and understanding. Similarly Nael Bhanji critiques the frequent use of the symbols 
of “home” and “border crossing” within transsexual narratives asking what transsexual citizen 
gets to speak for transsexual subjectivity in finding “home”.249 Bhanji points to the racism and 
colonialism implicit in the transsexual search for home which cannot be accessed by racialized 
and/or trans immigrants or refugees who are part of a diaspora250 or I would add, a dislocated 
Indigenous person. Instead, in creating transsexual and transgender narratives he asks for a 
greater attempt to disidentify with “home” as a metaphor for the body, and “journey” as a 
metaphor for transitioning. These are but a few of the trans of colour critiques of academic trans 
studies, feminist and queer theory and mainstream trans writings building on the discussion in 
Chapter 1.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided the conceptual groundwork for the analysis of pluralist sources of law 
and original data from trans racialized youth in the following chapters. I described the theoretical 
concepts of intersectionality, structural vulnerability, relational autonomy, and the analytical 
tools of disidentification and transgender theory. I developed my own list of autonomy–
enhancing factors to apply to my analysis in Chapters 4 and 5. The factors are: information 
sharing, access to justice, transparency of power in relationships, personal responsibility, self-
awareness, and interdependence. 
                                                 
249 Bhanji, supra note 49 at 1, 7–8. 
250 Ibid at 4,9. 
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 These containers and tools allow us to better understand the ways in which the experiences of 
trans racialized youth and their visual stories engage with the hegemonic narratives about health, 
race, gender, body and self that are embedded in legal and medical culture and discourses 
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Chapter 3: Methods & Methodology 
 
Throughout my preliminary community consultations and literature review, I developed and 
refined my choice of data sources and collection and analysis methods. I decided to use 
traditional primary legal sources including legislation, Hansard debates, policy documents and 
jurisprudence, with academic literature as a secondary source.  I knew I had to get at trans 
racialized youth’s experiences of health care decision making and use inductive reasoning to 
draw conclusions. Therefore, I decided on a focus group Photovoice method to learn from group 
discussions and obtain visual data.251   
In Part I of this chapter I explain the methods of analysis I used on the legal source documents 
I collected, based on a blended internal and external method articulated by Schwartz.252 In Part 
II, I describe and problematize my two participatory qualitative fieldwork methods: feminist 
participatory research (FPR) and visual arts-based methods, specifically Photovoice. I consider 
the ethical considerations arising from using photography-based methods with a structurally 
vulnerable population by applying relational and situated visual ethics. I describe why I chose 
thematic network analysis as a focus group data analysis method and conclude with observations. 
   
                                                 
251 John W Creswell, Qualitative inquiry & research design: choosing among five approaches, 2nd ed. ed (Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007) at 133. 
252 Richard L. Schwartz ‘Internal and External Methods in the Study of Law’, Law and Philosophy, Vol. 11 No. 3 
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Guiding Concepts 
 
Underpinning my inquiry into the decision-making autonomy of trans racialized youth are 
two concepts: legal pluralism and “laws as tactics”. Below, I describe how these two concepts 
shape my legal research before turning to my analytical method.253  
Critical Legal Pluralism 
 
Contemporary legal pluralism explains law as a phenomenon fed by many sources beyond the 
formal and experienced in different ways beyond statutes and courtrooms.254 I hoped to capture 
how trans racialized youth experience decision-making in health consent law and I hypothesized 
that as a group they are legally constructed through the regulation of gender, age and race. I saw 
this regulation occurring in several places: the clinic, the emergency room, the courtroom, in the 
Legislative Assembly and in community spaces. Applying a legal pluralistic approach to my 
research question allowed me to mine four different categories of information for legal rules and 
norms.255  
Laws as Tactics 
 
 
                                                 
253 Ibid. 
254 Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A Macdonald, “What Is a Critical Legal Pluralism Le Pluralisme 
Juridique/Legal Pluralism” (1997) 12 Can J Law Soc 25 at 31–2. 
255 Ibid at 32. 
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Singh’s FPAR checklist for researchers (Fig. 1) asks us to clearly articulate a theory of gender 
and show how it impacts our methodology. Spade’s notion of “Laws as Tactics” helped me 
connect my gender theory to my method of legal analysis.256 Spade draws from Foucault and 
Butler to push scholarship on gender’s interaction with the law into the consequences of 
discursive subjectivity formation through the multiple elements that make up “the law”.257 Spade 
references Foucault’s writings on the disciplinary and norm-producing function of law and 
Butler’s writings on the performative nature of gender and its social construction, as discussed in 
Chapter 2258 describing laws as tactics deployed to achieve the state’s population level aims.259 
In a pluralist fashion, Spade also decentralizes “the law” noting the spread of law’s action 
beyond what statutes say and into what elements of the law do, in the pluralist sense, to trans 
people.260 As I demonstrated in Chapter 1, certain subjectivities benefit from norms produced by 
law and medicine, and others are punished when laws tactically refuse to recognize them.261 
Through “laws as tactics” Spade considers how trans people interpret laws locally to achieve 
their desired ends and also to resist gender essentialism and the imposition of the gender 
binary.262 I borrow from Spade’s approach to draw out the disciplinary functions of my four 
sources.  
                                                 
256 Spade 2012 supra note 199. 
257 Spade 2012, supra note 199 at 41. 
258 Butler 1990 supra note 215 at 33, 114, 232; Butler 1997a, supra note 212; Michel Foucault, Society must be 
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two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991) at 95. 
260 Spade 2012, supra note 199 at 68. 
261 Ibid at 44–45. 
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As theoretical tools used in tandem, critical legal pluralism and laws as tactics helped me 
select and analyse my sources. These concepts took me to an inquiry of not just how laws and 
subjects interact but how subjects might interpret, deploy and/or resist legal norms. 
Part I Legal Sources and Methods 
 
I selected four types of legal knowledge to answer my research question: how do trans 
racialized youth experience autonomous and or agentic decision making in health care. Statutory 
law is the first type of legal knowledge.  As I demonstrated in the first two chapters, statutory 
law currently defines sex as a legal category and confines the subjectivity of trans people 
administratively limiting their life outcomes. I probe deeper into formal law by reading 
legislators’ intentions and opinions about my chosen statues in Hansard debates of my selected 
statutes concerning decision making in health, age and gender identity. Decisions of courts and 
tribunals constituted the second form of knowledge.  However, trans racialized youth are non-
existent in reported court decisions. Trans youth are the subjects of a small number of family law 
cases and administrative tribunal decisions. In contrast, the case law on mature minors and health 
care decision-making is rich. Between the two bodies of jurisprudence I can demonstrate the 
opinions of judges and decision makers regarding gender identity, biology, legal capacity and 
age-based decision-making autonomy. The third form of legal knowledge is health care 
providers’ normative clinical and diagnostic practices, accessed through their authoritative texts. 
Fourthly, the way that health care providers apply the common law and statutes is accessed from 
published studies of health care providers and from the experiences of focus group participants.  
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Kleinhan and MacDonald’s critical legal pluralism supported my choice to seek out the daily 
experiences of trans racialized youth as law-creators who hold law within themselves.263 
Through a Photovoice project, Trans racialized youth produced visual and textual narratives that 
gave me an idea of what local law and autonomy/agency practices were, even if practices 
differed from what the statute prescribed.264 This phenomenology of trans racialized youth 
autonomy is shared in Chapter 5 through my fieldwork findings and analysis.  
Internal and External Analytical Method 
 
Webber notes two tendencies in legal pluralism, namely: deference to law in its social context 
and the production of norms through the active choice of legal outcomes from a selection of 
options.265 These tendencies will support my application of Schwartz’s interpretive methods, to 
my analysis of law and policy impacting the autonomy of trans racialized youth in health care. 
 Unlike the internal analytical method, which seeks the intrinsic cumulative principles or logic 
of law, external forms of legal analysis seek to get at truth and evaluate process. The external 
method is not limited by acceptance of classic texts as authoritative sources or by the hegemony 
of professional opinions266 and thus the external method can apply knowledge and methods from 
other scholarly fields. Like other legal scholars, I use a combination of internal and external 
analytical methods, as demonstrated in the four main sources I used.267  
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Sources of Legal Norms 
 
Ontario statutes dealing with health care consent were most clearly connected to my research 
question. The primary statute for decision-making in health care is the current Health Care 
Consent Act 1996 (HCCA).268 For historical background, I considered its antecedent the Consent 
to Treatment Act 1992 (CTA), and the now repealed Advocacy Act 1992.269 I read these three 
statutes together to see how in the last 25 years legislators dealt with freedoms and protections 
for minors and other groups like disabled people who were perceived to be vulnerable in health 
care. Regulation 552 of the Health Insurance Act 1990 (detailing provincial health insurance 
coverage) was another key source because most youth access health care but especially gender-
affirming treatments through OHIP.  
A practitioner’s guide was helpful in understanding the practical uses and implications of the 
consent, capacity, substitute decision maker and liability provisions.270 I used the Law 
Commission of Ontario’s Final Report on Legal Capacity and Decision-making for wider 
historical policy development information.271 Hansard debates over amendments to health care 
statutes between 1990-1996 covered questions including mature minors and the appropriate age 
for consent to treatment and included the deputations of parents, doctors and others. The 
Affirming Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Act 2015 (ASOGIA) banned conversion 
therapy on minors. Debates during 2015 about the private member’s bill that became ASOGIA 
                                                 
268 HCCA supra note 11. 
269 Consent to Treatment Act, SO 1992, repealed on March 29, 1996 c. 2, s. 2 (2); [CTA]; Advocacy Act, 1992, SO 
1992, c. 26 [AA]. 
270 D’arcy Hiltz & Anita Szigeti, A Guide to Consent and Capacity Law in Ontario, 2017th ed (Toronto: Lexis Nexis 
Canada, 2017). 
271 Law Commission of Ontario, Legal Capacity, Decision-making and Guardianship, Final Report (Law 
Commission of Ontario, 2017) [LCO 2017]. One major limitation of the Report was that it does not address issues 
for minors or youth at all, rather focusing on elderly and mentally disabled or incompetent people.   
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involved many trans community members, activists and scholars. I also read the provisions of the 
Criminal Code that ban medically assisted death for minors. Reading both the debates and the 
Statutes helped to illustrate both what evidence had been considered and why the legislature 
made certain choices. Tracking the opinions and reasoning of judges with respect to trans 
racialized youth proved to be much more elusive. 
Jurisprudence 
 
I had hoped to find trans youth litigating their rights to gender-affirming treatments but this 
proved very difficult. Where I did find cases, the race/ethnicity of the youths were not mentioned 
at all. I also read one custody case from British Columbia involving the treatment of a racialized 
non-binary child because I had access to the child’s lawyer who offered further insight into how 
legal actors engage with the autonomy of trans minors.  
Authoritative Texts 
 
I returned to external methods by considering policy documents that impact the way health 
care is delivered, accessed, or denied to trans racialized youth, choosing three policy documents 
issued by health care providers and researchers from an international clinical association, a 
provincial professional association and a local community health centre. Firstly, in order to 
explore what rules the Ontario government requires health care providers to follow if providing 
transition-related and gender affirming care to trans youth I examined the most current version of 
The Standards of Care issued by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health 
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(WPATH SoC).272 The Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care adopted these standards to 
regulate the public subsidy of gender-affirming treatments.273 The SoC affirm the psychiatric 
diagnostic criteria for gender dysphoria from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual Version V 
and so they provided a view into narratives for transness generated by medical and government 
institutions relevant to my research question.274 For contrast, I turned to the  Sherbourne Health 
Centre’s Guidelines and Protocols for Hormone Therapy and Primary Care for Trans Clients 
(2015) for contrast with the international clinical standards. The SHC is notable because it is a 
family physician and nurse-based health centre with close ties to Toronto’s queer and trans 
communities. Some trans racialized youth go to the Sherbourne Health Centre for primary health 
care and psychosocial programming. Finally, I read the College of Physicians and Surgeons of 
Ontario’s official policy statement on Consent to Treatment updated in 2015.275 The HCCA 
leaves several key processes to be determined by regulated health care professionals’ colleges 
and this document was intended to fill a statutory gap. I compared this document and the 
accompanying frequently asked questions section with opinions about consent practices and 
autonomy expressed by the three Ontario doctors I consulted in 2016-2017. Secondary material 
by psychiatrists and pediatricians about how to apply the HCCA with youth patients was helpful 
in fleshing out the physicians’ identification of challenges and solutions, although none of these 
sources dealt specifically with trans youth or racialized youth.276  
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Part 2 Qualitative Research 
 
Methodology 
 
Paradigms and Feminist Participatory Research 
 
The feminist participatory research method I employed in the second component of my work 
is embedded in a transformative paradigm. Mertens described the transformative paradigm as an 
improvement on the emancipatory paradigm because of its emphasis on the leadership of 
marginalized research populations rather than their experience as objects emancipated by 
researchers.277 
FPR developed out of the body of work exists critiquing well-intentioned but damaging 
community-academic partnerships. For as Koggel says, there is exploitation implicit in research 
and simply focusing on marginalized and oppressed people does not ensure that equity is 
achieved.278 To avoid the methodological pitfalls of traditional CBPR, I adapted methods of 
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researcher Singh who added a feminist anti-oppression praxis to CBPR methods in her research 
with trans youth to conduct feminist participatory action research (FPAR).279 Her use of FPAR 
methods has made spaces for trans racialized youth to articulate barriers, agentic strategies and 
long-term autonomy producing solutions.280 Singh’s studies rigorously consider the ethical 
implications of cis adults researching with trans youth. Mirroring Merten’s move from 
“emancipatory” to “transformative” paradigms for research, Singh et al. are skeptical of research 
that claims to empower and know trans people.281 Singh insists that FPAR researchers must 
examine all of their beliefs, expectations, and desires for their research before deciding on 
methods and before undertaking fieldwork. To this end, I completed Singh’s thirteen-point 
questionnaire for researchers as I prepared my research design and my ethics documentation.282  
 
Photovoice  
Photovoice is a form of participant-employed photography (PEP).283 PEP allows the 
participant, along with the researcher, to determine both the subject and meaning of the 
photograph, which is important to the power-sharing aspect of FPR.284 Additionally, the 
participant’s captioning and explanation of their own photographs can also convey significant 
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participatory Indigenous research” (2008) 66:6 Soc Sci Med 1393 at 1395. 
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socio-cultural nuances.285 Wang describes it as a process for participants to identify, represent 
and enhance their community through a specific photographic technique.286 
Photovoice draws from two theoretical frameworks: 1) the critical popular education of 
Freire;287 and 2) the feminist theory that lived experience creates expert knowledge,288 infusing 
these theories into a community-based documentary approach to photography.289  
In my view, the purpose of my fieldwork was not a concrete social change. I had seen from 
the literature and from community consultation that many social action research projects fall 
short on their promises of social change.290 Instead I would seek to encourage personal and 
collective reflection on autonomy experiences and practices, interpret the resulting 
phenomenological data and if possible, share policy recommendations at conferences and with 
legal and health care providers in Ontario. In choosing to conduct qualitative research using a 
phenomenological approach I was not trying to generalize from my sample to the broader 
population.291 Working with 3-6 participants would allow for easier trust building, richer textual 
and visual results, and easier data management.292  
                                                 
285 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the oppressed, 30th anniversary ed. ed (New York: Continuum, 2000). 
286 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the oppressed, 30th anniversary ed. ed (New York: Continuum, 2000). 
287 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the oppressed, 30th anniversary ed. ed (New York: Continuum, 2000). 
288 One source on feminist epistemology is Lorraine Code, What can she know?: feminist theory and the 
construction of knowledge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
289 Wang, C. C., Morrel-Samuels, S., Hutchison, P. M., Bell, L., & Pestronk, R. M. (2004). Flint Photovoice: 
Community Building Among Youths, Adults, and Policymakers. American Journal of Public Health, 94(6), 911–
913 at 911. 
290 Sarah Switzer, “What’s in an Image?: Towards a Critical and Interdisciplinary Reading of Participatory Visual 
Methods” in M Capous-Desyllas & K Morgaine, eds, Creat Soc Change Creat Anti-Oppressive Arts-Based Res 
Methodol (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) 189 at 200; Adrian Guta et al, “Governing through community-
based research: Lessons from the Canadian HIV research sector” (2014) 123 Soc Sci Med 250 at 257. 
291 Jonathan A. Smith, Michael Larkin & Paul Flowers, Interpretative phenomenological analysis: theory, method 
and research (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009) at 51–52. 
292 Ibid at 52; Creswell, supra note 252. 
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The Photovoice focus group method was in keeping with the gender theory I articulated in 
Chapter 2 that combined embodiment, social construction, performance and intersectionality; a 
theory I contemplated through Singh’s checklist for research methodology.293 Photovoice 
methods allow participants to express abstract relational concepts more than interviews, offer 
participants time for creative reflection and create the possibility that their images could capture 
nuanced experiences, feelings and meanings.294 Still, Singh’s checklist required  further 
reflection. 
Representation, Truth and the Desire for Stories 
 
All colonized and subjugated people who, by way of resistance, create an oppositional 
subculture within the framework of domination recognize that the field of representation 
(how we see ourselves, how others see us) is a site of ongoing struggle. (bell hooks, 
2016, p. 57) 
 
When carefully incorporated into legal research, first person narratives add direct relevance 
and encouraged accountability to the group being researched.295 The danger in elevating first 
person narratives to the truth comes from some of the power dynamics embedded in the research 
method. Influences affecting participant storytelling include: the desire to please those in power, 
the confines of discursive spaces for trans people, youth, and BIPOC, and the pressure of the 
perceived expectations of researchers.296 I will show in Chapter 5 how trans people could 
                                                 
293 Singh et al 2013b, supra note 281 at 97 fig .1; JL Nagoshi, CT Nagoshi & S Brzuzy, Gender and Sexual Identity: 
Transcending Feminist and Queer Theory (New York: Springer Science + Business Media, 2013). 
294 Susan Finley, “Art-Based Inquiry: Performing Revolutionary Pedagogy” in Norman K Denzin & Yvonna S 
Lincoln, eds, Handbook of qualitative research, 2nd ed. ed (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 2000) 681 at 
684 see also Carlsson, supra note 285 at 131. 
295 Patricia Monture-Angus, “Standing against Canadian Law: Naming Omissions of Race, Culture and Gender” 
(1998) 2 Yearb N Z Jurisprud 7 at 19.296 Ibid. 
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become barely recognizable to themselves in their narrative attempts to access treatments and 
services and this could also occur in research through participatory visual methods.  
One example is found in Charania’s account of listener expectations of “coming out” stories 
in anti-homophobia education.297 She describes the pressure to tell a linear coming out narrative 
that ended in a “complete” gay subject, without contradictions and unanswered questions. 
Charania describes how students required clear indications of “wholeness” and “arrival” in her 
stories of becoming as a working-class Muslim.298 In their Photovoice project with queer and 
trans youth Holtby et al. describe how queer and trans youth struggle with the complexities of 
how they want to be seen as marginalized and historically misrepresented people and their fear 
that their experiences would be taken by cisgender viewers as representative of all queer and 
trans youth.299  
Barriers to self-disclosure can come from within and without LGBTQ communities, for 
example biphobia, transphobia and racism were named by Holtby et al.’s participants as 
examples of oppressions replicated within LGBTQ communities.300 Wilson and Flicker’s 
transactional sex Photovoice and digital storytelling project illustrated how structurally 
vulnerable people might recreate stereotypes, or affirm attitudes they think researchers want to 
hear, or that they feel are innocuous, while not revealing their true values and behaviours.301 In 
their photographs, the young Black women did not self-disclose their own use of transactional 
                                                 
297 GR Charania, “Regulated narratives in anti-homophobia education: complications in coming out stories.” (2005) 
24:2–3 Can Woman Stud 31 at 33–4. 
298 Ibid at 34. See also the counter concept of “inviting in” used by queer people of colour instead of “coming out” in 
Darnell L Moore, “Coming Out or Inviting In?: Part I”, (12 July 2012), online: The Feminist Wire 
<http://www.thefeministwire.com/2012/07/coming-out-or-inviting-in-reframing-disclosure-paradigms-part-i/>. 
299 Holtby et al, supra note 206 at 318. 
300 Ibid at 322 & 323 
301 Ciann Wilson & Sarah Flicker, “Picturing Transactional $ex: Ethics, Challenges and Possibilities” in Aline 
Gubrium, ed, Participatory visual and digital research in action (2015) 73. 
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sex and instead shared negative views of those who did.302 Relatedly, Prins writes about the 
resistance to being photographed or even being seen taking photographs by participants from 
communities that experience high levels of surveillance, rendering visual disclosure of one and 
one’s community unsafe.303  
In summary, researchers must realize that taking pictures does not mean that participants are 
suddenly ‘‘free’’ to tell the “truth” about themselves. As these research accounts demonstrate, 
taking and viewing photographs is situated in the histories and present conditions of local 
LGBTQ spaces, research contexts and in unequal age, class, racial, and gender relations. I use 
Photovoice to watch and analyze the image making process and to interpret the phenomenology 
of the resulting images and discussions about gender, race, age, agency and autonomy in health 
care.  
 
Situated Visual Ethics 
I applied for and received ethics approval from the York Research and Ethics Board (REB) 
for my fieldwork in November 2016.304 I also engaged with relational ethics, based on the 
principles of “engaged interaction, mutual respect, embodied knowledge, uncertainty and 
                                                 
302 Ibid at 79. 
303 Esther Prins, “Participatory photography: A tool for empowerment or surveillance?” (2010) 8:4 Action Res 426 
at 429.304 Research Ethics Board Certificate # 2017-057; Government of Canada, Panel on Research Ethics, TCPS2 
Chapter 1 Ethics Framework Core Principles http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/eng/policy-politique/initiatives/tcps2-
eptc2/chapter1-chapitre1/; Eikeland calls this “condescending ethics” in Olav Eikeland, Olav. “Condescending 
Ethics and Action Research.” Action Research 4, no. 1 (March 2006): 37–47 at 42. Austin, Goble, & Kelecivic, 
2009, at 843.  
304 Research Ethics Board Certificate # 2017-057; Government of Canada, Panel on Research Ethics, TCPS2 
Chapter 1 Ethics Framework Core Principles http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/eng/policy-politique/initiatives/tcps2-
eptc2/chapter1-chapitre1/; Eikeland calls this “condescending ethics” in Olav Eikeland, Olav. “Condescending 
Ethics and Action Research.” Action Research 4, no. 1 (March 2006): 37–47 at 42. Austin, Goble, & Kelecivic, 
2009, at 843.  
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vulnerability, and interdependent environment.”305 Reducing autonomy and choice to an 
individual issue of informed consent, as the REB guidelines tend to do, without regard for 
context will obscure larger systems of power, privilege, and oppression.306  
As a method, Photovoice in focus groups requires attention to ethical concerns due to several 
factors: the creation, use and release of visual material in print and digital forms and the 
structurally vulnerable intimate and familiar community of my participants.307 In situated visual 
ethics (SVE) issues are addressed as they arise in the field. It encourages researchers to rethink 
and adjust confidentiality, anonymity expectations, informed consent processes and include SVE 
training for the participants and fieldwork team.308 In terms of the release of images made by 
marginalized participants, considerations must include: the reluctance to self-disclose; the 
appropriation of shared images by researchers or viewers; and misreadings by viewers. These are 
risks for marginalized participants vis a vis privileged participants and researchers. Power 
dynamics between the research team and the participants and also among participants will have a 
significant impact on how and what to share and should be subject to ongoing consent 
procedures.309 
Conventional understandings of anonymity were challenged as most participants in my study 
chose to photograph their faces, body parts and identifying features like canes, body 
modifications and shoes. I did not assume that participants would want to hide their identity 
                                                 
305 Wendy Austin, Erika Goble & Julija Kelecevic, “The ethics of forensic psychiatry: moving beyond principles to 
a relational ethics approach” (2009) 20:6 J Forensic Psychiatry Psychol 835 at 843. 
306 Sherwin 1998 supra note 157 at 36-37. 
307 Clark, A, J Prosser, and R Wiles. “Ethical Issues in Image-Based Research.” Arts & Health 2, no. 1 (March 
2010): 81–93, and John Creswell 
308 Wilson and Flicker supra note 303 at 82-84. 
309 Sherene Razack, Looking white people in the eye: gender, race, and culture in courtrooms and classrooms 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) at 36-38. 
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when they might seek to conduct advocacy through the subject matter of their images and by 
disseminating the results.310 At the same time, I needed to be aware that participants might 
change their minds later and regret revealing such personal details. This tension between 
exposure to future harm and paternalism towards stigmatized participants required a discussion 
with the participants about the risk of revealing personal information, not a unilateral decision 
made by me to prevent them from doing so.311 
Reflexivity 
 
Because a relational ethics approach explicitly names power relations and imbalances, I knew 
I had to be critically aware of my own power, biases and expectations in the process and attempt 
to minimize restrictions or pressures on participants' decision-making autonomy.312 As part of 
the imagined audience, the fieldwork team would inevitably influence participants’ actions in 
unanticipated ways.313 
The York University Human Participants Review Sub-Committee (HPRC) ethics approval 
process positioned me as the expert, who would determine what would be ethical and safe for my 
participants months in advance of meeting them.314 Specifically, the HPRC ethics protocol form 
                                                 
310 Pamela Ponic, “Balancing safety and action: Ethical protocols for photovoice research with women who have 
experienced violence” (2012) 4:3 189, online: 
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asks researchers to commit to recruitment language, risk mitigation, interview questions, and 
informed consent language without input from the participants. Yet to apply FPAR tenets to my 
research study and using the transformative paradigm, I preferred to act as the facilitator of 
ongoing information exchange and reflection.315 In Singh’s checklist for researchers, question #1 
asks us to practice humility about one’s knowledge and assumptions, apologize as necessary and 
make changes to the study based on this learning. I was not able to make changes to my study 
during the field work stage because any changes required approval from the REB and if I had 
postponed my focus groups, I would have lost participants.  
Singh’s checklist for researchers asked me to describe my own intersecting identities.316 I am 
a queer non-youth gender non-conforming cissexual woman of colour with deep roots in the 
Toronto queer community. I am able-bodied. I am also a graduate student with a law degree and 
therefore have access to much more information about trans health care and rights than my youth 
participants did. The checklist also asks about researcher positionality vis a vis transgender 
concerns. I have had significant volunteer and professional engagement with queer and trans 
youth. My relationship to the youth participants was partly as a stranger researcher, however, 
they might have known me through LGBTQ community events. I had to consider that we knew 
many of the same people and we would likely continue to cross paths for years to come. 
Ultimately, this awareness made me feel accountable to the participants and my co-facilitator. In 
terms of my own preconceptions, I realised I might expect youth to have negative experiences 
with health care professionals due to my own negative experiences. I also might be expecting 
                                                 
fast enough to address the issues that come up in the field. Susan Boser, “Ethics and Power in Community-Campus 
Partnerships for Research.” Action Research 4, no. 1 (March 2006): 9–21. 
315 Ponic et al., supra note 312 at 2010. 
316 Singh 2013b, supra note 281 at 97 fig 1. 
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trans youth to have unsupportive families. Having identified positional privileges and 
preconceived expectations, I could consciously bracket317 these things to help me view the 
participants data as fresh and belonging to them.318 Finally, knowledge transfer and access to 
research results were key considerations in Singh’s checklist and I am committed to ensuring 
participants will have access to the completed thesis and a plain language summary of research 
results. Participants have been invited to all conference presentations of this research as co-
presenters where possible. 
                                                 
317 Clark E Moustakas, Phenomenological research methods (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage, 1994) at 96–97; Max Van 
Manen, Researching lived experience: human science for an action sensitive pedagogy, 2nd ed. ed (London, Ont: 
Althouse Press, 1997) at 175–176. 
318 Anneliese Singh, supra note 51 at 693. 
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Figure 1. Checklist for participatory action research (PAR) feminist researchers working with 
transgender communities from Anneliese Singh 
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Methods 
 
Recruitment 
 
I looked for 8-10 participants between the ages of 18 and 25 years old who identified as trans 
(transsexual, transgender, gender non-conforming, gender non-binary, gender fluid, genderqueer 
and more) at any stage of their social, legal or medical transition and who also identified as 
Black, Indigenous and/or people of colour. As 18+ they would not need parental consent but 
would be close enough to being minors to be able to remember the experience of navigating 
health care systems as minors and compare to their current experiences. The small number of 
participants meant that the group would generate comfort and trust faster, and I would be able to 
manage analysis of the data set by myself.   
In putting together the method and the groups, I approached a number of community partners 
for consultation.319 The participants were recruited through those community partners using 
purposive snowball sampling methods.320 For example, youth were also solicited by email and 
phone by youth workers from within their networks. I was available to present about the research 
and focus group at the 2017 Youth Sexual Health Symposium and at other youth groups, so 
some youth met me in person before deciding whether to participate. 
                                                 
319 Planned Parenthood Toronto – Director of Community Programming and Research, Cheryl Dobinson & TEACH 
Program Coordinator David Udayasekaren; Supporting our Youth (Sherbourne Community Health Centre) Gender 
Journeys Group facilitator Kusha Dadui; LGBT Youthline Outreach Coordinator and Service Coordinator Tamar 
Brannigan and Noami Martey; Griffin Centre Executive Director Tai Vo; YMCA Sprott House LGBTQ Shelter 
Manager Kate Miller and Case Worker Scout Bay; Gender Clinic at Sick Kids Hospital Drs. Miriam Kaufman and 
Joey Bonafacio.  
320 Patricia Leavy, Research Design: Quantitative, Qualitative, Mixed Methods, Arts-Based, and Community-Based 
Participatory Research Approaches (New York: Guilford Press, 2017) at 78–9. 
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Kiley May served as focus group co-facilitator and trans community consultant.321 Kiley 
handled the photography training section of the focus group. Kiley is a Mohawk trans feminine 
photographer and theatre artist. Working with Kiley fulfilled Singh’s recommendations about 
how to determine community needs and about working with other people to provide 
accountability mechanisms.322 I also thought the youth would feel more comfortable with her as 
another trans person, and that they would be motivated to work with her as an artist.  
Participants 
 
Eight people agreed to participate in the workshop. Two youth cancelled the night before the 
workshop citing work and family commitments, and two youth cancelled the morning of the 
workshop giving health reasons. The group expressed a variety of gender identities: trans 
feminine, trans, trans masculine and gender fluid. Their ethnic and racial identities were: Afro-
Caribbean, biracial white Filipino, Chilean, and Pakistani. One person identified as Muslim. 
Class backgrounds and income levels varied, with the group including working class, working 
poor and middle class. In terms of ability, one youth used a cane and required several 
accommodations in the physical space; two youth self-identified as having anxiety. While some 
participants were working, others were in non-university-based schooling, and were volunteering 
in peer support groups for LGBTQ youth, another youth was running a trans youth of colour 
group in the GTA.  
Only one participant lived with their biological parents. Others lived with friends or partners. 
One youth had experience with the CAMH GIC as a young adult. None of the others had been to 
                                                 
321 Kiley signed a confidentiality agreement for the purposes of this research project. 
322 Singh et al 2013b supra note 281 at 97 check boxes #6 and #8.  
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a GIC. Two youths were on hormone therapies; one could not access them, and another was not 
interested in taking hormones.  
Focus Group Process 
 
The workshop took place at Springtide Resources, a feminist non-profit organization in 
Toronto that provided all-gender bathrooms, a kitchen and a fully wheelchair accessible private 
space. I provided the participants with a list of external support resources.323 I provided the 
participants with an honorarium, meals, snacks, and TTC tokens/taxi vouchers. All the youth 
were given access to digital cameras and memory cards, camera bags and chargers for the 
duration of the focus group. They also received legal information handouts about consent to 
treatment and capacity law and gender-affirming treatment subsidies in Ontario (see Appendix 
5). The entire workshop totalled 11.5 hours over the span of two days: April 22 and 29, 2017. 
Unstructured discussion continued during mealtimes during which I took notes.  
 
Image Creation 
 
Photovoice training took place on Day 1 of the workshop after my introduction to the research 
project and a detailed description of project parameters and the meaning of consent (see 
Appendix 4). Kiley taught the participants a combination of situated visual ethics, image theory, 
photographic techniques, and aesthetic styles. 
Situated visual ethics training and discussion consisted of consent for people of different ages 
and capacities and vulnerabilities, and techniques for how to protect people's anonymity, as well 
as using historical examples of how Black and Indigenous and trans people of colour have been 
                                                 
 
324 Attride-Stirling, supra note 326 at 389–390. 
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misrepresented in photographs since the 18th century as a way of exploring race and gender and 
agency. We also discussed what it means to have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” and 
where that expectation might apply and how the lines are blurred between public, and semi-
private spaces. We strategized about how participants could avoid invading people’s privacy and 
how they could protect their own privacy with screens, staging, costumes and metaphors. 
Finally, we discussed how public and private photography can become illegal due to subject 
matter, invasion of privacy or the way the picture was taken and how to avoid those situations.  
Participants also received general training on camera use including how to look, how to 
capture a shot, flash and lighting, rule of thirds, composing a shot, saving pictures, deleting 
pictures, utilizing different angles, zooming, considerations about nudity and undress and the 
implications of taking and sharing pictures within the project. We came up with strategies to 
photograph abstract concepts and protect anonymity by staging tableau photographs and using 
actors.  
Kiley and I had written creative prompts for the Day 1 exercises selecting open ended and 
specific prompts. We also sent prompts for the week of shooting and gave the participants 
notebooks to carry with them over the week in which to record observations, questions and ideas.  
Between the two workshop days participants were expected to take their photographs and 
record experiences in their journals. The second day of the workshop was held one week later. 
Participants each sent me ten photographs they chose based on how well they thought the photos 
related to the health care and consent related prompts in Appendix 2. We displayed the photos 
they had taken using a digital projector and viewed them together, writing down our own 
reactions and then listening to the photographers’ descriptions of the content and context of their 
shots. We related each photograph to the image creation prompts. As a group, we examined the 
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photographs using the rubric (Appendix 3) which I developed with Kiley. Our model shifted the 
emphasis from identifying why certain conditions exist and doing something to change such 
conditions, to asking about the photographer’s and viewers’ feelings, motives, representation and 
context. 
Kiley provided some instruction on captioning and combining photos to make narratives, in 
which she recommended participants consider a series of questions to create their narratives. The 
participants were given time to work on captioning and ordering their images. They then shared 
their narratives and captions with the group.  
Data Analysis 
 
To begin my analysis, I immersed myself in the focus group data by looking at all of the 
photographs with captions and listened to all audio recording as I transcribed. In addition to what 
I heard and saw, I paid attention to what they did not show in photographs or say in discussion 
(while transcribing I had noted silences and moments of laughter in focus group sessions).   
I played with the organizing themes by making an interconnected thematic network (see fig 
2). Through this work, global themes (higher-level evaluative categories that bring greater 
interpretive meaning to the data themes) emerged.324  
I used the same rubric Kiley and I offered to the participants (Appendix 3) for my own 
analysis of the participants’ photographs. I borrowed five gazes from Lutz and Collins’s theory 
as analytical tools.325 One way to understand gazes is as “lines of sight” of subjects, 
photographers and viewers and that may intersect inside or outside a frame.326 These 
                                                 
324 Attride-Stirling, supra note 326 at 389–390. 
325 C Lutz & JL Collins, “The Photograph as an Intersection of Gazes” in Reading National Geographic (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993) 187. 
326 Ibid at 187. 
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intersections of gazes and the presence of multiple points of view made the act of taking and 
viewing photographs an interactive experience. The photographer’s gaze, the editorial gaze, the 
subject’s gaze and the researcher’s gaze all offer insights.  
I built my initial framework for coding transcripts and photos from themes in the extant 
literature I reviewed in Chapter 1.327 Then I augmented those categories with new concepts and 
themes emerging from the voices and images made by trans racialized youth as interpreted by 
me. Therefore, what I discuss in Chapter 5 is a blend of deductive and inductive analysis. The 
themes and sub themes that emerged from participant photographs and discussions will be laid 
out in detail in Chapter 5 in relation to specific photographs and the thematic network map.  
Verification of Findings 
 
Member checking allows marginalized participants the opportunity to tell the researcher if the 
transcripts are accurate, if analytic techniques used were effective, and findings reflect their own 
understanding of their experiences.328 The member checking session on August 30, 2017 was 
attended by all participants. I showed participants the themes that I had pulled from the 
photographs using the thematic analysis method. Together they had an opportunity to evaluate 
my grouping of themes for accuracy and suggest other themes. The group consensus was to add 
two themes: lack of accountability from service providers and avoidance of medical care.  
                                                 
327 Doctors’ assumptions in Pyne 2018, supra note 35; Gatekeeping in Chang, supra note 120; and in X Sly 
Sarkisova, “Resisting the Binary: The Role of the Social Worker in Affirmative Trans Health Care” in Brian 
O’Neill, Tracy A Swan & Nick J Mulé, eds, LGBTQ People Soc Work Intersect Perspect (Toronto: Canadian 
Scholars’ Press, 2015) 255; institutional barriers in Namaste, 2011 supra note 10; intersectional identities and 
resilience in Singh, 2013a supra note 50; Performance and self-image in Prosser, supra note 132; and in Thom, 
supra note 120; and avoidance of medical care in Hammond, supra note 78; Bauer et al, supra note 89; and legal 
barriers in Nussbaum, et al, supra note 28. 
328 Wilson & Flicker, supra note 303 at 77. 
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After the checking session, I created a map working from the periphery inwards to the Global 
themes,329 grouping the themes into three broader categories: those that reflected disruptions to 
autonomy arising from doctors, health care providers and health care organizations; those that 
constituted systemic barriers to autonomous decision making; and finally, themes that reflected 
participants’ responses to these disruptions.  
Reflections on Methods in Hindsight 
 
As I learned, there is no magic formula for Photovoice focus group fieldwork success but 
rather a gradual mutual testing of interactions and sharing of ideas between fieldwork co-
facilitators and participants. I built critique of Photovoice on the work of Switzer, Holtby et al., 
and Wilson and Flicker 330 on participatory visual methods. I knew from the works of hooks and 
Machida, that the method would be difficult for my participants because visual representation is 
not simple for multiply marginalized people who are under or misrepresented in popular cultural 
and scientific visual spaces. Therefore, the burden of self-representation can feel very heavy. The 
very act of taking photographs was challenging for focus group participants.331 Taking 
photographs was not totally enjoyable for two of the participants. One person felt unsafe placing 
herself in a photograph in public or even being seen outdoors with a camera, and the other did 
not like looking at images of their face in photographs. 
 Despite these limitations, most of which I anticipated, the image production process did 
allow participants to use image production to challenge sameness within identity categories, and 
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to portray their individual humanity, or to question the viewer’s assumptions about trans 
racialized youth and health care decision-making.332 There were several moments during the 
focus group process where I sensed that the participants felt what it could mean to experience 
autonomy in a world that erodes their autonomy. The image production process and the focus 
group sessions were at times a place where relationships of autonomy were fostered. 
Conclusion 
 
My methods attend to issues of epistemology, ethics and pluralism in legal, sociological, art-
based and health science scholarship. The guiding concepts of legal pluralism and the notion of 
laws as tactics informed my methods, sending me to four categories of legal information. The 
role of trans racialized youth as legal actors animates my analysis in the next Chapter. In the 
Photovoice portion of this project, I was able to integrate anti-oppression praxis and relational 
principles using Singh’s FPAR checklist and by integrating situated visual ethics into my use of 
Photovoice. Through this combination I was able to consider and adjust to meet the dynamic 
needs of the structurally vulnerable and trans racialized youth focus group participants as I 
attempted to answer my research question in the field.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
332 hooks describes this transcendent potential of art in her essay “Art on My Mind” supra note 201 at 8. 
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Chapter 4: Consent to Treatment in Normative Legal Sources 
 
What truth claims does the law make about trans racialized youth? How do the processes of 
racialization in health care identified in Chapters 1 and 2 also interact with cisnormative 
processes found in authoritative clinical and diagnostic texts? How do the white/Western 
foundations of authoritative texts compromise the gender transitions of trans racialized youth?333 
What can be revealed about decision makers’ attitudes towards youth autonomy beyond the 
aspirational declarations of legislators? Recall that in Chapter 1 I argued that for trans racialized 
youth the barriers to attaining adult markers are so significant they find themselves in a 
stretched-out period of non-adulthood that has become "youthhood", extending well into, if not 
to the end of their 20s. 
To answer these questions, I begin a pluralist examination of multiple sources of law using 
the list of factors affecting decision-making autonomy emerging from my exploration of 
relational autonomy in Chapter 2. The rationale behind my selection of these sources was fully 
canvassed in Chapter 3. Together, these sources form the pluralist legal container in which trans 
racialized youth attempt to develop and practice autonomy in health care contexts creating their 
own law as they share in their own words and photographs in Chapter 5. Part one begins with 
common law principles of autonomy, informed consent and legal capacity. I then zero in on 
doctrines developed specifically for minors. These doctrines foreground the period of statutory 
                                                 
333 I use the phrase “white/Western” conceptualized by G. Mahrouse, “Race-conscious transnational activists with 
cameras: Mediators of compassion,” International Journal of Cultural Studies, 2008 vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 87 at 91. With 
that phrase Mahrouse captures “the complex confluence of race (whiteness) and nation (Canadian), geopolitical 
centre/margin location (Western) that produces the privilege that marks the work” of in this case the American 
Psychiatric Association and the WPATH. 
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consolidation presented in the next section. In section two I introduce the Health Care Consent 
Act (HCCA) and evaluate whether it creates the conditions conducive to a relational autonomy 
experience of health care for youth that I discussed in Chapter 2.334 In the third section I will 
contrast actual treatment of trans minors’ and youths’ health care interests in courts and tribunal 
decisions with the autonomy promises of the HCCA. In Part 2 I examine how health policy in the 
form of two authoritative texts, indirectly diminishes the selfhood and health of trans racialized 
youth. I show how the application of ostensibly neutral health insurance regulations fail to 
address the intersectional realities of trans racialized youth. The section ends with conclusions 
about whether the law lives up to its aspirations of autonomy in health care for trans racialized 
youth given its adherence to paternalism, binary gender categories and colour-blind language.  
Part 1 Ontario’s Legal Frameworks for Health Care Consent 
 
Common Law Principles 
 
The common law rule of consent to treatment is linked to the principle of autonomy. The 
leading case Fleming v Reid stated: 
 
The common law right to bodily integrity and personal autonomy is so entrenched in 
the traditions of our law as to be ranked as fundamental and deserving of the highest 
order of protection. This right forms an essential part of an individual's security of the 
person and must be included in the liberty interests protected by s. 7. …Indeed, in my 
view, the common law right to determine what shall be done with one's own body and 
the constitutional right to security of the person, both of which are founded on the belief 
in the dignity and autonomy of each individual, can be treated as co-extensive.335  
 
                                                 
334  HCCA, supra note 11. 
335 Fleming v. Reid, 1991 CanLII 2728 (ON CA), <http://canlii.ca/t/1p78q>. 
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Thus, the right to bodily integrity and autonomy were affirmed as values that extended 
beyond physical security and protection of life to include the autonomy protecting and enhancing 
rule of consent to medical treatment. The case of Malette v Shulman, established that a 
physician's duty is to take instructions from capable patients even if they do not agree with the 
patient’s treatment decision.336 Legal capacity is codified in statute and is comprised of two 
elements: the ability to understand the information about a treatment and secondly, the ability to 
appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of taking or refusing a treatment.337 Because 
I argue that judicial attitudes towards minors extend to non-minor youth and influence the 
attitudes of health care providers, a brief description of the development of the mature minor 
doctrine is necessary.  
 
The Mature Minor Rule 
 
The mature minor rule reflects a judicial attempt to recognize a form of gradual autonomous 
health care decision making for a person under the age of majority.338 The doctrine permits a 
minor to make most decisions about health care without consent from parents, guardians or 
courts when a health care practitioner finds they have sufficient cognition and understanding.339 
Recorded mature minor cases have primarily addressed the right to refuse invasive but life-
                                                 
336 1990 CanLII 6868 (ON CA), 72 OR (2d) 417 (CA) at 426. 
337 HCCA supra note 11 at s. 4(1); Starson v. Swayze, [2003] 1 SCR 722, 2003 SCC 32 (CanLII), 
<http://canlii.ca/t/1g6p9> [Starson]. 
at para 78 [Starson]; LCO supra note 272 at 62-63. 
338 The House of Lords first articulated the “mature minor” principle in Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area 
Health Authority, [1985] 3 All ER 402., yet here the mature minor could only consent to treatments approved by a 
medical professional, thus conflating best interests and decision-making autonomy. 
339 AC v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), [2009] 2 SCR 181 (SCC) (available on 
http://canlii.ca/t/24432), Abella J, at para 23 [AC]. 
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saving treatments, on the grounds of religion or culture.340 In Ontario, the trend has been for 
judges to negate the decision-making autonomy of minors who want to refuse lifesaving 
treatment by endorsing the use of child protection laws.341 Overall judges seem to find capacity 
where they agree with a minor’s decision and find incapacity where they do not. While Canadian 
jurisprudence pre-2009 allows for a minor to be sufficiently capable to make most decisions, the 
judicial reluctance to encourage minors to develop autonomy skills, and to make decisions 
incurring significant risk, seems to be a sticking point driving litigation up to and including A.C. 
v Manitoba. 
In C. (A) v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) the Supreme Court addressed 
the constitutionality of deploying child welfare legislation when doctors disagree with parents’ 
and minor’s refusal of a life-saving treatment. 342 A.C. clarified the national position at common 
law but did not formally change, or even mention, the legal situation in Ontario where no age 
threshold exists.343 Justice Abella interpreted the impugned provisions using a "best interests" 
                                                 
340 That physicians and children’s aid societies litigate the refusal of treatments more than consent to treatment by 
minors was observed by Cheryl Milne, Justice for Children and Youth https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-
business/committees/administration-justice/parliament-36/transcripts/committee-transcript-1996-feb-20 at 930. For 
cases adjudicating a minor's decision to consent to treatment see C. (J.S.) v. Wren (Alta. C.A.), [1986] AJ No. 1166 
(abortion consented to by minor was not considered tort of battery when parents sued the doctor who performed it) 
and Cates v Kendall where Court allows incapable adult to take growth hormones against mother’s wishes by 
applying best interests analysis instead of finding capacity. 
341 The 12-year-old Jehovah’s Witness in Re L.D.K. (An Infant), 1985 CanLII 2907 (ON CJ) Yet as the exception the 
case engaged several special factors: long and painful treatment with a bad prognosis and her doctors supported her 
refusal of transfusion.  But then see Hughes v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, 1996 CanLII 8153 
(ONSC), where a 13-year-old Jehovah's Witness’s autonomy was denied, despite her s. 15 rights being violated on 
the basis of age and religion. Hughes had also challenged her doctor’s finding of incapacity under the Consent to 
Treatment Act. Her parent’s and her doctor’s opinion of her capacity to consent depended on whether they agreed 
with her or not. Wilson J ruled that the threat to life was more important to the Court than her religious beliefs and 
prevented a finding of capacity justifying the use of child protection law under s. 1 of the Charter. This case 
foreshadows the majority decision in A.C. supra note 341. 
342 A.C. was a 14-year-old Jehovah's Witness. She consented to treatment but refused blood transfusions against her 
doctor’s recommendation. Three psychiatric evaluations confirmed that A.C. understood the nature of the treatment 
and the consequences of refusing transfusions at AC supra note 341 para 82. 
343 Minors in other provinces are not so lucky. For example, in Nova Scotia youth have to rely on the mature minors 
doctrine and interpretation in A.C. Newfoundland and Labrador minors between 16-17 years old are able to have 
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analysis imbued with the mature minor rule.344 While she said345 minors must be given a chance 
to demonstrate their capacity, she did not unequivocally state that capable youth’s wishes would 
determine their health outcomes.346 Therefore A.C. leaves loopholes allowing for the judicial 
overriding of mature minors' wishes. 
The decision eshews the typical atomistic understanding of autonomy and prefers to frame 
autonomy as a process that requires support to develop much like my application of relational 
autonomy. A.C. shows concern for religion, culture and parental pressure as external forces 
undermining independent decision making. The Court does not however, recognize that religion 
and culture can be part of a youth’s development of selfhood. It failed to acknowledge systemic 
forces that impact decision making for racialized youth such as poverty, citizenship statutes and 
racism.347 Yet rather than encouraging fostering of conditions conducive to relational autonomy 
such as information sharing, or supportive decision making, the Court chooses protectionism.348 
This protectionist attitude from the highest court influences other decision makers even where 
                                                 
their own capacity assessed and their reasoning considered even for decisions in life-threatening circumstances. 
Minors under 16 years still fall under the Child and Family Services Act and therefore have much more limited 
decision-making autonomy. 
344 In addition to current evidence about adolescent development and autonomy, Abella referenced the Canadian 
history of the mature minor’s rule and international covenants to confirm the principle that minors under 16 can 
indeed make informed and capable decisions about most aspects of their health. The best interests doctrine stems 
from the belief that parents are the natural guardians of their children and will act in their best interests. However, 
when family values clash with a minor’s well-being in a socially accepted sphere then courts must act in the minor’s 
best interests; for Abella J’s reference see David N Weisstub, Enquiry on Mental Competency: Final Report 
(Toronto, ON: Publications Ontario, 1990) 1990 at 125-127 [Weisstub Report].  
345David Day, “Getting Respect: The Mature Minor’s Medical Treatment Decisions: A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of 
Child and Family Services),” Canadian Bar Review, vol. 88, pp. 671–681, 2007 at 678. 
346 Day argues that because the French version of Abella J's decision says that the mature minors' wishes “must be 
respected” that settles the issue in favour of capable minors under 16.  
347 Binnie J, dissenting, takes a traditional libertarian view of autonomy at para 166 yet also recognizes that religious 
convictions can motivate an autonomous decision at A.C. supra note 341 at para 197. 
348 While Binnie J’s dissent found for the right of A.C. to make the decision to refuse life-saving treatment, Binnie 
relied on the typical legal understanding of autonomy as independence not interdependence. 
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the HCCA specifies that age is not a determining factor in Ontario and vis a vis other groups such 
as trans racialized youth who have reached the age of majority. 
Paternalistic Decision-making post A.C. 
 
Family court judges emboldened by A.C., continue to ignore minor's autonomy, even that of 
capable 13 to 17-yr-olds. In Cates v Kendall349 parents with joint custody disagreed over the 
treatment of their son Ryan who was 19 years old but had the mental functioning of a 7-year-old 
and was considered incapable for this decision.350 Ryan wanted to take growth hormones 
recommended by his doctor, to improve the quality of his life. Ryan’s father consented to the 
treatment, but his mother did not.  
Judge Wilkinson reviewed both the Starson test for capacity and A.C. factors for assessing the 
capacity of a minor under 16 years old. It was clear Ryan understood the principle of informed 
consent and that he could withdraw his consent at any time.351 While the judge affirmed Ryan’s 
wishes, his ruling was based not on finding him to be a capable minor but on the Judge’s own 
assessment of what was best for Ryan. This discussion demonstrates a judicial application of 
A.C. in which a court prefers a best interest analysis to a capacity to consent to treatment 
approach. In section three I will show the same pattern in Ontario cases involving the health 
rights of trans and gender non-confirming minors, that mirror the experiences of non-minor trans 
racialized youth in Chapter 5. Now I will evaluate the health care consent statute and whether it 
fosters autonomy practice for trans racialized youth. 
                                                 
349 2011 SKQB 225, [2011] SJ No. 351. 
350 Ibid at para 44. 
351 Ibid at para 56. 
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The Health Care Consent Act 
 
HCCA has been described as "balancing competing interests of liberty and welfare".352 The 
preamble states the following objectives: the provision of consistent rules across all health care 
settings, to enhance the autonomy of persons facing treatment, to promote communications and 
understanding between health care providers, patients, clients and to ensure a significant role for 
supportive family members when a person is incapable with respect to a treatment. 353  
A brief genealogy of the Health Care Consent Act is necessary to contextualize my critique of 
the gaps and inadequacies in Ontario’s legislative and regulatory framework that undercuts 
autonomy for trans racialized youth. The HCCA is part of a suite of four statutes developed 
together over 15 years subject to the conflicting philosophies of three successive ruling political 
parties. The group of statutes created or amended by the Consent and Capacity Statute Law 
Amendment Act, 1992, were: The Consent to Treatment Act, the Mental Health Act, the 
Substitute Decisions Act, and the Advocacy Act.354 Subsequently Bill 19, Advocacy, Consent and 
Substitute Decisions Statute Law Amendment Act, 1996 repealed the Advocacy Act and the 
Consent to Treatment Act. In 1992 these statutes were enacted and amended by the Liberals to 
clarify the common law on consent and substitute decision making in health care which had 
                                                 
352 Starson, supra note 339 Major J at para 75. 
353 HCCA, supra note 11, pursuant to s. 1 the definition of treatment excludes the following: a capacity assessment, 
health history-taking, the assessment or examination of a patient to determine the general nature of his or her 
condition, communication of an assessment or diagnosis, the admission to a hospital or other facility, a personal 
assistance service, a treatment that in the circumstances poses little or no risk of harm to the person, and anything 
prescribed by the regulation as not constituting treatment, HCCA s. 2(1). 
354 Consent and Capacity Statute Law Amendment Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 32; CTA supra note 270; Mental Health 
Act, RSO 1990, c. M.7; Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, SO 1992, c. 30; Advocacy Act, supra note 270. The CTA had 
a fleeting existence before being replaced in 1996 by the HCCA. The CTA had narrower parameters than the current 
legislation only addressing consent related to treatment decisions whereas the HCCA encompasses admission to and 
confinement to treatment facilities and personal support services in homes. 
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become confusing even to legal experts for constituents and health care professionals and by the 
NDP to increase advocacy for vulnerable populations.355 In the 1996 amendments the PC 
government’s objectives were to streamline consent and capacity procedures and to cut costs.356 
 
The Period of Legislative Health Care Reform: 1989-1996 
 
In the mid to late 1980s, at the behest of a Liberal government, three committees reviewed 
health statutes and health policy with a focus on vulnerable populations including youth.357 Their 
findings informed the legislative overhaul of the early to mid-1990s.358 The Committee on the 
Enquiry on Mental Competency, was asked to develop standards for determining mental capacity 
in minors.359 Its findings, known as the Weisstub Report, elevated the principle of autonomy and 
also expressed the need for best interests analyses to remain in future health care consent 
legislation vis a vis minors out of respect for family caregivers.360 The Report integrated both 
                                                 
355 Ernie Lightman & Uri Aviram, “Too Much Too Late: The Advocacy Act in Ontario” (2000) 22:1 Law 26 at 29-
30. 
356 Ibid at 26; “Government Picks bad time to Quit Advocacy: Bill 19 Increases Risk for Vulnerable People”, 
Ontario Advocacy Commission, News Release, February 5th, 1996. 
357 The Committee on the Enquiry on Mental Competency, (the Weisstub Enquiry), The Advisory Committee on 
Substitute Decision Making, and the Review of Advocacy for Vulnerable Adults, in LCO 2017 supra note 272 at 13. 
Three factors strengthened this initiative: increasing pressure from disability and mental health rights activists, 
political will from the NDP government who attempted to create less institutional and legal mechanisms to support 
vulnerable people; and, finally, the Supreme Court decision in Eve. 
358 Sean O’Sullivan, You’ve Got a Friend: A Review of Advocacy in Ontario (Toronto, ON: Ministry of the Attorney 
General, 1987); Steven Fram, The Advisory Committee on Substitute Decision Making (Toronto: Ministry of the 
Attorney General, 1987). Elinor Caplan said November 22, 1995 regarding proposed repeal of the Advocacy Act, “I 
say that's unfortunate, because Fram's report, O'Sullivan's report and Manson's report all identified a definite need 
for advocacy services.” https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/house-documents/parliament-36/session-1/1995-
11-22/hansard#P441_105096 at 1740. 
359 Weisstub Enquiry supra note 346 at 55 and 122. The Final Report on mental capacity and the importance of 
autonomy as a guiding principle for health law was referenced in Starson, A.C. and in the Ontario Legislative 
Assembly during debates between 1990-1996 over health care statutory reform.   
360 Ibid at 137, 152. 
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concepts into a set of standards to guide legislators that eschewed age-based markers as reliable 
indicators of capacity.361  
The Health Care Consent Act of Ontario 
 
The Presumption of Capacity 
 
The HCCA codified the common law on consent and the two-part capacity test. There is no 
age threshold for capacity.362 S. 11(1) outlines the four elements of consent. It must relate to the 
treatment, it must be informed, it must be voluntary, and it must not be obtained through fraud or 
manipulation. The meanings of “voluntary” and “misrepresentation” are not explained and are 
left up to regulatory colleges to explain to providers. As I detail below and in Chapter 5, this 
leaves room for providers to overlook coercive external factors acting on patients and to 
misinform patients about treatment possibilities based on providers’ ignorance or prejudice. The 
meaning of informed consent is described in s. 11(2) which states that reasonable information 
must be provided and questions arising about treatment must be answered. The statute, however, 
does not specify that information must be provided in a format or manner that the person can 
understand thus creating gaps for anyone with cognitive or intellectual differences or who 
communicates in a language other than English.363 The statute is clear that legal capacity to 
consent to treatment does not consist of one blanket assessment. Each treatment decision requires 
a new capacity assessment.364 For example, a trans youth might be found capable of deciding to 
                                                 
361 Ibid at 55. 
362 The presumption of capacity without a statutory age threshold was consistent with the 1992 CTA. 
363 LCO 2017 supra note 272 at 131 and 143. This means that a certified interpreter or attendant will be necessary to 
translate to ensure that the patient understands and can give consent. 
364 HCCA supra note 11 at s.15(1). 
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start cross sex hormone therapy, but not capable of deciding to have a hysterectomy.365 Capacity 
still appears to be linked to cognitive abilities and functional decision making in the minds of 
many judges and clinicians.366 Because cognitive and functional capacity are the litmus test, 
youth who feel voiceless and powerless over their health can be viewed as incapable by 
clinicians when they refuse treatment.367 Trans racialized youth might struggle to demonstrate 
their decision-making capacity. For example, this way of assessing capacity could work against 
trans racialized youth who are English language learners unless they had access to a certified 
language interpreter.  
Advocates voiced concerns that vague requirements for regulatory colleges to explain the 
legislation to professionals would maintain the status quo of large-scale misunderstanding of 
health consent law at the expense of youth.368 The Policy Statement #3-15 from the College of 
Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) was designed for this purpose. The policy expands 
requirements for doctors beyond the provisions of the HCCA. Overall, the document tells 
physicians to “respect patient autonomy”, yet autonomy is not explained, and the assumption is 
that patients have autonomy rather than framing autonomous decision making as a practice that 
must be fostered through relationships and structural equity.369  
                                                 
365 Ibid at s.15(2). 
366 LCO 2017 supra note 272 at 15. Geist supra note 277 at 81. 
367 Geist supra note 277 at 81. 
368 Legislative Assembly, “Bill 19, An Act to repeal” Lawyer Linda Bohnen February 6, 1996, before the Advocacy 
Act, 1992, revise the Consent to Treatment Act, 1992, amend the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 Committee on 
Administration of Justice, Evidence, 36 (February 6, 1996) https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-
business/committees/administration-justice/parliament-36/transcripts/committee-transcript-1996-feb-
06#P146_29940 at 930 (Linda Bohnen). Regulatory colleges were expected to assist health care providers in 
practical details of applying the HCCA resulting in wide variation across professions in key areas such as the 
provision of rights information. 
369 CPSO #3-15 supra note 276 at 2. 
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CPSO members are reminded that for consent to be informed the appropriate information 
must be understood not simply provided. It advises that doctors consider communication 
barriers. To this end members should vary “the plainness of the language used, the modality in 
which the information is communicated, any literacy issues, etc.” and are cautioned against 
automatically relying on family members as interpreters citing family dynamics or conflict as a 
reason.370 This caution could certainly benefit trans racialized youth who are English-language 
learners and accompanied by family members, an experience mentioned by my focus group 
participants. The CSPO instructs doctors to chart all capacity and consent determinations with 
details and references as to whether parents were consulted or not and a summary of the 
information provided, and questions asked by the patient.371 Doctors are told to ensure consent is 
provided by a minor even if parents/guardians are present.372 The policy does not specify who to 
seek help from when capacity is hard to determine namely specialists in supportive collaborative 
youth decision making such as community advocates or the Office of the Public Guardian and 
Trustee.  
The Supreme Court interpreted the common law and the HCCA on how mental illness 
impacts capacity in Starson in ways that should benefit trans youth. Firstly, the Court was clear 
that mental illness alone does not render one incapable.373 Secondly, when it comes to a 
diagnosed mental illness, the patient must be able to recognize the possibility that they have 
something resembling the diagnosed condition although they do not have to describe it as a 
                                                 
370 Ibid at 3, 8. 
371 Ibid at 9–10. 
372 Ibid at 5. 
373 Starson, supra note 339 para 77. 
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negative or pathologized condition.374 Therefore, a gender dysphoria diagnosis, although located 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders should not automatically make a 
trans youth incapable, nor as I contend throughout this chapter, should they have to describe 
themselves in pathological terms in order to meet the second part of the capacity test. 
The Starson Court emphasized the cognitive and functional theory of capacity found in the 
HCCA.375 If the patient shows an ability to consider the parameters of the treatment decision 
including the nature and foreseeable risks of treatment; the available alternative courses of 
action; and, the expected consequences of not having the treatment, it does not matter if the 
patient's way of weighing the parameters is different from the doctor's. It is the ability to 
appreciate consequences that makes one capable.376 Furthermore refusing to speak to one’s 
doctor does not automatically result in a finding of incapacity.377 This legal framework 
technically allows trans racialized minors and youth to make decisions on puberty blockers and 
surgeries without parental approval. Clinicians must ultimately be able to keep the wishes of 
guardians separate from those of capable minors and youth. They can do this by maintaining 
confidentiality or where youth and family members are in open disagreement, provide 
counselling supports for guardians who do not accept the capable choices of a youth rather than 
allowing guardians who disagree to exert pressure on the youth to capitulate.378 Health 
                                                 
374 Ibid at para 79; see also O. (Re), 2005 CanLII 57809 (ON CCB) the patient was incorrectly found incapable 
because the doctor misapplied the Starson test and did not ask if the patient acceded to the possibility that some 
condition affected her mood or behaviour. 
375 Ibid paras 80-81. 
376 Ibid paras 80-81. 
377 In R.K. (Re), 2004 CanLII 57303 (ON CCB) a 17-year-old was found capable despite refusing to discuss her 
treatment with her doctor but had instead requested relevant information about her mental illness diagnosis and 
treatment from her nurses. She came to the capacity hearing clearly having read all the literature provided by her 
doctor and nurses. 
378 Geist and Opler supra note 277; Geist supra note 277. 
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practitioners are well protected from liability for administering treatments that may not have 
been consented to, refused, withheld or withdrawn, as long as they believe "on reasonable 
grounds and in good faith to be sufficient for the purposes of the Act", that their actions were 
taken in accordance with wishes of a capable person.379 This provision should also encourage 
physicians to support capable minors and youth in situations where they are at odds with their 
parents or where the physician disagrees with the patient’s capable informed decision without 
fear of civil liability or discipline for their regulatory College.380 
Legislative Debate Over the Decision-Making Autonomy of Minors 
 
It is clear from the record that the legislative intention was to recognize the decision-making 
autonomy in health care of minors. Nonetheless the precise question of whether children and 
youth should have the right to direct their own health was debated in the legislature on several 
occasions.381 Minister Lankin and Minister Wilson’s original position was to set 16 years as the 
                                                 
379 Pursuant to s. 29 of the HCCA treatment can only be administered without consent to a capable person in an 
emergency where there is a communication barrier due to language or disability if steps have been taken to assuage 
the communication problem even if unsuccessful and there is no way to communicate in time to prevent serious 
bodily harm and significantly there is no reason to believe the person does not want the treatment. 
380 No cases exist where a minor’s capable informed decision was overrode by physician or a hospital. All of the 
judges find the minors incapable, and the SDMs incapable if the court is ordering a minor to be treated. In each case 
the Child and Family Services Act (now the Child and Youth Family Services Act) was activated and no challenge to 
the incapacity finding occurred under the HCCA. Hamilton Health Sciences Corp. v. D.H., 2014 ONCJ 603 
(CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/gf8sg> note that doctor did not chart the finding of incapacity at para 39; Children’s Aid 
Society of Toronto v. L.P., 2010 ONCJ 320 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/2c4m0> at 123; T.H. v. Children’s Aid 
Society of Metropolitan Toronto, 1996 CanLII 11981 (ON SC) Wilson J wanted to decide all issues and Consent and 
Capacity Review Board was not allowed to review the incapacity finding as the court was hearing an appeal on the 
finding of incapacity. 
381 Legislative Assembly, “Bill 109, An Act respecting Consent to Treatment” Standing Committee on the 
Administration of Justice, Debates, 35, (September 14, 1992) (Standing Committee for Bill 74 MPPs Barbara 
Sullivan, Norman Sterling, legal counsel Gilbert Sharpe); debated this point  https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-
business/committees/administration-justice/parliament-35/transcript/committee-transcript-1992-sep-14; 
subsequently, former Health Minister Elinor Caplan when commenting on the Conservative’s amended bill, 
Legislative Assembly, “Bill 19, An Act to repeal the Advocacy Act, 1992, revise the Consent to Treatment Act, 
1992, amend the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992”, Debates, 36-1 (November 22 1995) 
https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/house-documents/parliament-36/session-1/1995-11-
22/hansard#P441_105096 at 1740 (former Health Minister Elinor Caplan). 
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threshold for the presumption of capacity to make health care decisions.382 Through debate and 
committee deputations from health care providers, social workers, and lawyers working with 
youth, the age threshold was eliminated altogether. 
During the Committee stages of the HCCA, parents’ rights activists, often with Christian 
affiliations, made protectionist arguments to curtail the decision-making autonomy of minors.383 
Bill 91 was introduced by Standing Committee on Justice member Frank Klees as an amendment 
to the HCCA in November 1996.384 Klees identified the problem that: 
   
The vast majority of Ontarians whom I speak to are not aware in the first place that 
children in this province can receive medical treatment of any kind without the 
knowledge of their parents, the only condition being that the health practitioner believes 
in his or her mind that the child is capable of making a decision. The reaction, when I 
discuss this with people across the province and in my constituency, is initially disbelief 
that this is the case in this province. The second reaction is indignation.385 
 
To rectify this widespread ignorance of the law, Klees argued for the HCCA to include age-
based thresholds and mandatory physician consultation with parents over decisions made by 
minors 16 years and younger. Confidentiality and options for supportive informed decision 
                                                 
382 Ibid at 1740 (Elinor Caplan) Elinor Caplan https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/house-
documents/parliament-36/session-1/1995-11-22/hansard#P441_105096 at 1740. 
383 Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on the Administration of Justice, Evidence, 35 (March 24 1992) at 
1040 (Louis DiRocco of the Family Coalition Party); Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on the 
Administration of Justice 36 (February 7 1996) at 902 (Rev. Lynch Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Toronto); and 
Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on the Administration of Justice, Evidence 36 (February 13 1996) at 
1000 (Diane Watts for REAL Women of Canada). Louis DiRocco of the Family Coalition Party 
https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/committees/administration-justice/parliament-35/transcript/committee-
transcript-1992-mar-24#P138_29878  at 1040; Rev. Lynch Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Toronto 
https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/committees/administration-justice/parliament-36/transcripts/committee-
transcript-1996-feb-07#P481_149033 at 902; and Diane Watts for REAL Women of Canada 
https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/committees/administration-justice/parliament-36/transcripts/committee-
transcript-1996-feb-13#P933_308739 at 1000. 
384 Health Care Consent Amendment Act (Parental Consultation), Frank Klees, November 1996 [HCCA Parental 
Consultation] at 91. 
385 Legislative Assembly “Bill 91, Health Care Consent Amendment Act (Parental Consultation)”, Debate, 36-1 
(November 18, 1996) (Frank Klees). Frank Klees, Hansardontla.on.ca/hansardetitle/36-1/130-12.html. 
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making with non-family members is crucial for trans youth who may disproportionately 
experience heightened conflict with family members. Decisions about their health care have 
implications on their physical and mental health, employment and housing options.386 This 
amendment met with strong opposition from the Health Minister and the majority of MPPs and 
health care providers.387 Justice for Children and Youth, a legal clinic serving youth under 18 
years, testified in 1992 and 1996 about the importance of autonomous decision making for their 
clients who were emancipated minors or youth in care. Staff lawyer Milne pointed out that youth 
were vulnerable to coercion and pressure: “They are generally accepting of adult authority. The 
image of the omnipotent adolescent refusing necessary treatment, although it exists, is not 
representative of youth in general.”388 This sentiment was echoed by MPP Dominic Agostino: 
 
I am not sure how you tell 15-year-old kids who unfortunately are living on Yonge 
Street, in a blanket and maybe a couple of cardboard boxes, that to access medical 
treatment they would have to somehow track down, or make an attempt to track down, 
parents they may not have seen for a period of time or guardians who may not exist or 
individuals in their lives who may have done nothing more than abuse them and scar 
them for life. To force that prior to getting treatment I think is irresponsible. I think it's 
taking away the judgements that family practitioners, physicians, can make today.389 
 
 
Physicians who had institutional support and access to resources such as the Hospital for Sick 
Children’s Youth Clinic were well informed of legal rights for youth in health care and keen to 
                                                 
386 Malaika Hill and Rebecca Cheff, “Supporting Safe Spaces for Trans Health: Being an Ally” The Wellesley 
Institute, June 30, 2016 online <http://www.wellesleyinstitute.com/health/supporting-safe-spaces-for-trans-health-
being-an-ally/>. 
387 Health Minister Elinor Caplan stated her rejection of Bill 91 and quoted strong opposition to the Bill from 
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario and the Ontario Medical Association Health Care Consent 
Amendment Act (Parental Consultation), 1996 [Health Care Consent Amendment Act (Parental Consultation), 
1996], at 1110. Similarly, the East York Health Unit, Windsor Teen Clinic, and the Hospital for Sick Children all 
expressed alarm over Bill 91 at 1120. 
388 Milne, supra note 342 at 930. 
389 “Bill 91 HCCA Amendment Act Parental Consultation, supra note 386, pts 1120–1130. 
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protect youth autonomy, which they described as supporting youth involvement in decision 
making and confidentiality in accessing medical services. These physicians wanted family 
involvement, where appropriate and recognized autonomy development as a gradual process.390 
While family physicians appeared to have more trouble applying consent law due to their close 
ties to parents or minor patients, clinic doctors recognized that youth often avoid family doctors 
because of the fear of breach of confidentiality.391 Dr. Alan Goldbloom deputed: 
 
As far as no age of consent, what that allows us to do, and in fact we have always 
functioned this way, is to recognize maturity when appropriate. It allows us to say to 
that 14-year-old, who either is very mature and appropriate or who may even be 
independent of his or her family, we recognize that individual's independence. It in no 
way prevents us from involving the family when it is appropriate to do so. In fact, the 
majority of teens we speak to want their family involved and we're happy to do that. It's 
in those circumstances when they don't and when family involvement may be an 
obstacle to care that we need that opportunity.392 
 
Redress for Findings of Incapacity 
 
The HCCA and the Substitute Decisions Act (SDA) were designed to be implemented with the 
robust protections of the Advocacy Act in place.393 The Advocacy Act, in its short life, provided 
                                                 
390 Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on the Administration of Justice, Evidence 36, (February 7 1996) at 
1140 (Dr. Alan Goldbloom and Dr. Christine Harris). Dr. Alan Goldbloom and Dr. Christine Harris 
https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/committees/administration-justice/parliament-36/transcripts/committee-
transcript-1996-feb-07#P481_149033 at 1140. 
391 Dr. Alan Goldbloom ibid at 1140; and Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on the Administration of 
Justice, Evidence, 35 (March 25 1992) at 1109 (Ontario College of Family Physicians, Dr. George Miller). 
https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/committees/administration-justice/parliament-35/transcript/committee-
transcript-1992-mar-25#P205_60163 at 1109. 
392 Dr. Alan Goldbloom, ibid at 1150. 
393 Former Minister of Health (1987-1990) Elinor Caplan speaking here as opposition Liberal MPP when Bill 19 
was introduced: The package of legislation that is before us comes from years of identified need to address some 
very specific and fundamental issues. The package of legislation was required because prior to the legislation that 
was presented by the previous government, the NDP Rae government; there was no comprehensive legislation that 
dealt exclusively with areas of consent to treatment. You did have some dealt with under the Mental Health Act, 
some under the Child and Family Services Act under the responsibility of the Ministry of Community and Social 
Services, and some under the Public Hospitals Act, Ministry of Health. “Bill 19, An Act to repeal the Advocacy Act, 
1992, revise the Consent to Treatment Act, 1992, amend the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992”, 2nd reading, 
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case management, formal rights advice and systemic advocacy to vulnerable adults.394 While the 
Advocacy Act did not offer advocacy services to minors, the overwhelming defeat of the Act in 
1996 strengthened the overall role of family members as substitute decision makers of choice, a 
move which I argue eroded autonomy producing conditions for trans children and youth who 
were more likely to be at odds with their family members.395 
Previously when any finding of incapacity was made a doctor had to give the patient 
information about how to contact a rights advisor.396 As Bill 19 was introduced in 1995, former 
Liberal Minister of Health, Elinor Caplan said, “I despair that this legislation removes all 
advocacy services, removes all rights advice.”397 This was the formally funded Advocacy 
Commission that provided public awareness about health care rights, enabling vulnerable youth 
(but not minors) to advocate for themselves and benefit from collaborative decision making 
when their families are unsupportive or unavailable.  If doctors resent the considerable time 
required to attend hearings at the CCB, they may not consistently inform patients of their rights 
to contest findings or help them contact lawyers, actions which alone may not be effective if the 
person is a minor, is not comfortable in English, uses ASL or is intimidated by lawyers. 
                                                 
Legislative Assembly Debates, 36-1 (November 22 1995)https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/house-
documents/parliament-36/session-1/1995-11-22/hansard#P441_105096 at 1730 (Elinor Caplan).. 
394 In 1996 the Advocacy Act was repealed as part of the Harris government’s common-sense revolution to save 
money leaving vulnerable adults minimally protected under the remaining statutes. For example, when introducing 
Bill 19 Attorney General Charles Harnick described the Advocacy Act as intrusive and an “expensive and 
unnecessary adjunct to existing services” in “Bill 19” ibid: https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/house-
documents/parliament-36/session-1/1995-11-22/hansard#P441_105096 at 1510-1700 (Hon Charles Hornick). MPP. 
Helen Johns said ibid: (Huron) https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/house-documents/parliament-36/session-
1/1995-11-22/hansard#P441_105096 “What we are saying is that we're going to eliminate the intrusive bureaucracy 
that came about through the last act and we're going to restore the role of the family in the care and treatment of 
their family and their close family members. It's very important to us to allow the family to make the decisions about 
what they believe is right for their family. This Health Care Consent Act does that for us.” 
395 AA supra note 270. 
396 LCO supra note 272 at 318-319. 
397 “Bill 19” supra note 395 at 1750 (Elinor Caplan). Elinor Caplan https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-
business/house-documents/parliament-36/session-1/1995-11-22/hansard#P441_105096 at 1750. 
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To illustrate this point through the operation of the HCCA’s own review tribunal, I examined 
decisions from the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB).398 S. 32(1) of the HCCA gives a person 
found incapable of making a treatment decision the right to challenge the health care provider’s 
finding of incapacity before the Board.399 However, the HCCA only requires health care 
practitioners to provide rights advisor information when the incapacity finding pertains to 
psychiatric treatment. 400 Thus, the bulk of the patients challenging findings of incapacity are 
psychiatric patients because they are the ones who are informed of their rights and the 
jurisprudence reflects this imbalance in access to review. Four reported CCB hearings were 
requested by youth diagnosed with gender identity disorder or gender dysphoria. While all the 
youth were challenging their involuntary status as psychiatric patients under the Mental Health 
Act, only two of the youth challenged findings of incapacity to make a decision to refuse 
psychiatric treatment under the HCCA.401 No other formal evidence exists of trans youth 
challenging incapacity findings under the HCCA. This suggests that trans youth do not often use 
the CCB for redress. They then miss out on an autonomy- promoting process that could possibly 
improve their health outcomes.402 Given that in the next chapter the focus group participants 
share several instances of health care providers’ findings of incapacity that they disagreed with 
but left uncontested in part due to unfamiliarity with their legal rights. This is troubling.  
                                                 
398 I examined CCB cases that were decided between 1996 - 2018. 
399 HCCA supra note 11 at s. 32(1). 
400 Ibid at s.32. 
401 KR (Re), 2011 CanLII 71437 (ON CCB), http://canlii.ca/t/fnsrf; ED (Re), 2014 CanLII 14703 (ON CCB), 
http://canlii.ca/t/g6cv0; CW (Re), 2016 CanLII 95339 (ON CCB), <http://canlii.ca/t/gwwp3>, MO (Re), 2014 
CanLII 14733 (ON CCB), <http://canlii.ca/t/g6csx> This youth was noted as being “native-Canadian”, however for 
the other cases race/ethnicity was not mentioned. 
402 Geist & Opler, supra note 277 at 867. 
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Substitute Decision Making 
 
The HCCA also provides a way to obtain a decision about health care treatment from a 
substitute, for someone who is incapable of consenting themselves. The Act recognizes that it is 
not always necessary (or expedient) to turn to an appointed decision-maker who has been 
through the legal procedures of the SDA.403 For example, the person’s mental incapacity may be 
only short-term or for one type of decision. Health care providers can automatically apply a 
hierarchal list of substitute decision makers in which legal guardians such as parents are ranked 
5th.404 Family members through blood, adoption and marriage ties are explicitly recognized 
creating a prima facie preference for traditional family members.405 The HCCA requires an 
application to be brought before the CCB under s. 33 by the incapable person or a person at least 
16 years old who wishes to be appointed as the SDM of the incapable person. Trans people who 
are at greater risk of estrangement from or conflict with biological family would have to apply to 
have a chosen family member appointed as their SDM.406  
                                                 
403 SDA, supra note 356. 
404 HCCA, supra note 11, s 20(1) 5. 
405 Ibid at s.20(10). 
406 Attorney General Charles Harnick stressed the goal of streamlining substitute decision making by family 
members for incapable patients through HCCA and amendments to the SDA, “Bill 19” supra note 386 
athttps://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/house-documents/parliament-36/session-1/1995-11-
22/hansard#P441_105096 1500 (Hon Charles Harnick); Jeffrey Cowan of the HIV and AIDS Legal Clinic of 
Ontario deputed on the need to expand the definition of family to include chosen family members trusted by gay 
men, HIV+ people and drug users who are more likely to be estranged from family,s Legislative Assembly, 
Standing Committee on the Administration of Justice, Evidence, 36 (February 8 1996) 
https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/committees/administration-justice/parliament-36/transcripts/committee-
transcript-1996-feb-08#P944_297051 at 1600 (Jeffrey Cowan). In EAM (Re), 2015 CanLII 19104 (ON CCB), 
http://canlii.ca/t/gh4h0 the CCB chose a longtime friend and roommate over a brother as a SDM for an incapable 
man who had no spouse or children. The decision turned on the friend’s demonstration of acting in EAM’s best 
interests while the brother applied the brother’s own preferences. 
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If an incapable person had appointed an attorney for personal care or a guardian of the person 
under the SDA, those would outrank parents and all relatives by marriage or adoption.407 This 
means that a person may use the SDA to designate, in advance of incapacity, the substitute 
decision maker of their choice. This SDM must be capable and at least 16 years old.408 Although, 
if youth are not aware of their rights and options for substitute decision making, they are very 
unlikely to have created powers of attorney for personal care under the SDA. It would seem from 
studies and focus group participants that where parents exist, doctors automatically refer to 
parents and relatives.409 For example, some doctors misunderstood the HCCA hierarchy and did 
not believe that trusted friends can apply to the CCB to trump higher ranking relatives.410 This 
misunderstanding could restrain trans racialized youth’s ability to choose a supportive SDM. 
As the HIV and AIDS Legal Clinic of Ontario pointed out to legislators in the context of gay 
men and HIV+ people, incapable trans people might not want doctors to automatically appoint 
family members to make decisions for them.411 The statute does not facilitate amending the 
automatic SDM list. Enabling trans racialized youth to exclude unsupportive relatives from the 
HCCA’s s. 20 ranked SDM list without having to create a power of attorney under the SDA 
would mean youth could easily choose who would be in their circle of care for collaborative and 
supportive decision making. The College requires members “where possible” to inform patients 
of findings of incapacity and that an SDM will assist them in understanding the proposed 
                                                 
407 HCCA, supra note 11, s. 20(1) 1,2. 
408 SDA, supra note 356. 
409 Dr. Miriam Kaufman, “The Impact of the Ontario Consent to Treatment Act (Bill 109) on Adolescent Health 
Care,” Health Law in Canada, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 31–32, 1994; Interview of Dr. Miriam Kaufman, Pediatrician, 
Transgender Youth Clinic, the Hospital for Sick Children, August 2, 2017. 
410 Judith Wahl, Health Care Consent and Advance Care Planning in Ontario, Commissioned by the Law 
Commission of Ontario (Toronto, ON: Advocacy Centre for the Elderly, 2014) at 246. 
411 See Jeffrey Cowan supra note 408. 
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treatment and be responsible for making the final decision.412 The decision making for incapable 
people is explained as per the HCCA’s reliance on substitute decision making. However, there is 
one reference to “collaborating” with patients and substitute decision makers that is never 
explained.413 Where patients disagree with an incapacity finding or the highest ranking and 
appropriate SDM, doctors must tell them about the CCB and take reasonable steps to assist the 
patient, such as giving the patient the number for the lawyer referral service of the Law Society 
of Upper Canada.414  
Finally, in addition to selecting and contacting the correct SDM from the list, doctors must 
take reasonable steps to ensure that SDMs are informed of their duties and acting in accordance 
with the HCCA.415 Given that some doctors find it onerous to provide so much information 
during a typical 20-25 minute appointment, there will be times when this dialogue is truncated or 
adequate accommodations for a patient are not made. 
Professional Awareness of the Law 
 
Throughout the 18 months of debates it was clear that many health care practitioners did not 
know the relevant common law, and this was attributed to cumbersome nature and legalistic 
language of the CTA.416 Further evidence of this comes from MPPs, lawyers and doctors 
themselves. Mr. Tilson (MPP Dufferin-Pell) stated:  
                                                 
412 CPSO #3-15 supra note 276 at 7. 
413 Ibid at 1. 
414 Ibid at 7. 
415 HCCA ss. 21 & 37, and M. (A.) v. Benes, 1999 CanLII 3807 (ON CA), <http://canlii.ca/t/1f9tr> at para 23. 
416 Legislative Assembly, 36-1 Debates (November 27 1995) at 1600 (MPP Rosario Marchese); 
https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/house-documents/parliament-36/session-1/1995-11-
27/hansard#P376_100718 at 1600; Dr. Allan Goldbloom the Hospital for Sick Children supra note 
392https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/committees/administration-justice/parliament-
36/transcripts/committee-transcript-1996-feb-07#P481_149033 at 1140; Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee 
on the Administration of Justice, Evidence, 36 (February 13 1996) at 1600 (Dr.Dr. Cheryl Katz Ontario College of 
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Most medical people, in fact I don't think there was anyone, any medical health provider, 
who didn't come to me and say they were simply made dizzy by the proposals that were 
being put forward as to the very topics you're talking about. They didn't know which 
way to turn. They were worried about liability. They were worried about breaking the 
law. They didn't even understand it.417 
 
Dr Adrian Grek described his experience with the CTA as follows: 
 
…perhaps because of my own inexperience in reading laws, but I did seek legal advice 
on the question as well. I've been unable to fathom just where my authority as a 
physician, as a psychiatrist in possession of such records, actually arises to release 
information in all sorts of circumstances in this connection, and it's not at all clear to me 
or to the lawyer who advised me.418 
 
And finally, health lawyer Linda Bohnen commented that: 
 
My experience with the Consent to Treatment Act includes helping to write a detailed 
manual about it for hospitals, and I have given seminars about it to health professionals. 
I can tell you from personal experience that the Consent to Treatment Act has been very 
difficult to teach. Many health practitioners are simply bewildered by it. In my view, 
the fact that it is so complex has been a very real impediment to its being 
implemented.419 
 
As focus group participants documented in Chapter 5, doctors often preferred to consult with 
unsupportive parents even when no finding of incapacity had been made and the statute is clear 
                                                 
Family Physicians); ibid at 1530 (https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/committees/administration-
justice/parliament-36/transcripts/committee-transcript-1996-feb-13 at 1600; Steve Thomas, of Brockville Psychiatric 
Hospital Patient Council); Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on the Administration of Justice, Evidence, 
36 (February 20 1996) at 1200 (Dr. https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/committees/administration-
justice/parliament-36/transcripts/committee-transcript-1996-feb-13 at 1530; Dr. Peter Singer, University of Toronto 
Joint Centre for Bioethics); https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/committees/administration-
justice/parliament-36/transcripts/committee-transcript-1996-feb-20 at 1200; Ben Clemens ibid, at 904. 
417 Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on the Administration of Justice, Evidence, 36 (February 6 1996) at 
1110 (David Tilson PC) David Tilson PC MPP https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-
business/committees/administration-justice/parliament-36/transcripts/committee-transcript-1996-feb-
06#P146_29940 at 1110 
418 Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on the Administration of Justice, Evidence, 36 (February 6 1996) at 
1110 (Dr. Adrian Grek). Dr. Adrian Grek https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/committees/administration-
justice/parliament-36/transcripts/committee-transcript-1996-feb-06#P146_29940 at 1110 
419 Linda Bohnen Ibid https://www.ola.org:en:legislative-business:committees:administration-justice:parliament-
36:transcripts:committee-transcript-1996-feb-06 - P146_29940 at 930 (Linda Bohnen). 
 
 108 
that doctors are not liable for providing care when they properly have confirmed capacity and 
informed consent.420 
A study of Ontario doctors’ knowledge and attitudes to health consent law was conducted in 
1996 just as the new HCCA came into force.421 The participants were 15 doctors who had 
received a book on the new Act from the Ontario Medical Association and who worked in 
adolescent medicine at major hospitals in Toronto. The surveys covered the following areas: i) 
capacity to consent; ii) disclosure; iii) documentation in charts iv) addressing parent-child 
conflicts; and, v) feasibility of compliance with the new Act.422  
The physicians said they always disclosed the most detailed information to the adolescent 
patients themselves not the parents, if parents were even involved.423 Less common was the 
situation where a patient wants something that parents disagree with. Only one participant stated 
that if the parents did not agree with the youth, the procedure would not be carried out. Most 
participants felt that the new Act, because it had no age threshold, would pit doctors against 
parents, since they did not have to succeed in helping parents and the child reach an 
agreement.424 Eleven participants said they already disliked the time and loss of income required 
to attend incapacity hearings before 1996. Some expressed frustration with legal processes 
especially the involvement of lawyers. Other concerns expressed by doctors were mixed. Doctors 
thought that the new Act made it easier to treat mature patients without their parents knowing or 
                                                 
420 See infra 598 and also below at 147. 
421 Catton et al, supra note 115; Urman et al, supra note 115. 
422 Urman et al, supra note 115 at 138. 
423 Ibid at 140. 
424 Geist corroborates that doctors held this concern in 1996 in Geist, supra note 277 at 84. 
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when parents were not available.425 Doctors also felt that compliance with the HCCA would be 
harder because they found the consent process and the capacity process vague and six doctors 
found capacity hard to determine since the new Act did not spell out the assessment criteria the 
way the Consent to Treatment Act did.426 This pattern has continued despite recent statutory 
affirmations of the common law position.427  
While some doctors have embraced the greater decision-making autonomy afforded minors 
and youth under the HCCA, others remain inadequately informed about the presumption of 
capacity. For example, what to do when parents disagree with a minor or youth’s decision, make 
capacity assessments and find a youth incapable for a decision.428 This inconsistent medical 
environment leaves trans minors and youth in danger of reduced autonomy. 
Mandating Public Awareness 
 
Legal advocates for youth critiqued the draft HCCA and continue to point to its failure to 
mandate how public awareness of rights would be achieved in an arena where ignorance of rights 
has drastic consequences.429 Justice for Children and Youth testified that: 
 
The legislation the way it's written now just applies to the health care providers. You're 
not going to find a young person who's going to go and look up the act. You're not going 
to find very many people who are going to go look up the act to see what their rights 
are. They're going to be faced with a situation and told that there's a decision made, and 
at that point, without knowing that there's a piece of legislation that governs them, 
                                                 
425 Notably, doctors appeared to be unaware that minors already possessed these rights both under the 1992 CTA and 
at common law prior to 1992. 
426 Urman, supra note 115 at 144; O. Reg. 19/95, s.4(4). See also Geist, supra note 277 at 84. 
427 Catton et al, supra note 103. Recent confirmation of physicians’ continued widespread misunderstanding of 
HCCA especially the SDM hierarchy, was documented by the Advocacy Centre for the Elderly in 2014 see Wahl, 
supra note 412 at 246. 
428 Geist, supra note 277 at 285. 
429 Community Legal Education Ontario has no youth specific, trans specific or Health Care Consent Act specific 
legal resources on its website https://www.cleo.on.ca/ searched on January 10, 2018. 
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without knowing that they have a right to appeal the decision if they don't like what's 
happening, you can have all the plain language you want, but it's never going to be 
read.430 
 
Recall that the physician’s duty to provide rights advice and the required information itself 
was stripped down between the CTA and the HCCA.431 Meanwhile the barriers to challenging 
incapacity assessments remain very high for structurally vulnerable clients.432 For example, one 
legal advocate cautioned that: “Without the requirement that the young person's rights be 
communicated to them, we are going to just see young people's rights being run roughshod 
over.”433 
All things considered, the HCCA provides the skeleton for trans youth autonomy in health 
care, and professional guidelines add some flesh to that frame. Autonomy-enhancing factors such 
as trusting relationships with health care providers, knowledge of legal rights and the CCB 
process can shift the finding from incapable to capable when a youth feels like they have a forum 
in which to articulate and own their health care choices.434 And yet statutory aspirations and 
regulatory cautions belie the intersectional realities of trans racialized youth in clinical and 
adjudicative contexts causing legal advocates to describe the HCCA as “a step backward for 
human rights and for personal autonomy.”435 What might happen when a trans youth makes a 
                                                 
430 Milne, supra note 342 at 930. 
431 CTA supra note 270 at s. 9 requires a health care provider to give anyone over 14 years a notice that they can 
receive rights advice whether they are in a psychiatric facility or not, and the physician must inform the rights 
advisor that a finding of incapacity has been made if the person requests rights advice or if the finding was made in a 
psychiatric facility. The rights advisor must promptly meet with the person in question and explain the process of 
challenging a finding of incapacity. The HCCA makes no mention of the provision of rights advice, however s. 17 
instructs health care providers to follow their regulating body’s guidelines about what information to provide to a 
patient found incapable and how to provide it. 
432 LCO 2017, supra note 272 at 139–141. Other statutes that explicitly mandate public education about rights are 
the Provincial Advocate for Youth Act 2007 SO 2007, c. 9, Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act 2005 SO 
2005, c. 11, and the Ontario Human Rights Code supra note 4. 
433 Milne, supra note 342 at 930. 
434 Geist, supra note 277 at 82. 
435 Milne, supra note 342 at 940. 
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treatment decision to choose a treatment such as gender affirming surgery that will cause them to 
be infertile for the rest of their life, or when their parents disagree about the decision to use 
puberty blockers (whose effects are reversible). These considerations are at the heart of the cases 
in the next section where the autonomy and health of trans youth are undercut by binary legal 
gender categories or buried beneath their parents’ custody disputes.   
Trans Youth in Jurisprudence 
 
The decisions of courts and tribunals are an influential source in which the articulation of 
legal norms and the application of principles about consent or capacity for trans youth can be 
observed. Decisions also reveal evidence of adjudicators’ conceptions of gender categories and 
transness. One challenge for my inquiry was that trans youth are absent from Canadian 
jurisprudence up until the late 2000s when human rights complaints were made against 
provincial ministries, private businesses and school boards.436 Moreover, the race/ethnicity of 
parties is rarely noted, so with few exceptions I could not determine who is racialized, and how 
that affects the decision maker.  
To get at decision makers’ views about trans youth I had to broaden my scope from Ontario 
case law to include cases from across Canada and the decisions of Ontario administrative 
tribunals such as the Consent and Capacity Board and the Ontario Health Services Appeal and 
                                                 
436 CF v Alberta (Vital Statistics), 2014 ABQB 237 (available on http://canlii.ca/t/g6ll9) 23 yr old trans woman 
sought accurate birth certificate; Lewis v Sugar Daddy's Nightclub, 2016 HRTO 347 (available on 
http://canlii.ca/t/gnxvq), young trans masculine person was assaulted and ejected from the nightclub; TA v Ontario 
(Transportation), 2016 HRTO 17 (Interim Decision) (available on http://canlii.ca/t/gmtmv) non-binary youth seeks 
accurate driver’s licence; DB v Toronto District School Board, 2015 HRTO 1592 (available on 
http://canlii.ca/t/gm9l1). Many other complaints settled before going to the tribunal and are therefore unreported, 
Jacquelin Pegg, Inquiry Analyst, Legal Services and Inquiries, Ontario Human Rights Commission, Personal 
Correspondence (2018). 
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Review Board. The gender identity of minors is the focus of conflict in several child custody and 
access cases examined here. This small body of cases is useful because it updates what we know 
about judicial attitudes towards trans people since the 1990s marriage and social entitlement 
cases involving adult trans litigants. More importantly, what this examination of custody cases 
reveals is that trans minors’ health care rights under the HCCA are ignored, therefore, 
suppressing the development of their autonomy practices. The experiences of older youth focus 
group participants in Chapter 5 confirm the continuation of this unfortunate pattern of neglect of 
their statutory rights and the diminished conditions of their autonomy in health care in Ontario.  
Gender as a Legal Category 
 
Despite the social changes and legislative reforms discussed in Chapter 1, gender remains 
conflated with sex in legal decision making in Canada and is still considered a legitimate legal 
category for everyone including trans youth.437 This judge’s comment about a youth’s request for 
accurate pronoun use is one example of lingering legal cisnormativity:  
 
She even requested that the Tribunal refer to her as a boy. It is with great respect that 
the Tribunal explained to her that sex is also a juridical reality. The Tribunal should not 
add to the confusion and will therefore treat a juridical reality as it is; which will not 
prevent the president of the Tribunal of being empathetic to her difficult situation.438 
 
 
The judge forces the youth to identify based on his understanding of legal gender categories 
as fixed and binary, instead of revising the law to fit the youth’s expressed identity. Even in 
decisions where trans litigants were successful in gaining legal recognition of their trans 
                                                 
437 I cited human rights code amendments and Vital Statistics Acts in Chapter 1. 
438 Protection de la jeunesse — 0968 (QCCQ January 21, 2009), [2009] RJQ 1215 (QCCQ) at para 1. 
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subjectivity, I argue that judges’ understanding of gender/sex is ultimately limiting.439 In the case 
of C.F. v. Alberta (Vital Statistics) a trans feminine youth won her s. 15 Charter challenge to a 
Vital Statistics statute that prevented her from obtaining a gender/sex accurate birth certificate.440 
Justice Burrows writes a compassionate and progressive decision affirming that a trans person 
should not be forced to have genital surgery just to prove they are trans and obtain accurate 
official identification.441 Burrows rejects the Attorney General’s convoluted argument that trans 
people should not be ashamed of their gender and hide by modifying their (bio)logic 
identification, thus incurring discrimination and potential violence over mismatched 
identification documents.442 The judgement emphatically critiques the genitocentric regulation of 
gender in a way that forces trans people to out themselves as a “third sex” and suffer harms.443 
However, there are two major problems with how Burrows theorizes gender/sex. Firstly, he says: 
“Alberta’s response does not appear to appreciate that C.F. like everyone else accepts that there 
are but two sexes. She does not consider herself a member of a third sex. She considers herself 
female.”444 With this statement he declares his common-sense belief in sexual dimorphism and 
                                                 
439 One exception is the case of KAB v Ontario (Registrar General), 2013 ONCJ 684 (CanLII) at paras 8 and 12, in 
which Cohen J found that a 17 year old trans racialized youth of a single mother had withdrawn from parental 
control due in part to transphobia. She was not in the mother’s custody, as she was not in the mother’s physical care 
or control, and K.A.B. made all her own decisions about residence, education, and health care. Accordingly, she had 
the right to apply on her own, without parental consent, for a change of name to support her social transition. 
440 ABQB April 22, 2014, 2014 ABQB 237 (CanLII), http://canlii.ca/t/g6ll9 [C.F.]. 
441 Ibid at para 25; Burrows J references evidence from the U.S. National Transgender Discrimination Study (see 
Chapter 1) and cites social science of discrimination against gender variant people as a result of legal categories of 
gender. 
442 Ibid at para 52; Sharpe coined the formula, “(bio)logic” to describe legal reasoning that sex is assigned at birth 
immutably forever based on external genitalia, supra note 51 at 39-56. 
443 Ibid at para 29; “Genitocentric” is a term used by Sharpe in “From Functionality to Aesthetics: the Architecture 
of Transgender Jurisprudence” in Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, Volume 8, Number 1 (March 
2001) at para 14. According to him, genitocentric legal reasoning decides sex based on one’s genitals.  In one 
version natal sex is determined and forever fixed by doctors on the basis of external genitals at the time of birth. In 
the second version while sex may change, for a legal transition, genitals must be surgically altered to reflect that 
change. 
444 Ibid at para 57. 
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erases the existence of a gender continuum and the subjectivity of non-binary trans people. 
Secondly, in relying on the medical evidence of C.F.’s commitment to her felt gender, he 
repeatedly confirms her gender based on the permanence of her transition, and her desire to “be 
full time in the female gender role for the rest of her life.”445 These statements deny the 
possibility of a fluid gender that can change over the course of one’s life more than once. The 
evidence that gender/sex can fluctuate is a reason why it is unsound as a legal category especially 
for the purposes of identification.446 
This type of legal reasoning is based on recognizing and repairing what Sharpe calls a 
psychological cultural/social disharmony.447 This model is becoming more prevalent in Canada 
where it has been increasingly applied by human rights tribunals since the turn of the second 
millennia.448 This adjudicative move away from previous legal determinations of sex based on 
natal sex and anatomical “correctness” is positive. The model instead accepts a plastic view of 
sex/gender and allows for a social and relational understanding of gender/sex. For example, 
when Waters challenged British Columbia’s provincial health insurance plan (MSP) for failing to 
pay for his phalloplasty the Tribunal commented that: 
 
What MSP did was to leave Mr. Waters in the middle of a surgical process: not being 
totally a male in physical appearance and function and being unable and unwilling to 
return to being a physical female.  The dignity and self-respect of a person is most often 
dependent on how he sees himself and how he is seen through the eyes of society.  In 
this case, Mr. Waters is not a complete and fully-functioning physical male.  He is aware 
                                                 
445 Ibid at paras 12, 66, 67. 
446 See also XY v. Ontario (Minister of Government and Consumer Services), 2012 HRTO 726 (CanLII), [2012] 
OHRTD No. 715 for an earlier complaint involving a non-youth. For a fulsome study of this topic see Wipfler, A. J. 
(AJ) N. (2016) “Identity Crisis: The Limitations of Expanding Government Recognition of Gender Identity and the 
Possibility of Genderless Identity Documents”, Harvard Journal of Law and Gender, 39, 401–463. 
447 Sharpe 2002, supra note 51 at 59. 
448 XY v. Ontario (Government and Consumer Services), 2012 HRTO 726, Forrester v. Peel (Regional 
Municipality) Police Services Board et al, 2006 HRTO 13, Kavanagh v. Canada (Attorney General), 2001 CanLII 
8496 (CHRT), Dawson v. Vancouver Police Board (No. 2), 2015 BCHRT 54. 
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of this everyday. When he moves in the community, he is inhibited in what he can do, 
namely being naked and urinating as a man without difficulty.449  
   
 
Notably, the decision supports Waters’ desire for external affirmation of his gendered 
selfhood, while at the same time colluding with traditional expectations of males and masculinity 
and ultimately agreeing that Waters has the wrong body for a binary male. 
Some legal commentators and scholars who agree that genitocentrism is based on faulty legal 
reasoning and discriminates on grounds of sex and gender identity endorse this model.450 While 
this model allows for greater acceptance of transgender and non-binary identities as opposed to 
only “post bottom surgery” transsexuals, as Bettcher observes, this reasoning is still based on the 
wrong body pathology theory.451 As a result, psychological and psychiatric evaluations continue 
to hold disproportionate weight in judicial decision making. As Hooley writes: “It is time to 
assert that there is no wrong body and that all bodies are alright whatever their state or genital 
status. It is the power of the norm and of medicine and law which take the cultural meanings 
made of biology as ultimate truth that sustains our deviant status, body regulation and 
discrimination.”452 It is this disconnect between theory and practice, that I argue is mirrored by 
law with respect to the lived experience of its trans youth subjects. 
Against this backdrop of evolving change about some aspects of gender/sex in law I will now 
turn to analyse four cases where the health consent rights of trans minors are trumped by family 
                                                 
449 Waters v. BC Medical Services Plan, 2003 BCHRT 13 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/h09z2> at para 225. 
450 McGill and Kirkup, supra note 39 and Shauna Labman, “Left in Legal Limbo: Transsexual Identity and the Law” 
(2001) 7 Appeal: Review of Current Law and Law Reform 66. 
451 Bettcher, supra note 226 at 386-388; Sharpe 2002, supra note at Chapter 4 “Reform Jurisprudence”.  
452 J Hooley, “What is this thing called ‘Gender Dysphoria’?”, Newsletter of the Transgender Liberation Coalitio 
Inc (1994) 6. 
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law best interest’s analyses where current and future health matters related to their gender 
identity are central to both the conflict and the custody order.  
 
Trans Minors’ Health Autonomy Rights Buried in Family Law  
 
The cases examined in this section illuminate how judges interpret the applicability of the 
HCCA’s consent provisions in custody and access proceedings. Justice Perkins frames the 
conundrum as follows:  
I have been struggling with how to balance or reconcile the powers and duties of the 
court under the Divorce Act to make custody and access orders in the best interests of 
the children, on the one hand, with, on the other hand, the children’s growing entitlement 
to personal autonomy and respect of their views and preferences.453 
 
 
Custody and access decisions result in orders that include directives about health-related 
matters. Such directives are especially pivotal for trans and gender non-conforming minors who 
have a greater propensity towards engagement in their own health care. Custody however is not a 
monolith. It refers to a bundle of rights and responsibilities regarding a child which can be 
separated and allocated to any person with custody of the child.454 Medical decision-making 
authority is bundled with education in custody orders, however some orders involve specific 
therapeutic directives which arguably engage the HCCA with its presumption of capacity for all 
                                                 
453 N.L. v R.R.M. 2016 ONSC 809 (CanLII), 76 RFL (7th) 428 Perkins J, at para 137. 
454 Chou v York Regional School Board [2005] OJ No 1374 (QL) (ONSC) at para 21; ss. 20(2) and (3) Children’s 
Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c. C.12 which governs custody and access when not arising from a divorce. 
 
 117 
persons. The best interests of the child analysis guide uide the custody decision, and I argue that 
health-related issues be construed broadly as treatment requiring corollary consent.455  
With no clear appellate ruling on the applicability of the HCCA consent provisions to minors 
in family court orders, lower court judges have taken different directions. There is obiter dicta 
recognition that minors close to 18 years old need to consent for health-related orders.456 There is 
also diversity of opinion in lower courts about the scope of the term “treatment” under the HCCA 
because a broad interpretation increases the instances where a person’s consent is required.457 
Furthermore, while the majority of judges favour paternalistic therapeutic solutions to family law 
matters, some judges recognize that to foster autonomy means allowing capable minors to make 
choices that courts and parents do not agree with.458 
Lawyers have made arguments that health-related incidents of custody should be decided 
under health consent law not family law. In N.K. v A.H., a British Columbia case, a father sought 
to prevent his racialized 11-year-old child from transitioning by attempting to wrest custody 
                                                 
455 Applicable sections of the CLRA: s. 24 (b) the child’s views and preferences if they can reasonably be ascertained 
and (d) the ability and willingness of each person applying for custody of the child to provide the child with 
guidance and education, the necessaries of life and any special needs of the child. Applicable sections of the Divorce 
Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), s. 16(6) authorizes the court to "impose such other terms, conditions or restrictions 
in connection therewith as it thinks fit and just". 
456 Leelaratna v. Leelaratna, 2018 ONSC 5983 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/hvgtc> a 12 yr old is ordered to attend 
therapy against his and his mother’s wishes although Audet J states that consent would likely be required for older 
children before a therapeutic order could be issued at para 67. 
457 For definition of treatment under HCCA see supra note 11. N.L. v R.R.M. 2015 ONSC “But the definition of 
treatment under the Health Care Consent Act is much broader than psychotherapy and counselling” Perkins J at para 
129; affirmed in Barett v Huver 2018 ONSC 2322 where the case was not decided on this point, however, Shaw J, 
stated in obiter dicta that reunification therapy was treatment by regulated health professional and the consent of 12 
and 15 yr olds would be required under the HCCA at paras 28, 31, 35, 42, 47. Cases that defined treatment narrowly 
and thus avoided engaging consent provisions of HCCA are Testani v Haughton 2016 ONSC 5827 ordered therapy 
for 13 yr old who refused therapy through custody order, but considered consent of parents to their own therapeutic 
order; and E.T. v. L.D., 2017 ONSC 4870 (CanLII), http://canlii.ca/t/h5c2r where consent of children 9, 12 and 16 
years of age was not required for an order to attend family reunification therapy because the therapy was held not to 
be treatment and the psychologist was not considered a regulated health professional at para 60. 
458 J.K.L. v. N.C.S., 2008 CanLII 30289 (ONSC), at paras 192–193 Turnbull J ordered therapy for a 13 yr old and 
erred in thinking HCCA had an age threshold of 16 years for legal capacity. 
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from the gender-affirming parent.459 The father also wanted the mother and child to terminate 
their retainer with barb findlay, queer activist lawyer, and to stop using other trans positive 
services and resources. The father’s wishes would certainly have undermined his child’s ability 
to access information about being trans, therefore thwarting conditions for autonomy 
development for the child. Deciding the case in neither parents favour, Justice Skolrod identified 
the ongoing conflicts as between the parents. As required by statute, the judge prioritized the 
child’s best interests by making sure they had their own litigation guardian, so in a sense, 
protecting their legal autonomy.460 That said, the judge ignored arguments made by the mother’s 
lawyer that the urgent issues of the possible use of puberty blockers before the onset of 
irrevocable pubertal changes pertained to health law not family law.461 The judge could have 
rejected the father’s motion on the basis that the court cannot actually grant the father legal 
authority to prevent the child from making medical decisions with their doctor by way of a 
custody order.462 The judge did not consider that under s. 17 of the British Columbia Infants Act 
the minor would have been able to make their own transition-related health decisions.463  
                                                 
459 N.K. v A.H. 2016 BCSC 744 (Prince George) (CanLII) available on, <http://canlii.ca/t/gpphw>, See also Halton 
Children’s Aid Society v G.K., BRK 2015 ONCJ 307 available on < http://canlii.ca/t/gjf2d> [Halton]. The decision 
does mention that the minor is racialized, however I received this information in personal communication with their 
lawyer barb findlay, October 19, 2018.  
460 Divorce Act (RSC, 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) s. 16(8); Family Law Act [Sbc 2011] Chapter 25 s. 37 (1) In making an 
agreement or order under this Part respecting guardianship, parenting arrangements or contact with a child, the 
parties and the court must consider the best interests of the child only and s. 37(2)(a) (2) To determine what is in the 
best interests of a child, all of the child's needs and circumstances must be considered, including the following: (a) 
the child's health and emotional well-being;. 
461 A point made argued by barb findlay and shared in our personal communication about the case.  
462 For decisions making this argument see Barrett v Huver, and N.L. v R.R.M.; and Children's Aid Society of 
Toronto v. M.S., [2018] OJ No. 123, 2018 ONCJ 14 
463 Infants Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 223, ss. 17(2), (3). Note that s. 17(3)(b) gives infants consent as long as the 
health care providers agrees that the decision is in their best interest. 
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In Halton v. G.K, a Children’s Aid Society tried to apprehend two children from their mother 
and place them in their father's custody with the Society’s supervision.464 The position of the 
Society and the father was that the mother was forcing “S.”, a four-year-old child assigned male 
at birth to behave and dress like a girl against the child’s wishes.465 The mother had been trying 
to support the child in developing their autonomy skills by seeking out community-based 
resources and other trans positive doctors.466 
Justice O’Connell found discrepancies in both parents’ evidence regarding their four-year-old 
child’s gender identity and gender expression.467 In that context, her ruling gave paramount 
weight to the expert medical evidence provided by Dr. Joseph Bonifacio of the Gender Clinic at 
the Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto.468  
Dr. Bonifacio recommended providing the child with a variety of options for behaviour and 
appearance without gendering such options and also reducing the number of medical 
professionals treating the child sees to avoid shaming and pathologizing the child.469 The judge 
was uncomfortable with the provision asking for either party to notify the Society if S. 
“expresses the desire to dress as a girl” because the meaning of dressing like a girl was unclear 
and seemed to incur negative consequences to S. if they did decide to “dress as a girl”.470 
                                                 
464 Halton, supra note 460 at para 1. 
465 Ibid at paras 13-14. 
466 Ibid at paras 43-44. 
467 Section 24 of the CLRA details the factors that a court shall consider when making a determination with respect 
to custody and access, and these factors act as a useful guide for a best interests analysis under the Divorce Act 
supra note 461 in A.F. v. D.G., 2012 ONSC 764, at para 185. 
468 Dr. Bonifacio explained the stages of gender development in young children, distinguished between gender 
expression and gender identity, and then cautioned against pushing a child towards any one gender identity based on 
their gender expressive preferences ibid at para 51. 
469 Ibid at para 52. 
470 Dressing like a girl was established as wearing skirts and dresses from the girls’ section of a clothing store, not 
just wearing pink and purple coloured clothing ibid at paras 111-112.  
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Dressing like a girl was established as wearing skirts and dresses from the girls’ section of a 
clothing store, not just wearing pink and purple coloured clothing. The judge amended the 
provision to read: “Neither party shall unilaterally dress S. as a girl or force S. to take on certain 
gender roles.” In the event that S. wanted to “dress as a girl” the party who had care of S. would 
notify the other parent and the CAS to decide how to proceed.471 The judge’s exposition in this 
case showed the artificiality of determining gendered behaviour for a child. The judge affirmed 
that gender identity and social roles are binary, in other words distinct for girls and boys.472 The 
order contained directives about treatment for the child by paediatricians and a family physicians 
as well as the Hospital for Sick Children’s Transgender Youth Clinic.473 Yet despite the presence 
of a gender specialist from a progressive transgender youth clinic, and ongoing medical 
treatments contemplated, there was no mention of the developing autonomy in decision making 
of the child who would eventually have the right, under the HCCA, if capable, to make their own 
decisions about medical transition.474  
In a third case where a non-binary 12-year-old child was the subject of a custody dispute 
between their non-binary mother and their father, Dr. Bonifacio again provided expert 
testimony.475 The judge’s opinion on the child’s gender identity was as follows:   
 
The child’s decision to identify as gender neutral has been made, even if influenced by 
the mother, what is relevant is which parent is best able to support the child. I am guided 
by the evidence of Dr. Bonifacio who testified that the parents should just wait and see 
and let the child function.  I find that it is the father who is the parent most likely to just 
                                                 
471 Ibid at 114. 
472 Ibid at 113. 
473 Ibid at 161. 
474 Ultimately, the father withdrew his appeal based on the amended gender-variance alert condition and the judge 
asked the parents to continue the shared schedule as before. 
475 J.P.K. v. S.E., 2017 ONCJ 306. 
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let N. be and explore his gender issues whereas the mother has difficulty letting N. be 
his own person.476  
 
Weight was given to the fact that the father was also attending a Gender Identity Group with 
the child. Ultimately the father was granted full custody over the child as he was found to be 
more responsible, stable and would cooperate with health professionals better than the mother.477 
The child had seen a psychologist and both parents took the child to different therapists.478 The 
custody order grants the father “sole decision making authority over all major issues regarding 
education, religion, medical, healthcare and counselling decisions”.479 This may be standard 
language for a custody order, yet nowhere else in the decision is there reference in obiter dicta to 
the minor’s health consent rights under the HCCA, to alert the parents of the existence of such 
rights.480  
The last custody case is B.D v M.M. where the gender fluid child was nine years old.481 The 
father, a middle-class engineer was unsupportive of social transitioning, let alone medical 
transition. The mother, a worker at a sexual assault centre was supportive of the child’s gender 
exploration. The child was comfortable expressing their gender with the mother and was upset 
and repressed about their gender with the father. The father felt the mother outsourced her 
parenting to professionals. In fact, the father’s central allegation in the case is that the child’s 
                                                 
476 At para 184. 
477 Zisman J, at paras 196-198. 
478 Ibid at para 26. 
479 Ibid at para 207. 
480 Notably the minor had been able to access free community support services, and out of pocket psychological 
services because various family members were able to take them to appointments and pay for uninsured services. 
The child was also a student in the Toronto District School Board which compared to school boards in smaller cities 
and towns, offers several supports for gender-expansive students, which however are culturally/racially white 
dominated. The minor might learn about their rights through community supports but as per the court and the 
parents would be unaware of their rights. 
481 Davies v. Murdock, 2017 ONSC 4763 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/h59c6>. 
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gender expression is scripted by these professionals and the mother and not a reflection of the 
child’s true desires and wishes.482 Recall this idea of self-awareness as a concept key to 
autonomy development of self from Chapter 2. Also, recall that this development is not status 
and is informed by internal and external factors like culture, religion and social interactions. 
In terms of final procedures for gender affirming decision making for the child who is nearing 
puberty, the Judge ordered: 
 
With respect to medical and psychological decisions or mental health regarding 
Rosie/James’ gender non-conformity the parents shall follow the recommendations of 
Dr. Stephen Feder, director of the Gender Diversity Clinic at CHEO or another doctor 
at the clinic if Dr. Feder is no longer able to provide services for Rosie/James. If there 
is a dispute as to those recommendations or their implementation, the parties are first to 
attempt to resolve the matter through the exchange of written proposals. If the dispute 
remains unresolved after the exchange of written proposals on the issue, it is strongly 
recommended the parties attend mediation or retain the services of a parenting 
coordinator to attempt to resolve the dispute, and share the costs proportionate to their 
incomes. If the dispute remains unresolved, the parties may return the matter to Court 
for determination.483 
 
 
The above order is issued even though earlier the Judge held that:  
 
As previously indicated, the parties’ ability to communicate, cooperate and collaborate 
in order to meet the needs and interests of their children has become severely 
compromised over the course of these proceedings.  In fact, the conflict and dispute 
between the parents caused the children’s doctor Dr. Kaplan-Myrth to withdraw her 
services in February 2016. As of December, 2016, the parties had not been able to agree 
on an appropriate replacement. 
 
 
This again is a case where the judge does not show an awareness of a minor’s legal rights 
conferred by the HCCA, perhaps because counsel did not argue it. Cis parents are becoming 
aware of gender identity and gender expression and the treatments available for trans and gender 
                                                 
482 Ibid at paras 26-27. 
483  B.D. v. M.M., [2017] OJ No. 4121, 2017 ONSC 4763 supra note 483 at para 192 and 31. 
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nonconforming children. Indeed, the child and their parents would be best served to be informed 
of such rights and cautioned that the child should be supported in making their own health care 
decisions about transitioning.484 
The language used by most judges in these four decisions and custody orders would not 
disrupt a parent’s belief that they can exercise full control over their trans children’s ongoing 
health care decisions. Furthermore, minors approaching puberty (4-12 yr olds), becoming aware 
of their legal rights to health care decision making autonomy is crucial in the face of potentially 
unsupportive parents and ignorant or intractable health care providers.485 And indeed, if both 
parents agreed on not supporting a gender-variant or trans youth, and the child did not have 
access to groups, resources, progressive clinics, the youth would likely not be able to transition 
in the manner they wanted to because of ignorance of their rights. And as we have seen from the 
literature and as the focus group participants confirm in the following chapter, this capability to 
self-advocate is key for the autonomy of trans racialized youth in health care at any age. 
Several of the decisions reveal attempts to grapple with gender and age-based roles for 
children within the contested site of the family. Yet despite the relevance of informed consent to 
treatment and the legal irrelevance of age in the HCCA, the judicial direction of lower courts is 
towards consolidation of control over minors’ decision-making autonomy in the hands of 
                                                 
484 In Leelaratna supra note 457 at para 78, while Audet J ordered therapy for a resistant teen, she recognized that 
uncooperative older teens may make a therapeutic order inoperable, and she considered the means to “convince an 
older child to cooperate” such as using the child’s own counsel or by meeting with the judge.  
485 Where youth were parties to proceedings and thus represented by their own counsel they argued for their 
autonomy in health care even if judges who both referenced “autonomy” declined to decide on the HCCA consent 
provisions: see S.G.B. v. S.J.L., 2010 ONCA 578 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/2cgvq> where a 16 yr old with 
learning disability was granted intervenor status and a stay of a far-reaching custody order by Mesbur J [2010 ONSC 
3717 at para 25] giving his mother authority to make all health related decisions for him due to his special needs, 
full-time school attendance, and being under 18; and see N. L. v. R.R.M. 2016 ONSC 809 17 and 18 yr olds asserted 
consent to treatment rights under HCCA which Perkins J affirmed in obiter dicta at para 113 but decided case against 
making a therapeutic order of counselling saying children had withdrawn from parental control and not subject to 
any custody order. 
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parents. Conditions that foster autonomy for minors continues to be a determining factor later in 
ensuring trans youth’s access to healthcare as we will see in the following chapter.  
In summary, when it comes to the application of the HCCA to minors and youth in various 
legal contexts, the two values of autonomy and protection continue to vie for precedence. As 
Paré argues, while legislation ostensibly recognizes the principle of autonomy for minors, "the 
protectionist approach remains integral to decision making".486 Autonomy, when referenced does 
not incorporate relational autonomy, for example HCCA rights education, recognition of chosen 
family or collaborative supported decision making. The conservative and paternalistic nature of 
the judiciary is alive and well. We see this in terms of court-ordered therapy for minors and older 
youth, circumventing the HCCA, and when it comes to enforcing binary gender and passing 
health-related decisions over to the guardians of trans and gender-non conforming minors.487 The 
data of Chapter 5 confirms that the trans racialized youth who are not minors still experience the 
same treatment. 
 Part 2 The Regulation of Transness through Authoritative Texts 
 
Doctors have the HCCA and the policy documents from their professional colleges to guide 
them through legal issues of consent. In their dual role as health care providers and as 
gatekeepers to health care they also reference nosologies and clinical texts. In this next section I 
                                                 
486 Paré, supra note 107 at 108. 
487 Manitoba and Alberta still balance the mature minor rule against child welfare legislation in situations where 
medical legal establishments paternalistically seek to protect the minor from their own decisions. New Brunswick 
has an age-based presumption in its legislation, and its Appeal Court affirmed the mature minor rule in Pole v. 
Region 2 Hospital Corporation, 1994 CanLII 4470 (NB CA). There were disagreements between judges about 
whether parens patriae jurisdiction was still valid despite the combination of the mature minor rule and the Medical 
Consent of Minors Act, SNB 1976, c M-6.1. 
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examine the two most authoritative clinical texts applicable to trans racialized youth: the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Standards of 
Care (SoC) issued by the WPATH. I contend that both texts work against the autonomy of trans 
racialized youth in health care in two distinct ways. Firstly, the formula derived from the DSM 
and absorbed by the SoC is coded to recognize and affirm normative gender roles, middle class 
realities and is configured to white/Western cultural standards.488 Secondly, the SoC eligibility 
requirements deselect racialized youth because of the SoC’s lack of intersectional and anti-racist 
analysis. Then I explain the implications for trans racialized youth when these authoritative texts 
are absorbed within insurance regulations. Finally, I provide a contrast by discussing a set of 
local guidelines developed with trans community knowledge and input for primary care 
practitioners. This brings us closer to Chapter 5, the phenomenology of four trans racialized 
youth, who will deepen this inquiry through their own words and photographs. 
Coercive Pathology  
 
Psychiatric institutions in particular have made themselves experts on trans people through 
professional committees that produce authoritative diagnostic and clinical texts such as the DSM 
and the SoC.489 When governments sanction professional expertise through policy, physicians 
then control access to trans health care. Furthermore, placing mental health professionals in the 
gatekeeper role undermines trust in therapeutic relationships and reduces the benefits of therapy 
                                                 
488 Sarkisova supra note 329 at 262. I use the phrase “white/Western” as conceptualized by G. Mahrouse, “Race-
conscious transnational activists with cameras: Mediators of compassion,” International Journal of Cultural Studies, 
2008 vol. 11, no. 1, 87 at 91. With that phrase Mahrouse captures “the complex confluence of race (whiteness) and 
nation (Canadian), geopolitical centre/margin location (Western) that produces the privilege that marks the work” of 
in this case the American Psychiatric Association and the WPATH.  
489 Sarkisova ibid at 261 and Chang, supra note 120 at 47. 
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for trans people.490 As I showed through the literature in Chapter 1, and as youth confirm in 
Chapter 5 there is a formulaic narrative that trans people know they must recite when seeking 
treatments. Sarkisova, encapsulates the dialogic process early described by Denny, Stone and 
others in Chapter 1 into the concept of “coercive pathology”. 491 Sarkisova describes it as a 
“pathologizing psychiatric narrative [that] narrows the possibilities for what it means or can 
mean to be trans”.492 Coercive pathology ultimately concludes that the formula for diagnosis 
mimics cisnormative narratives, desires and paths.493  
The Nosology of Trans Youth 
 
The SoC endorses the DSM, a manual of mental disorders, produced by the APA as an 
authoritative classification system for the health conditions of trans people.494 The DSM authors 
have been primarily white, male, middle-class, high-status psychiatrists.495 They determine what 
constitutes a mental illness based on grouping symptoms of so-called abnormal behaviours. 
Psychiatry is socially and culturally situated, thus the authors of the DSM operate within their 
own social constructions of abnormality.496 Numerous studies have pointed to racial, cultural and 
                                                 
490 Lev, supra note 130 at 53-54.; Chang, supra note 120 at 49; Sarkisova, supra note 329. 
491 See Stone 1991, supra note 125; Denny 1996, supra note 132; Prosser, supra note 132 and in Namaste 2000, 
supra note 75; Spade 2003, supra note 52 at 2 and Thom, supra note 132. 
492  Sarkisova, supra note 329 at 263. See also Prosser, supra note 132, and Spade 2003, supra note 52 and Dean 
Spade, “Mutilating Gender” in Stryker & Whittle, supra note 226 at 315. Trans people have shared fictional and 
autobiographical narratives since the 1960’s as ways of writing themselves into existence and challenging the 
pathological medical model. See Janet Mock, Imogen Binnie, Kai Cheng Thom, and Dylan Scholinski through 
blogs, magazine articles, photographs and novels that challenge medico-legal stereotypes. 
493 Sarkisova, supra note 329 at 262. 
494 SoC, supra note 273 at 5-6. The SoC also references the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) now on 
version 11 released June 2018 which is used more widely around the world, has a primary care focus and is 
published by the World Health Organization, http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/. I address the DSM in my 
research as it is the primary diagnostic text used in Canada. 
495 Preface to Caplan and Cosgrove, supra note 123 at xx. 
496 M. Linder, “The Construction of Illness,” in Caplan and Cosgrove supra note 123, 3–7 at 3. 
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gender bias in the creation of DSM diagnoses.497 Despite these critiques and resulting changes to 
definitions of illnesses over decades, DSM authors continue to view nosology as atheoretical and 
race and gender neutral. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to recount the long and 
turbulent history of trans nosology a brief summary of nosological evolution helps establish my 
argument that the APA is a driving force in coercive pathological narratives for trans racialized 
youth.498 From 1980 to 2013, the APA classified trans minor youth under “Gender Identity 
Disorder in Children and Adolescents”. In 2013, the APA changed the classification to Gender 
Dysphoria (GD) in the DSM-V. Currently GD describes a marked incongruence between one’s 
experienced gender and one’s sex characteristics, how one is perceived and gendered in society, 
respectively for more than six months and accompanied by “clinically significant distress or 
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.”499 Often during 
adolescence, GD is worsened by intense distress about body image, and the wish to alter physical 
and behavioural sex characteristics.500  
Whereas distress over one’s physical and psychological incongruence could be partially 
remedied by medical treatments, the phenomenon of transphobia also causes intense distress and 
though widespread is not considered pathological.501 While the 2013 nosological change 
certainly decreased the pathologization of transness and shifted the focus to the experience of 
                                                 
497 R. Littlewood, “Psychiatric Diagnosis and Racial Bias: Empirical and Interpretative Approaches,” Social Science 
and Medicine, vol. 34, no. 2, 141–149, 1992; Alisha Ali, “Racism in Psychiatric Bias”, in Caplan and Cosgrove, 
supra note 123; N. Javed, “Clinical Cases and the Intersection of Sexism and Racism,” in Caplan and Cosgrove, 
supra note 123, 77–80. 
498 For history of the psychiatric classification of transness see Jemma Tosh, “Working together for an Inclusive and 
Gender-Creative Future: A Critical lens on ‘Gender Dysphoria’” in Meyer & Pullen-Sansfaçon, supra note 53, 41.  
499 DSM-V, supra note 3. 
500 Mieke Roder et al, “Health-related quality of life in transgender adolescents: Associations with body image and 
emotional and behavioral problems” (2018) 19:1 Int J Transgenderism 78. 
501 For evidence of psychological impacts of transphobia on trans youth see ODSP appeal cases from the Social 
Benefits Tribunal in this chapter infra note 575. 
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distress over transphobia and gender incongruence, the diagnostic criteria for GD barely 
changed.502 
The World Professional Association for Trans Health Standards of Care 
 
The WPATH SoC version 7 are the latest internationally prescribed clinical standards 
regarding transition related care for transsexual and transgender people.503 They cover the 
components of a gender dysphoria diagnosis, puberty suppression, hormone replacement 
therapy, mental health assessment, requirements for surgery, surgical procedures and 
postoperative care. The SoC are also the officially accepted protocols for provincially insured 
gender affirming surgeries in Ontario. Ontario’s Ministry of Health and Long Term Care 
(MOHLTC) adopted these standards when developing insurance coverage regulations for 
surgeries.504 However, analogous to the widespread misapplication of health decision making 
law in Ontario, it is reported that many health care providers apply outdated clinical standards 
and believe that diagnosis is required for hormone replacement therapy instead of a less coercive 
and less pathologizing assessment.505  
The SoC have improved since they were originally released as the Harry Benjamin Standards 
in 1979.506 For example, Version 7 incorporates harm reduction principles and explicitly 
                                                 
502 Kelley Winters, “Methodological Questions in Childhood Gender Identity ‘Desistence’ Research”, (Paper 
delivered at the 23rd WPATH Health Biennial Symposium, Colorado, February 16, 2014), online: GID Reform 
Weblog <gidreform.wordpress.com/2017/02/10/revisiting-flawed-research-behind-the-80-childhood-gender-
dysphoria-desistance-myth/>; and Tosh, supra note 500 at 56.   
503 SoC, supra note 273. 
504 MHLTC SRS, supra note 274. 
505Interviews with Kai Cheng Thom (May 2016), Jordan Zaitzow (April 2016 and March 2017) and see also SoC, 
supra note 273 at 166–167. 
506 The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association (HBGDA) is the precursor to the WPATH. It 
was named after the endocrinologist who started treating transgender youth in the United States. There have been six 
versions of the Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders, published in 1979, 1980, 1981, 1990, 1998, and 
2001. 
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acknowledges the North American and Western European research foundations of the SoC.507 
Notwithstanding these aspirational statements and their improvement over previous standards, v7 
continues to espouse the professional mental health medical model where individuals with a 
disease require treatment. Additionally, they impose requirements that contraindicate against 
access to treatments for trans youth of colour. 
Cisnormativity, misogyny and pathologizing elements within the DSM-V and the SoC are 
easy to identify because the language used is explicit, and indeed substantial critiques on these 
topics exist.508 The SoC are most easily understood by and meant to be used by people who have 
a medical or health education because of the abstract and psychiatric lexicon they deploy. 
Frequently used terms like “patient”, “management”, “clinical” and “eligibility” are 
pathologizing to a trans reader. Recalling that the SoC incorporates the DSM’s misogynist gender 
binary, recently some have highlighted concerns that the SoC remains problematic for gender 
non–binary, trans feminine people:509 a DSM-V diagnosis of the mental illness of Gender 
Dysphoria; a one-year test of living in your felt gender role without surgery; a three-month 
mental health screening and assessment before any type of treatment; an identifiable history and 
narrative of cross-gender affiliation.  
While racism is harder to pinpoint, the core required elements of the SoC are damaging to 
trans people and gender non-conforming people of colour. The reader can recall the observations 
of Stone and Ms. Major from Chapter 1 about the cultural whiteness of the HBGDA/WPATH 
ideology of transness and the racism within the clinical encounter. The way that authoritative 
texts affect trans racialized youth differently is seen through what is not acknowledged and in the 
                                                 
507 SoC, supra note 274 at 1, 2, 33, 36, 44. 
508 Tosh, supra note 500; Sarkisova, supra note 329; Chang, supra note 120. 
509 Sarkisova, supra note 329 at 261–265; Pyne 2018, supra note 35. 
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application of the diagnostic and eligibility criteria. To illustrate the first point, there is no 
mention of social determinants of health, intersectional identities, structural or systemic barriers 
to care or the importance of community generated knowledge anywhere in the SoC. In a 
reference about which youth are accessing treatment through gender clinics the SoC says: 
The percentages of treated adolescents are likely influenced by the organization of 
health care, insurance aspects, cultural differences, opinions of health professionals, and 
diagnostic procedures offered in different settings.510 
 
Beyond this vague comment, the SoC does not dig deeper into the different impacts and 
experiences and clinical needs of racialized, disabled trans people. There is minimal 
acknowledgement of white/Western research foundations and the continued white North 
Americanness of the SoC Committee and International Selection Committees.511 And finally, the 
SoC uncritically elevates mental health professionals especially psychiatrists whose field has 
been critiqued for its implicit white/Western bias. Devoid of meaningful anti-oppressive critique, 
there is no signal of awareness that racism, ageism, classism and ableism are embedded in the 
culture of the APA or the WPATH, let alone action to change the practices.512 
Application of the following SoC eligibility minimum criteria has a differential impact on 
trans racialized youth: expression of a recognizable story, with familiar symptoms, signs of 
physical and social commitment to the gender role, being stable, and having family support.513  
As Pyne’s research suggested in Chapter 1, trans racialized youth are largely absent from the 
                                                 
510 SoC, supra note 273. 
511 Of the 34-member Revision Committee for version 7, only nine were not from the USA, and of that nine only 
one was not from Western Europe or Canada. The International Advisory Group Selection Committee was entirely 
North American, and the International Advisory Group itself had only two members from the Global South, SoC 
supra note 273 at 111. 
512 Michel Foucault, Psychiatric power: lectures at the Collège de France, 1973-74 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003); Caplan and Cosgrove, supra note 123; Ali, supra note 499. 
513 SoC supra note 273 at 19. 
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white middle class client base using Ontario’s progressive clinics and being fast-tracked to their 
desired gender.514 In its section on the assessment and treatment of children and adolescents with 
GD the SoC states that the best way to reduce distress for pubertal transgender adolescents (with 
a GD diagnosis) is by taking puberty suppressing medication and gender affirming hormone 
treatment.515  
The adolescent specific section of the SoC is also problematic because the section 
wholeheartedly accepts the highly contested clinical research by Dr. Kenneth Zucker and his 
school of psychiatry.516 For example, in the section on the difference between children and 
adolescents the SoC describes the higher rates of dysphoria continuing into adulthood for 
adolescents over children, based on the 1995 research by Drs. Zucker and Bradley and 
subsequent research by one other researcher.517 While there is no doubt that not all children who 
show cross gender and gender bending behaviours are actually trans, relying uncritically on 
methodological and ethically biased studies by Dr. Zucker undermines the credibility of the 
SoC.518 Dr. Zucker was a proponent of using conversion therapy on minors, especially children 
as the following passage shows: 
 
The new early gender transition therapeutic approach stands in marked contrast to other 
therapeutic approaches in which efforts are made to help a child feel more comfortable 
with a gender identity that matches his or her birth sex, in part to avoid the complexities 
of lifelong cross-sex hormonal treatment and sex-reassignment surgery. My impression 
is that the early gender transition approach will result in more children persisting in 
                                                 
514 Pyne 2018, supra note 35. 
515 SoC supra note 273 at 19. 
516 Zucker’s research is cited 17 times in the Adolescent section alone in SoC from 10-20. 
517 SoC, at 11. 
518 Thomas D Steensma & Peggy T Cohen-Kettenis, “A critical commentary on ‘A critical commentary on follow-
up studies and “desistence” theories about transgender and gender non-conforming children’” (2018) 19:2 Int J 
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their desire to live as a member of the other gender, which is, in effect, a rather 
interesting social experiment of nurture.519 [emphasis added] 
 
He equates the production of cissexuals and cisgender people with clinical success and 
believes that early gender transition cannot be neutral despite being reversible. This thesis argues 
that even the use of the word "persistence" with reference to gender dysphoria connotes 
pathology to the state of being transsexual or transgender which is indeed a tension throughout 
the SoC. For example, the SoC clearly states that it is now considered unethical to use 
conversion therapy. Yet, it continues to require DSM-V diagnoses and mental health assessments 
of trans youth by “qualified mental health professionals” before any kind of treatment 
commences. And, the SoC relies on pathologizing research by Dr. Zucker who vehemently 
opposed the banning of conversion therapy on minors in Ontario when Bill 77 was passed in 
2015.520 
While OHIP states there are no age minimums for surgeries the SoC sets recommended ages. 
The SoC only recommends genital surgeries for minors after 16 years of age perhaps because 
they are very hard to reverse.521 The SoC references “medical age of consent” for youth, which 
very likely reinforces the validity and even existence of age-based markers for consent to 
treatment in the minds of health care providers.522 For partially reversible interventions like cross 
sex hormone therapy, 16 again is the recommended age for “medical consent” although the SoC 
notes that parental consent may not be required.523 The concern is that practitioners with low-
                                                 
519 Kenneth Zucker, “Opinion | Sunday Dialogue: Our Notions of Gender”, N Y Times (29 June 2013), online: 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/opinion/sunday/sunday-dialogue-our-notions-of-gender.html>. 
520 WPATH 2011 supra note at 16; Affirming Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Act, 2015, SO 2015, c. 18 - 
Bill 77, 24 July 2014 [ASOGIA]. 
521 SoC supra note 273 at 18. 
522 Ibid at 19. 
523 Ibid at 19. 
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level knowledge of trans health, fear of law suits by parents or transphobic or ageist attitudes 
may rely too heavily on the SoC rather than their own judgement and application of the HCCA.  
In the past, WPATH had advocated for a three-month period of life experience in the felt 
gender role prior to starting hormone therapy. This step was developed to establish coping 
mechanisms for the abovementioned social stressors. The ‘Real Life Experience’ (RLE) 
requirement has been shown to be especially stressful and frequently dangerous for trans 
racialized people. By requiring racialized trans people to express a non-normative gender role 
prior to acquiring any physical changes commensurate with that gender, increased their 
vulnerability to interpersonal, public and state violence beyond that of cis racialized and white 
trans counterparts.524 Several sources discussed in Chapter 1 provided evidence that racialized 
trans people especially Black and Indigenous people experience disproportionate levels of police 
violence, harassment and profiling.525 
Fortunately, there is no longer a prerequisite for an RLE of any length prior to starting 
hormone therapy. For surgical interventions such as genital surgery and gonadectomy a one-year 
RLE is still recommended.526 For chest surgery youth are expected to have spent “ample” time in 
a desired gender role and completed one year of testosterone treatment.527  
                                                 
524 Annelou LC de Vries, Peggy T Cohen-Kettenis & Henriette Delemarre-Van de Waal, Caring for Transgender 
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In addition to gender affirming physical modification, however, the SoC emphasizes the role 
mental health professionals working with transgender youth have to fulfill and which concerns 
should be canvassed as part of a holistic treatment plan.528 There are two factors to note here: 
first, that North American and European psychiatry, psychology and endocrinology form the 
foundation of the research the SoC relies on, and second, that the research is based primarily on 
the white youth who are referred to gender clinics in urban areas accompanied by their 
parents.529 As we will see below,  these whitening factors shape the DSM and the SoC, which 
claims to be universally applicable.530 Authors of both are overwhelmingly white, male cis and 
North American and thus both documents define transness in white/Western terms.531 The SoC 
v7 makes a brief acknowledgement that “much of the recorded clinical experiences and 
knowledge in this area of health is derived from North American and Western European sources” 
taking the analysis no further.532 The SoC v7 also explicitly tries to depathologize GD through 
statements which are not followed through in the clinical guidelines. Because both documents 
are endorsed by OHIP they have the greatest impact on trans racialized youth health autonomy. 
Overall, while the SoC recognizes the dangers of abuse that can follow from withholding GA 
treatments from youth, significant hurdles are maintained through reliance upon “colour-blind” 
psychiatric diagnostic criteria, age thresholds, time limits and mental health assessments even for 
HRT. Furthermore, a contradiction exists between declaring that there is nothing inherently 
                                                 
528 Ibid at 13–14. 
529 Interview with Dr. Cary’s Massarella, (August, 2016); Interview with Dr. Joey Bonifacio, Department of 
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wrong with being trans and that conversion therapy is unethical, but then adopting norms 
entrenched in its white/Western cisgender psychiatric research foundations.533 As I will discuss 
below, other agencies such as the Sherbourne Health Centre have collaborated with community 
members to create a more autonomy enhancing approach based in primary care. Yet OHIP 
coverage relies on adherence to the SoC requirements in approvals for subsidized surgeries with 
its built-in coercive pathology, and gatekeeping role for physicians especially psychiatrists, thus 
use of the SoC continue to erode trans racialized youth’s autonomy.534 
Health Insurance Act Reg. 552 535 
 
Access to Healthcare and Health Insurance Models 
As discussed in my research portrait of trans health in Chapter 1, Namaste’s 1995 study found 
that transsexuals and transgender people face a multitude of interpersonal and systemic barriers 
in Ontario health services.536 They lacked health information, health rights information,  safe 
access to hormones, were mistreated by hospital staff, were denied entry to traditional alcohol 
and drug rehabilitation programs and were refused access to shelters designated for youth, 
women and the homeless.537 The very conditions necessary for autonomy in health care decision 
                                                 
533 Nicholas Matte, Aaron H Devor & Theresa Vladicka, “Nomenclature in the World Professional Association for 
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making were attacked by government institutions, policies and attitudes of providers. And yet 
subsidized health services are critical for the bulk of trans people who do not have employment 
related health benefits, due to being disproportionately under or unemployed.538 Poverty is 
racialized and gendered and employment access is shaped by English language proficiency and 
citizenship status which puts many trans racialized youth at a disadvantage. 
While OHIP adopted the superficially and recently trans-affirming SoC when developing 
policies and regulations on insurance coverage for transition, related primary care coverage has a 
checkered history and is still not comprehensive or easily accessible.539 Since 1978 Ontario had 
covered “sex reassignment” surgery (SRS) meaning, top surgery for trans masculine people and 
bottom surgeries for both trans men and trans women under Regulation 552 of the Health 
Insurance Act and the Schedule of Benefits.540 Unlike many other insured surgical services, to be 
eligible for SRS subsidies a person had to complete the psychiatric assessment program at the 
GIC and be recommended for surgery by the CAMH GIC and the Ministry itself.  
In 1998 soon after the HCCA came into effect, the Ministry under a Mike Harris government, 
delisted SRS saying the move was part of broad cost cutting measures necessary to keep the 
health insurance system viable. Yet, due to the GIC’s high rejection rate for trans applicants, 
only about six people were recommended for surgery each year. In sum the cost of SRS to 
                                                 
538 Brodeur v Ontario (Health and Long-Term Care), 2013 HRTO 1229 (Canlii) at para 25 -27, where two 
applicants alleged discrimination on the basis of sex due to OHIP refusing to cover them for voice therapy, breast 
augmentation and laser hair removal. In Brodeur, the Tribunal cited Auton (Guardian ad litem of v British Columbia 
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Ontario was a mere $123,891.83 out of the $30 billion annual health care budget suggesting that 
gender-affirming care was less of a budgetary issue and more of a political maneuver. 
Four trans people who had almost completed the real-life experience of the GID program 
challenged the Ministry's delisting of SRS in Hogan.541 The majority for the Tribunal found 
discrimination on the grounds of sex and disability for three out of four claimants and awarded 
them amounts between $20-35,000 to reimburse them for the surgeries the province would have 
covered prior to the date of delisting. The majority's decision relied on ss. 11 of the OHRC, 
which refers to adverse discrimination or indirect discrimination.542  
Several major changes in health insurance coverage have taken place since Hogan.543 The 
same gender affirming surgeries were re-listed as insurable in 2008. Prior to 2015, Ontario 
required that all subsidized gender affirming surgeries had to be recommended by the Gender 
Identity Clinic at CAMH (run entirely by cisgendered staff).544 In November 2015, Regulation 
552 was amended again to extend the surgical referral role to any medical professional, acting in 
accordance with the SoC.545 This loosening of the CAMH GIC’s gatekeeping monopoly was 
necessary  because of the extreme hardships cause by their wait lists, delays and rejection rate.546 
At least one human rights complaint had been filed over the wait times at CAMH and SBT cases 
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mention the unnecessary hardship caused by having to travel to the Toronto clinic when primary 
health care could be provided by local doctors.547 Currently, there is one letter of reference 
required from mental health professionals for most procedures and two letters required for 
genital surgeries.548 Trans people in major urban centres will likely have an easier time getting 
referral letters though letters are not guaranteed due to barriers such as income, English language 
proficiency, occupation, age, mobility and race/ethnicity.549 
What has remained the same? The new regulations in Ontario continue to require that surgical 
referrals need to align with the SoC which will create barriers for trans racialized youth who may 
not be seen as stable due to lack of housing, income, family support, or having other mental 
illness diagnoses caused by the impacts of racism. Furthermore, the general requirement that the 
MHLTC pre-approve all gender affirming surgeries is an encumbrance not placed on other 
surgical referrals, which causes delays and leaves room for physician errors.550 OHIP coverage is 
marked by trans misogyny in terms of the number of services deemed unnecessary and therefore 
not covered for trans women such as laser hair removal, voice and communication training, 
facial feminization voice therapy.551 Ontario's new regulations ostensibly cover top surgery for 
trans women (augmentation mammoplasty). However, service providers find the eligibility 
                                                 
547 Hogan, supra note 543. 
548 MHLTC SRS, supra note 274. 
549 Interviews with Kusha Dadui, supra note 546, Jordan Zaitzow, supra note 546, Kai Cheng Thom (May 19, 
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criteria impossible to meet.552 To obtain a subsidized breast augmentation, trans women in 
Ontario are required to have taken feminizing hormones for at least one year and have 
experienced zero breast growth (aplasia). Jordan Zaitzow, a Provincial Trans Health Coordinator 
at Rainbow Health Ontario, has observed some clinicians try to assist their clients, by being 
flexible on how they measure "no growth", but OHIP applies the Tanner Stage measurements for 
secondary sex characteristics to evaluate their eligibility requirements. So far, all referrals 
Zaitzow has heard of have been rejected.553 
In addition, an unsuccessful legal challenge was made over what constitutes a "medical 
necessity" in the context of trans women and laser hair removal.554 Currently, medical necessity 
is defined by cis gendered standards – i.e. whether cis women who might receive the treatment 
are publicly funded. However, this logic ignores the fact that their reasons for doing so are purely 
cosmetic and does not deconstruct what we consider to be cosmetic and the different needs of 
trans women.555 
OHIP+: The New Youth Pharma Care Plan 
 
Youth can receive coverage for drugs such as Lupron, estradiol, testosterone and anti-
androgens if they are receiving income assistance from Ontario Works or Ontario Disability 
Support Program, by submitting an Exceptional Access Program form filled out with the support 
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of their primary care provider if they have one.556 In Chapter 5 trans racialized youth share their 
experiences of attempting to navigate systemic access hurdles. Far fewer youth of colour will 
access puberty blocking and hormone replacement drugs through the employee health benefits of 
their parents for several reasons. This is because racialized families are less likely to enjoy 
employee health benefits due to the precarity of their jobs that lack health benefits.557 Racialized 
youth may not be on social assistance because they live at home. Youth whose parents do not 
have employment health benefits but who are not themselves on social assistance, i.e., they live 
at home, fall into the gap that the new OHIP+ program could resolve. Currently Lupron costs 
$500.00 a shot making it unobtainable for working class and low-income families and youth 
since it must be administered daily for 1-3 months.558 Youth who are not enrolled full-time in a 
recognized post-secondary institution could also lose their entitlement to their parent’s plan if 
they are over 18 years according to Green Shield and Great West Life.559  
The Hospital for Sick Children’s Transgender Youth Clinic occasionally encounters patients 
without any means to pay for drugs and has at least once approached the makers of Lupron 
successfully for complimentary courses of the drug.560 A youth worker at Skylark Youth 
Services in Toronto also mentioned employing the same approach for a youth whose parents 
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refused to pay for their Lupron.561 This of course is not an approach to be used consistently but 
speaks to the resourcefulness of some healthcare providers who are supported by their 
institutions. 
In June 2017 the Liberal government announced a pharma care program to pay for 
prescription drugs for the province's children and youth.562 It remains to be seen what drugs will 
be covered by the new plan and how pharmacies will respect the decision-making autonomy of 
youth when they fill their prescriptions. Most recently, in 2018 the PC government announced 
that children and youth will not receive free pharmaceuticals if they have private coverage 
through their parents plans.563 
The Sherbourne Health Centre Guidelines 
 
This section analyzes the health guidelines for Ontario trans youth as found in the Sherbourne 
Health Centre Guidelines and Protocols for Comprehensive Primary Care for Trans Clients [the 
Guidelines].564 The Sherbourne Health Centre (SHC) is unique because it is located in a 
neighbourhood with several other trans community service providers, and has at least one trans 
doctor, and several trans nurses and trans health care providers on staff.565 Rainbow Health 
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Ontario (RHO), a program of Sherbourne Health Centre, shares space in the same building. RHO 
provides information, training and resources on LGBTQ+ public health across Ontario and has 
delivered training about the Guidelines since 2011. The Guidelines provides a useful public 
health contrast to the clinical psychiatry-led WPATH text. 
Consultations were held in 2003 with trans communities who access the SHC.566 SHC staff 
and interested community members met for discussion of needs and concerns. The group also 
reviewed other protocols. Unlike the SoC, some trans input was incorporated into the 
protocols.567 Trans community knowledge incorporates trans lived realities and health expertise 
which has been sorely lacking in research on transness, and the creation of protocols for trans 
health, not to mention general health policy that also affects trans people.568 As a result of 
community input the Guidelines reflect a more collaborative and patient-directed approach that 
recognizes trans community knowledge about health care.569  
Unlike the SoC, the Guidelines relate gender affirming treatments to the provision of primary 
care as opposed to automatically relegating trans needs to psychiatrists and endocrinologists.570 
The 2015 edition was also adapted to better suit needs of non-binary clients.571 The purpose of 
these guidelines is to expand the number of primary care providers who feel competent to see 
trans clients by describing routine care practices tested by SHC nurses, nurse practitioners and 
                                                 
566 I was unable to find out if racialized people, and racialized youth took part and how outreach was carried out. 
567 Guidelines, supra note 566 at 5; Matte et al, supra note 535. 
568 Ibid at 2. 
569 Florence Paré, “Do you know my relationship to the mirror? A perspective article on public policy surrounding 
informed consent to transition-related surgeries for transgender Quebeckers.” (2018) McGill J Law Health. 
570 Guidelines, supra note at 2. 
571 Ibid at 4, the Guidelines describe how non-binary clients can receive hormone therapy without a GD diagnosis 
under the rubric of harm reduction, or by fast tracking clients well known to providers. 
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doctors.572 This is evident in the Guideline’s description of dosages and monitoring for more 
typical cases of HRT that would enable a trans client to obtain standard care from their family 
doctor. This kind of precise information for local doctors would prevent an automatic consult 
with an endocrinologist a process causing delays and likely the need to travel to an urban center, 
often not possible for a trans racialized youth.573 Another notable practice example from the 
Guidelines is the refraining from automatic referrals to psychiatrists or CAMH, encouraging 
family doctors to make the diagnosis of GD listed in the DSM -V.574 While their public health 
equity approach to the care of trans clients is a strength of the Guidelines the phenomena of 
racism, classism and ageism as social determinants of health are not explicitly named. Still, 
inclusion of access to health care tips for Ontario practitioners about navigating provincial drug 
plans and health insurance policies to assist clients in accessing hormone therapy and writing 
free support letters to obtain gender accurate identity documents would have a significant benefit 
for trans racialized youth.575 The Guidelines include some inaccurate information about consent 
to treatment law by claiming that there is no specific age of consent in Canada, when like all 
health related matters, it is a provincial jurisdiction.576 They do not define capacity precisely, 
                                                 
572 Ibid at 5. 
573 Ibid at 2, 7. For examples of the  impact of unwilling or incompetent family doctors on trans youth see 1401-
00532 (Re), 2014 where a 25 year old youth from a small town was waiting for referrals to Toronto doctors and 
deeply depressed as a result of gender dysphoria and transphobia to the point of being disabled and qualified for 
ODSP; and 2017 ONSBT 4197 (CanLII where the family doctor of a 23 year old trans youth was not comfortable 
prescribing hormones for them and referred them to a GIC with a long-wait list causing disabling distress; also 
1109-07575 (Re), 2013 ONSBT 496 (CanLII), where a 23 year old who was not receiving any gender affirming care 
because their psychiatrist wanted them to go to a Toronto GIC for a “full diagnosis from a gender specialist” first 
and they could not afford to travel and stay there. 
574 Ibid at 11. 
575 Ibid at 22-23. Note that since April 2017 nurse practitioners who have completed specific courses can prescribe 
controlled substances such as testosterone, http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/news/bulletin/2017/hb_20170419.aspx; 
an Exceptional Assistance Program request under the Ontario Drug Plan for injectable testosterone is much cheaper 
and is therefore preferable to clients over transdermal patches which deliver a more stable dose of testosterone, 
Guidelines supra note 566 at 23.  
576 Guidelines supra note 566 at 10. 
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however they show confidence in primary care providers to make capacity assessments for trans 
clients just as they would for any other clients, being mindful of cognitive abilities, age, life 
experience and substance use.577 
The health care provider’s role in assessing a client’s eligibility and readiness for HRT creates 
an inequitable dynamic, with the provider acting as the ‘gatekeeper’ to treatment. In response to 
this, the SHC practices the ‘informed consent model’ for hormone therapy which aligns with the 
HCCA. In this model, the primary care provider focuses on obtaining informed consent as the 
threshold for the initiation of hormone therapy, with less emphasis on meeting DSM-V diagnostic 
criteria for Gender Dysphoria or requiring a mental health assessment unless significant mental 
health concerns are identified.578 The primary care approach to mental health is more nuanced 
and intersectional than the SoC’s reliance on clinical expertise, due to SHC’s reliance on 
community based knowledge and community based research through research affiliates like 
TRANSpulse offers methods for a depathologizing way of caring for trans people.579 However, 
as doctors from Ontario youth clinics confirm, this informed consent model works best where 
youth rely on their parent’s health care benefits not on OHIP which require the diagnosis for 
coverage of surgeries.580  
The primary care model developed by the SHC in collaboration with trans community 
members incorporates social determinants of health and public health strategies making it a more 
effective and autonomy enhancing system for those youth with in its catchment area, in contrast 
to the medical model applied in other sites across Ontario. 
                                                 
577 Ibid. 
578 SoC supra note 273 at 5-6. 
579 Guidelines supra note 566 at 13. 
580 Dr Carys Massarella, supra note 161; Dr. Joey Bonifacio, Department of Pediatrics, St. Michael’s Hospital and 
the Hospital for Sick Children, supra note 161; Dr. Miriam Kaufman, Paediatrician, Transgender Youth Clinic, the 
Hospital for Sick Children, supra note 161. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter illustrated how taken together, Ontario’s expansive health statutes, policies, and 
insurance programs have not actually expanded access to needed resources for trans racialized 
youth and have in application intensified their exclusion from autonomous decision making in 
health care. Legal sources I examined failed to explicitly recognize social determinants of health 
such as age, race, class, and gender identity that affect access. Since access to non-trans specific 
health care is racialized, then access to trans specific health care will also be racialized. 
The cases that propelled the development of the common law primarily turned on refusal to 
consent to life-saving treatments on the grounds of religion. With few exceptions, judges imbue 
decisions about young people’s health, whether minors or not, with paternalism. Youth 
autonomy is seen as undermined only by parents and by religion and not by systemic forces of 
poverty, racism, citizenship status or cisnormativity. Decisions show that judges determine 
capacity by evaluating the correctness of a young person’s decision especially if there is risk to 
life or the body is modified significantly.  
Courts have not addressed whether trans youth can make life-altering, and as some would 
argue, life-saving medical decisions about transitioning. These discussions have addressed social 
transitions or taken place in family courts where the tendency of jurisprudence from lower courts 
is to ignore or to override the application of the youth’s right to consent pursuant to the HCCA. 
And indeed, the Ontario Court of Appeal has yet to rule on this issue head on. 
The erosion of gender essentialism has changed faster in statutory law such as human rights 
codes and vital statistics acts than in the minds of judges where decades of gender essentialism 
and binary gender have created precedents. Jurisprudence continues to promulgate ontological 
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myths about binary gender even as decision makers recognize transnormative options for trans 
legal subjectivity.  
Even though the general objectives of the HCCA claim to support autonomy and it contains a 
presumption of capacity for all persons, broad understanding of and compliance with the HCCA 
remains a significant issue for health care providers. These claims remain aspirational because 
the HCCA lacks the regulatory infrastructure required to create conditions that foster autonomy 
namely: information sharing, redress for findings of incapacity, and non-automatic appointment 
of family of origin as SDMs, collaborative decision making by youth and trusted advisors, 
adequate trainings for professionals and regular intersectional public awareness aimed at youth.   
The relationship between the DSM-V, the SoC and OHIP regulations cements the 
white/Western bias of diagnostic criteria, into clinical eligibility standards for transgender 
people, and subsidized health care. This is exacerbated in application by the gatekeeping role 
assigned by all three texts to physicians, nurses and mental health professionals.  
The triple threat structure produces diminished standards for autonomy: the coercive 
pathology of diagnostic criteria rejects trans racialized youth selfhood; eligibility criteria 
prevents them from accessing treatments and services, and gatekeeping diminishes the potential 
for therapeutic honesty. Locally developed guidelines for primary care practitioners address 
some of these problems in effective ways. I contend that replacing relational autonomy with 
informed consent is flawed. Informed consent is an individualized process locked in a system 
that does not adequately inform structurally vulnerable youth of their statutory rights. 
Legislators though aware of equity-based principles and progressive legal norms, need to 
enact education and monitoring into statutes so autonomy conditions can be fostered. This is 
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critical since advocacy mechanisms were repealed and it seems that youth find internal equity 
complaint programs and courts inaccessible. 
As such, youth experience legal restrictions to their decision-making autonomy due to 
inadequate health care rights knowledge and protectionist beliefs from their families, health care 
practitioners, social workers and judges framed as questions about their capacity best interests or 
through language and application of bureaucratic policy. Furthermore, phenomenological field 
work data presented in the next chapter, confirm that trans racialized non-minor youth continue 
to be subjected to arbitrary constraints on their autonomy in health care decision making. 
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Chapter 5: Transcendent Bodies 
 
Introduction 
 
The question at the heart of this research project is: How do trans racialized youth experience 
autonomy in health care decision making? To lay the groundwork for this, in Chapter 2 I 
discussed a relational version of autonomy and distinguished it from the concept of agency. I 
theorized that autonomy is the ability to act in a manner congruent with one's values, long-term 
individual and collective interests, and in consideration of different types of personal, social and 
political relationships.581 I developed a list of six factors conducive to autonomous decision-
making for trans racialized youth. As Chapter 4 explained, Ontario’s health care consent statute 
presumes that everyone can capably make their own health care decisions unless proven 
otherwise. 582 In addition, I considered the meaning of legal capacity to make health care 
decisions and the process of informed consent or refusal. Moreover, we saw how judge’s written 
decisions act as a type of representation of the litigants’ experience and identity. Most judicial 
representations reproduce and affirm medically-constituted notions of the essence of transness 
that ultimately confine trans people to heterosexual binary narratives and fail to validate the 
health consent rights of minors. Recall from Chapter 1 that critical trans scholars have long 
critiqued these legal and medically-produced narratives as transnormative.  
                                                 
581 My definition is developed from the works of Roberts 1996, supra note 183, Roberts 1997, supra note 157, 
Sherwin 1998, supra note 157, Jennifer Nedelsky 1989, supra note 157, Nedelsky 1993, supra note, 164, Meyers 
1989, and 2005 supra note 167, Moya Bailey & Whitney Peoples, “Articulating Black Feminist Health Science 
Studies” (2017) 3:2 Catalyst: Feminism, Theory, Technoscience, online: 
<http://catalystjournal.org/ojs/index.php/catalyst/article/view/120> and Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative 
Violence, Critical Trans Politics, and the Limits of Law (Duke University Press, 2015). 
582 HCCA supra note 11. 
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Despite the current state of Ontario law where capacity, not age, is the crucial factor for 
decision making, I have argued that racialized trans youth are still prevented from making health 
care decisions autonomously by the attitudes of judges, legislators, health care practitioners, and 
the barriers embedded in officially endorsed clinical policy documents. Integrating my earlier 
discussion of theoretical concepts of structural vulnerability, intersectionality, selfhood, 
relational autonomy and the analytical tool of disidentification theory I now present my focus 
group results organized thematically. I then discuss participants’ responses to the barriers in 
health care as: autonomy-enhancing, protective/agentic, and a mix of autonomy-enhancing and 
agentic.  
Results 
 
The following results from my focus group with four trans racialized youth are organized 
under two major themes: a) structural and systemic barriers and b) interpersonal, professional 
and organizational barriers. Photographs were analysed using the rubric in Appendix 3 with a 
modified typology of gazes.583 Interview transcripts were analysed using thematic network 
analysis.584  
Structural and Systemic Barriers 
 
 
                                                 
583 Lutz and Collins, supra note 327. 
584 Attride-Stirling, supra note 326. 
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Within this first major theme, participants described experiences relating to five structural 
areas affecting autonomous decision-making: financial barriers, legal barriers, undermining 
consent, gatekeeping, and the institutional nature of care. 
Financial Barriers 
 
Participants came from various economic backgrounds and had different income levels based 
on whether they received financial support from their parents. This impacted their access to 
health care. The major financial barriers they noted were the cost of pharmaceuticals, doctor’s 
letters, ambulance fees, name change fees, binders, canes, and knee braces pointing to gaps in 
Ontario’s universal health care coverage. Prior to 2018, pharmaceuticals, including cross-sex 
hormones or puberty-blockers were not covered unless one was an Ontario Works or Ontario 
Disability Support Program recipient.585 According to participants, the coverage for gender-
affirming treatments under their parents’ employee benefits plans was limited and their access to 
the benefits was controlled by their parents, therefore not confidential. There were no sliding 
scales for drugs or doctors’ services that were not covered by OHIP. Three participants were 
unable to benefit from one-on-one mental health services from psychotherapists586 or 
psychologists relying on the OHIP covered services provided by social workers and 
psychiatrists. This comment reveals Pogi’s (they/them) frustration with the interplay between 
private insurance and ODSP drug coverages both requiring medical documentation: 
 
And then I'm being penalized for being able to work because they don't believe I'm 
disabled, but it's like nothing, it's contract work. I stopped taking T as well, because it 
                                                 
585 As discussed in Chapter 4, by 2018 most pharmaceuticals were covered for youth 25 years of age and under with 
the introduction of the OHIP+ Youth Pharmacare Plan. 
586 Gitanjali Lena, ed., Transcript of Focus Group (April 22, 2017) [Day 1] 
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was costing me too much. It's frustrating because I have to make money to survive but 
by doing that I can't prove I'm disabled…So I live with my mom, and I was getting her 
benefits before because I was in school and then I was bipolar, so I was getting benefits 
because I was bipolar, but then the insurance committee decided to challenge that. So I 
had to get a bunch forms, a psychiatrist to prove full time incapacitation. But I can't 
because the doctor I'm seeing doesn't think I have bipolar, so I don't have benefits and I 
can't apply for ODSP and then I don't even know...and then he's like, lithium is the 
cheaper one...if I don't have bipolar why do I need medication? 
 
Unlike service providers with lived experience of seeking gender-affirming treatments, 
participants’ doctors appeared uninformed about the costs of drugs, or the ways to access drugs 
through the Exceptional Access Program (EAP), drug plans and benefit schemes for youth who 
had no private insurance.587 Sakura River (they/them) who was emancipated from the age of 16 
described their challenges thusly:  
 
Yeah, I don’t have coverage from work, I don’t have coverage from family matters, I 
don’t have that coverage like other people might. And other people might have like, 
family, who helps them get the hormones they want, helps them have things to help their 
identity, my family was the complete opposite of that.588 
 
  
This passage shows how financial barriers that work against youth with inadequate family 
support exacerbated their specific situation, thus further undermining their ability to make 
autonomous decisions in contrast to Participant #4 who lived at home and had some financial 
support or Pogi whose parents were able to share private insurance benefits with them for a time. 
Financial barriers to health care caused the participants a great deal of stress and increased the 
pressure to make agentic choices to avoid health care.589 
 
                                                 
587 Ibid; Gitanjali Lena, Notes from Focus Group (April 29, 2017) [Day 2 Notes]. 
588 Day 1, supra note 588. 
589 For another supporting quote from see Sakura River below in “Avoidance of Medical Care” at 177. 
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Legal Barriers 
 
Participants described legal barriers arising from the regulation of gender through identity 
documentation, and the inadequate provision of information about and application of health 
consent law. Participant #4 said that requirements “like having gender markers on identification 
when in essentially every instance they aren’t needed” created a barrier.590 
None of the participants had official identification with their chosen name or gender 
markers.591 Furthermore, one participant reported that they could not afford to change their 
identification documents to reflect current names and sex designations to reflect lived gender 
such as, passports and birth certificates. For Sakura River, the major obstacle was being unable 
to access a legally required birth certificate from their country of birth. They recalled:  
 
I have like my legal documents for Canada, I don’t personally own it, my mum has 
it…It’s very hard to get those, because she won’t let me have them…She doesn’t want 
me to change my name. She is refusing to let me change my name on legal documents 
as she’s like keeping them.592  
 
 
This passage provides one example of how legal requirements for naturalized citizens and 
parental control combine to prevent autonomous behaviour for emancipated youth. 
Two participants recounted experiences of being misgendered upon presenting their OHIP 
card to service providers.593 An MRI technician misgendered Participant #4 this way: “the person 
was gendering me using like he/him pronouns, and then like I gave them my health card and they 
                                                 
590 Participant #4, Pre-Focus Group Survey (April 22, 2017). 
591 Gitanjali Lena, Notes from Focus Group (April 22, 2017) [Day 1 Notes]. 
592 Ibid. 
593 In 2017 Ontario enacted a policy removing the sex designation from OHIP cards. The focus group met prior to 
that policy intervention. 
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were like, ‘OH! You’re a girl!’ and I was just like, fuck this.” Sakura River shared another 
example of insistence on legal names: “Every time I have to use health care, I tell them of my 
identity and most just decide that I am a female and my legal name is the name they will use. It 
creates a huge sense of incompetence in doctors as well and does not help my issues.”594  
Sakura River’s photograph “UNH Invoice”595 captures their frustration with structural 
barriers. It shows a torn Fact Sheet about changing one’s name on official documentation, and an 
invoice from the University Health Network for an ambulance half-buried in a muddy puddle 
strewn with cigarette butts. In my interpretation, this photograph and their quotes demonstrate 
the delegitimizing power of regulatory documents and how difficult it can be to transition 
legally. Sakura River also commented that the University Health Network was unwilling to 
reconsider invoicing them for an ambulance fee despite their efforts to have the fee waived for 
inability to pay. 
 
Undermining Consent  
 
Informed consent is central to the HCCA, however, results show that in application it was 
undermined. The main tactics identified that contravened HCCA provisions and professional 
regulations on informed consent were: inadequate information, coercion, breaches of 
confidentiality, and failure to apply the legal presumption of capacity. Results suggest health 
care providers deployed these tactics more often when the participants were under 18 years 
old.596 
                                                 
594 Day 1, supra note 588. 
595 Sakura River, UHN Invoice (April 2017). 
596 Supporting quotes from Participant #4 below at 148, 149 and 150; from Pogi below at 153-154; and from Sakura 
River below at 149. 
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Lack of access to health rights information and health related legal remedies created a health 
rights vacuum for the participants. None of the participants was aware of their statutory rights 
with respect to consent to treatment in health care. On the first day of the focus group I had asked 
them questions to assess their legal knowledge pertaining to making health care decisions. 
Participants had never heard of the HCCA. They were unaware of their formal legal rights as 
youth and rights they possessed as minors under the HCCA.597 They had never heard of the 
Consent and Capacity Board and did not know that findings of capacity could be challenged at 
that tribunal.598 Participants had not talked to lawyers or paralegals or community legal workers 
about health care rights or problems.599 They had not encountered legal information about their 
rights in health care settings or online. In contrast to the community knowledge they accessed 
about treatments and providers, community knowledge circles such as friends and online groups 
had shared no information about health care statutes or legal rights.600 They were unaware that 
legal information could help them access their health needs, and of how to go about finding legal 
information.601  
Before they reached the age of majority, they all disclosed that their parents made their health 
decisions. During the discussion they disclosed that they did not want their family members to 
make health care choices for them if they were found incapable. They were not aware that they 
could interrupt the automatic SDM hierarchy.602 Participants reported that health care providers 
                                                 
597 Day 1 notes, supra note 588. 
598 Ibid. 
599 Day 1 notes, supra note 593. 
600 Ibid. 
601 Gitanjali Lena ed., Member Checking Session (August 30, 2017) [MC]. 
602 Day 1 notes, supra note 593. 
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had not informed participants that if they had any problem with family members acting as SDMs 
participants could challenge decisions or ask for a new SDM to be appointed.  
Participants who lived with their parents as minors and young adults expressed the most 
frustration over doctors’ non-consensual involvement of parents in the decision-making 
processes.603 Participant#4 stated:   
As I continue to share residence with my parents my mother in particular has always 
tried to make particular decisions around my health for me without my full 
understanding or consent if at all. In my adult years I’ve tried to give her less space to 
take up regarding my health, but she still often ends up taking the lead in those 
conversations.604 
 
Further evidence of breaches of confidentiality was shared by Sakura River said their family 
doctor consulted their mother without asking for their consent. “My mum, at the time she went to 
the same doctor as me, so in that time the doctor started listening to her side of the story about 
how I was too confused to know if I was trans and the doctor stopped believing what I was 
saying.”605 The consequences of such breaches were serious for Sakura River, “My mum took 
me off her healthcare plan when I was 13, because I was trans and talked about mental 
health.”606 
Health care providers sometimes allowed caregivers to exert further control over decision 
making when they accompany minors or young adults to their doctor’s appointments. Two other 
participants described this experience. At one point, Participant #4 said, “so I go over, and my 
                                                 
603 For additional supporting quote see Participant #4 below at 149. 
604 MC, supra note 603. 
605 Gitanjali Lena, ed., Transcript of Focus Group (April 29, 2017) [Day 2]. 
606 Ibid. 
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doctor of course misgenders me, ‘cause like I’m not having a conversation with her about this 
stuff, especially since like, my mom is usually in the room when I go to the doctor’s office.”607  
Pogi described how their parents took the lead in all health care discussions, and from a young 
age they never remember consent being explained to them, it was just assumed by doctors after 
talking to their parents.608  
Two photographs evoked this frustration. Pogi’s photograph, “Think before you scream”, 
shows a person with long curly hair and glasses sitting in a forest in front of a wire fence.609 In 
the background is what looks like a high school sports field. The photograph is black and white 
except for a bright blue loud speaker that the subject holds away from their mouth. Pogi 
described the loud speaker as a symbol of urgent communication.610  
Participant #4’s photograph, “The Ground is a long way down, but there is more than one way 
to be grounded” was taken in response to prompts 1, 3, and 4 (Appendix );611 They used a 
downward camera angle to force the viewer’s gaze downwards, literally putting the viewer in 
their shoes. They incorporated a lot of empty space in the foreground of the frame, describing 
themselves in relation to health care providers as their blackness and their transness being 
invisible, while their access needs are highly visible but misunderstood. This participant wanted 
the viewer to be unsure whether the turquoise fish-scale patterned object that points downward to 
their feet, parallel to their front body is a stick or a cane.612 The participant wanted to portray the 
discomfort of health care providers with trans racialized bodies and the negative impact of this 
                                                 
607 Ibid. 
608 Pogi, Pre-Focus Group Survey, (April 22, 2017). 
609 Pogi, Think Before You Scream (April 2017). 
610 Day 2, supra note 607. 
611 Participant #4, The Ground is a long way down but there is more than one way to be grounded (April 2017) 
[Grounded]; See photography prompts for participants Appendix 2. 
612 Day 2, supra note 607. 
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discomfort on the iterative communication process so critical for decision-making autonomy. 
Participant #4 said, “Yes, when I was younger there were many conversations about mental 
health and cognition that were had with my parents rather than including me. I was started on 
medication without consent, although I refused to take it anyways, and made to be monitored by 
[sic] teachers via check-ins at my schools.”613 They explained how as a child and a teenager, 
doctors spoke almost exclusively to their parents, and this discouraged them from learning how 
to communicate with doctors.614 This photograph and quote demonstrate how doctors, parents 
and teachers breached confidentiality failed to build trust, communicate information and support 
autonomous decision making for this person as a minor. 
One participant described an experience where a service provider practiced informed consent. 
Sakura River mentioned two high school social workers who supported their autonomy when 
they were hospitalized. The social worker asked Sakura River if there was anyone they wanted to 
be contacted; Sakura River did not want their mother to be notified. The social worker respected 
their wishes by contacting their cousin who was their main support person. Sakura River 
described the impact of feeling listened to and cared about in the following way:  
She understood that I was not close to my family and she knew not to call them. She 
knew that and respected that fact so greatly. She was the first one to fully understand it 
I guess you could say. I felt like super cared for at that time, when I needed it most. 
Which was like the best ever, because she was just always there. And hospitals never 
did the same, my own mom never did the same.615  
  
During our initial discussions on the first day of the focus group about participants’ 
understanding of consent to treatment practices, Participant #4 said, “In my experience, consent 
                                                 
613 Day 1, supra note 588. 
614 Ibid. 
615 Day 1, supra note 588. 
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hasn’t been made something explicit in medical spaces (specifically from service providers) but 
is often instead implied.”616 Participant #1 said they thought that there was an age threshold for 
receiving cross sex hormone therapy. Pogi thought there were age thresholds for surgery because 
they had been given consent forms at the beginning of surgery approval processes with the ages 
of 17 and 18 on them.617 One participant had heard of “DSM criteria”.618 None of the participants 
knew the name of the HCCA, or were aware of consent, capacity or substitute decision maker 
hierarchy provisions.619  
As laid out in Chapter 4 another way that autonomous decision making is undermined is 
through inadequate provision of accessible information about the HCCA. All of the participants 
described a total lack of information sharing about their legal rights as minors when interacting 
with health care providers and institutions. Pogi reflected on how knowledge of their rights 
might have changed their experience at the CAMH GIC:  
 
I don't know what would have happened if I was more honest and less rehearsed at the 
GIC. If I researched more into and took more initiative into asking what I was looking 
for and being more aware of my rights and the GIC's jurisdiction, if I was less emotional 
and more practical.620  
 
Pogi had been hospitalized at Sunnyside for bipolarity as a minor. Pogi said they were not 
informed of the incapacity finding or told how to challenge that finding. This is troubling, 
recalling from the previous chapter that the requirements for rights advice for incapable people in 
the psychiatric context are more robust than in non-psychiatric findings of incapacity although 
                                                 
616 Ibid. 
617 Ibid. 
618 MC, supra note 603. 
619 Day 1, supra note 588; Day 2 supra note 607; Gitanjali Lena, Member Checking Session Notes (August 30, 
2017) [MC Notes]. 
620 MC, supra note 603. 
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not for minors. The doctor chose an SDM from the prescribed HCCA list but Pogi was not 
informed of how this process worked. The doctor did not tell Pogi that they could ask for a 
different SDM. Pogi was unaware that the SDM had to follow any prior capable wishes about 
treatment Pogi had made at the age of 16. Pogi said that between the ages of 12-16, “I didn’t 
even know I had a say in health decisions. I was taught that I was a minor, and it would be 
doctors and parents discussing what to do then explaining what they were going to do.”621  
The improper resolution of capacity issues was also cited as a reason for inadequate gender-
affirming care. Pogi, Sakura River and Participant #1 were all initially found incapable to decide 
to take cross sex hormone therapy as minors by family doctors in private practice. Participant #1 
for example, did not want to disclose their significant anxiety due to numerous experiences of 
being found incapable simply for having mental health issues and being a minor.622 They did not 
want to delay starting feminizing hormones so they eventually chose to temporarily take 
unprescribed hormones by taking a friend’s birth control pill.623 They explained that they had not 
been able to find a doctor or nurse who they could work with because so far, at the age of 18, 
several health care providers told them they were not old enough to make this decision on their 
own.624 
At another time a health care provider who acted non-consensually in an emergency, placed a 
youth in a difficult financial situation. Sakura River depicts this situation in their photograph, 
“UHN Invoice”. They staged this photo by crumpling up the invoice for an ambulance that was 
sent to their home against their wishes. The invoice lies in a muddy puddle with a pen and half of 
                                                 
621 Ibid. 
622 Day 1 notes, supra note 588. 
623 Day 1 notes, supra note 593. 
624 Ibid. 
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a cigarette. Sakura River had spoken to a Telehealth nurse about an undisclosed health issue. The 
nurse thought they had to send an ambulance, despite the fact that Sakura River insisted they did 
not want an ambulance. Their main reason for refusing the ambulance was the prohibitive cost of 
ambulance service. Sakura River received many notices to pay this invoice and eventually the 
fee went to a collection agency.625 Sakura River used their agency to attempt to refuse the 
ambulance to avoid the fee despite the fact that it was in their best interests to take the 
ambulance. They eventually took the ambulance because they were told they would be charged 
regardless. They placed the capped pen and the cigarette butts in the photograph to symbolize 
their blocked capability to act autonomously.626 
All the participants lacked formal opportunities to practice autonomous decision making as 
they approached the age of majority. This was heightened for two youth whose families were 
very engaged in their health care as minors. Pogi had experienced parental control over their 
health decisions up to age 16 and felt suddenly unprepared when doctors began asking their 
parents to leave the room. Pogi explained it this way:  
 
Yeah, it’s weird because like something happens after 16 where the doctors like ask 
your parents to leave the room. And it’s like what? Doctors talk to you directly and ask 
what I think. I also noticed soon after turning 18 and all up until 21, health care staff 
seemed to reinforce that I was an adult now, and ‘it’s your choice, but I...’ kind of 
statements. It was noticeable over time, like I felt and still do, like I’m in autopilot with 
my health. It’s like all of sudden I have this autonomy over my body that I’ve never 
practiced asserting, or even understanding what that meant.627  
 
 
The ways that health care providers undermine autonomous decision making are amplified 
by the gatekeeping role that health law and policy assign to these professionals. This 
                                                 
625 Day 2, supra note 607. 
626 Day 2, supra note 14. 
627 MC, supra note 603. 
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combination negatively impacts a trans racialized youth’s self-image, and as participants 
describe, forces them to engage in agentic strategies such as performance, avoidance of medical 
care and hiding. 
 
Gatekeeping 
 
As shown through analysis of authoritative texts in Chapter 4, health care providers perform 
gatekeeping functions by making diagnoses, and approving trans people for gender-affirming 
treatments. Participants named other gatekeeping actions such as selecting which treatments to 
propose, sharing medical and legal information, prescribing hormones, and making referrals to 
specialists. In addition, the participants felt like they had to say yes to whatever the doctor 
wanted simply to get the diagnosis. Three participants described psychiatrists as having the most 
direct gatekeeping power because of their power to diagnose Gender Dysphoria. As Pogi 
complained: “Psychiatrists don’t know anything. You spent 12 years, and this is what you got? 
You have so much power! From insurance, to benefits, letters for id docs, all that trickles down 
and service providers and judges will take whatever you say here…”628  
Participant #4 recognized that: “…for some people doing diagnosis based is really important, 
it’s like necessary. To be able to access different services, to get things subsidized. And like I 
think some service providers will sprinkle language around willy nilly.”629 The health care 
professional’s gatekeeping role to diagnose and provide evidence in the context of disability 
income support meant that, in Participant #4’s own words:  
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I did and still continue to avoid getting diagnosed for things that are necessary, like 
accessing ODSP for example; but even when in a medical space I still have a difficult 
time trying to convey any issues I'm having, leading to me being, underdiagnosed, made 
to wait, disbelieved, or ignored.630  
 
Paternalism manifested through gatekeeping and capacity assessment when Pogi tried to find 
a doctor who would prescribe them testosterone. Pogi’s family doctor considered them too young 
and would not prescribe. Then their doctor tried to put them on the CAMH GIC waitlist in 2014. 
They were waitlisted for the GID youth clinic at CAMH in 2015, and eventually was called for 
an appointment in 2016. By this time Pogi said, “… I was referred to a St Mike’s clinic nurse 
through Pieces to Pathways who was reputably trans-competent. Three weeks after that I started 
taking testosterone.”631 This quote shows that Pogi received more timely access to care from peer 
trans youth workers who run Pieces to Pathways, a substance use program for LGBTTQ+ youth 
who were better at facilitating access to hormones for low-income youth and emancipated trans 
youth. This access was facilitated in part, by the provincial by-law change in March 2017 that 
allowed nurses to prescribe controlled substances like testosterone, after taking some additional 
training thus reducing the reliance on doctors.632  
Referrals from family doctors were needed to get appointments with specialists, however 
participants struggled just securing or maintaining a relationship with a family doctor for primary 
care. Doctors are also required to sign approval forms for treatment. Participant #4 said they 
were seeing their family doctor, “but only really for a medical referral”. After months of 
searching for a doctor who was seeing new clients, getting on waitlists at recommended clinics, 
                                                 
630 Ibid. 
631 For evidence of the contrasting actions of the doctors and CAMH GIC administrators see Pogi’s quote below at 
168-69. 
632 NPs prescribing controlled substances, Q & A Regulations and bylaws, website of the College of Nurses of 
Ontario, http://www.cno.org/en/trending-topics/nps-and-prescribing-controlled-substances/qas-proposed-
regulations-and-by-law-changes/ 
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“talking to different representatives who would give me different information,” Pogi recalls how 
“desperate I was to start HRT”. They said after trying to access HRT “that was incredibly 
charged with emotional energy, I felt drained and depressed with each phone call.” Finally, being 
refused testosterone at the CAMH GIC, Pogi said: “I was confused to what the point of the GIC 
was and why my doctor had referred me here if she could had prescribed me HRT. The GIC is 
busy, if I had ['lot] schedule to see these people consistently before getting a referral that would 
take months on top of the medication.”633 
Furthermore, participants named three health categories explicitly used to block access to 
gender-affirming care: disability, body weight and mental health. The insurance company that 
administered Pogi’s parent’s employee benefits program wanted proof of disability to cover them 
for hormones. Pogi was reluctant to frame themselves as disabled for being trans and bipolar. 
Furthermore, proving disability would have required even more meetings with doctors, so 
instead they chose to pay for their hormone therapy out of pocket, as he was not on OW or 
ODSP. Through a discussion of their photograph, “Reading between the Signs”,634 Pogi shared 
that their bi-polarity diagnosis became a gatekeeping issue to be either hidden or presented as 
appropriately managed before they were seen as stable enough to access gender affirming 
treatments, a policy which matches the requirements in the DSM-V and SoC v7. About being 
assessed at CAMH GIC Pogi said: “So like I had to be distressed about how I was unable to 
physically transition but not so distressed I was mentally unstable.” 
Doctor’s preoccupation with weight frequently arose as a type of gatekeeping for Participant 
#4. Participant #4 believed that doctors used their size as a way to dismiss other health needs. 
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They had been told by doctors, “you have to lose ten pounds before I’m gonna do any other 
treatments.”635 Participant #4 was motivated to address this experience visually by taking 
pictures of their belly. They said, “weight and being plus size doesn’t need to be an access to 
health care issue but it is,” and: 
…you enter the room and it’s like, ‘Well you could lose some weight’ and I think that’s 
a particular experience of doctors doing that to either women or people perceived as 
women…and that’s a gatekeeping method for doctors.636 
 
Results demonstrated the gatekeeping role law and health policy assigns to doctors in 
particular. We now look at what participants said about the health care system overall. 
 
Institutionalization of Care 
  
 
Despite the closure of the CAMH clinic and the passage of legislation banning the use of 
conversion therapy on minors, two participants expressed a lingering fear of retribution if 
opinions about doctors or institutions such as CAMH were made public. Pogi talked about not 
wanting to vilify CAMH through their photo, “Building on Health Care”, as they had attended 
the GIC there when they were 20 years old. They depicted through both “Building on Health 
Care” and “You Change” that CAMH had a psychiatric environment where being trans felt like a 
disease compared to the affirmative trans-led community care he now received. 637  
They also described undergoing multiple mental health assessments at the GIC, “When I 
went to the clinic, I met with two people that each did an evaluation with me. I think the first one 
was a psychiatrist and the second was a psychologist. I was nervous.” In their photo Pogi used 
                                                 
635 Day 1, supra note 14. 
636 Ibid. 
637 Pogi, Building on Healthcare (April 2017); You Change (April 2017). 
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the angle of the camera and the high contrast lettering of a blue and white sign to give a 
directional sense of industrial growth to an image. A person of colour in a dress wearing 
sunglasses to hide her identity, points with a single finger to the lettering on the sign. She seems 
marginalized because she is literally at the edge of the frame, yet she also seems deliberate and 
aware. Perhaps this editorial gaze is Pogi’s recognition that while CAMH has a negative 
historical connotation for many trans people across Ontario, due to its practices, its low referral 
rates for surgery, and its waiting lists, there are some people who would say they benefitted from 
CAMH services.638 
Both Pogi and Sakura River shared that they had been institutionalized as minors and as 
young adults. Both created photographs that evoke the unsettling control and invasion of 
surveillance and knowledge production.639 Pogi’s photograph, “Building on Health Care”, 
displayed their perception that CAMH prioritized institutional budgets and research goals over 
the needs of consumers. They called the structure the “medical industrial complex”.640 
Meanwhile, Sakura River gave two examples supporting Pogi’s opinion. The message of their 
Bloody Glove series on neglect in health care was emphasized by their choice of alleyways in 
close proximity to CAMH as the location:  
I’ve been to hospital so many times for either suicide watch or something, or panic 
attack, I was never given the health care that I needed at that time, because the hospitals 
either didn’t believe me, or didn’t care.641 
 
Unfortunately, when I had issues with my mental health I was in hospitals, they never 
seemed to understand me as a person of trans experience as I continually asked to be 
                                                 
638 Day 2, supra note 607. 
639 Michel Foucault, Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison, 2nd Vintage books ed. ed (New York: Vintage 
Books, a division of Random House, 1995) at 25. 
640 Day 2, supra note 607. 
641 Day 1, supra note 588. 
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called my preferred name and pronouns but was never shown the courtesy in situations 
with ER [emergency room] professionals. I always say quotations of professionals.642 
 
Despair comes across as a resulting sub-theme in Sakura River’s Bloody Gloves series where 
black-hooded figures loom in graffitied alleyways wearing bloody medical gloves. Sakura River 
depicts feeling neglected and disbelieved in part because of sounding articulate and assertive and 
in part because of experiencing health care as an impersonal bureaucracy.643 While other factors 
such as unsupportive family members and poverty were named as barriers by Sakura River, what 
two participants emphasize here as a partial reason for inadequate mental health care is the 
frightening impersonal institutional nature of mental health services in hospitals.  
Interpersonal, Professional and Organizational Issues 
 
This next thematic section digs deeper into the results, offering a meso-level analysis of their 
experiences with health care provider organizations, and the practices, behaviours and attitudes 
of health professionals. Sub-themes include inaccurate assumptions by doctors, racism, negative 
attitudes from a variety of health care providers, and lack of service provider accountability. 
Doctors’ Inaccurate Assumptions about Trans People 
 
 
Two participants shared a common experience of being slotted into the white/Western 
medical model of linear transitioning discussed in Chapters 1 and 4. Participant #4 noted that the 
assumption held by doctors they encountered who had some familiarity with trans patients is that 
                                                 
642 Sakura River, Bloody Glove Series (April 2017); Day 1, supra note 588. 
643 This experience was documented since the 90s in the writings of Dallas Denny who describes how the 
stereotypes of gender clinicians about “real transsexuals” presented i.e. desperate, crazy and loud became selection 
criteria for everyone who came for services see Denny 1991, supra note 122. 
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everyone aspires to medical transition with hormones followed by surgeries. They also met 
doctors who work with trans people who immediately assumed medical transitioning was the 
point of the visit: “Sometimes a trans person may want to visit a service provider for needs not 
directly related to their transness, but service providers may want to focus on the transness 
anyways.”644 As Pogi said friends warned them about doctors’ binary beliefs about gender: “Like 
don't talk about nonbinary or genderqueer identities. Don't mention any sort of hesitation or 
confusion about identifying with the opposite gender you were assigned at birth.”645 Participant 
#4 recounted an experience at a clinic near Toronto’s gay village where, “in sort of my 
experience visiting this doctor I was like, ‘hey I don’t really know what’s up, I don’t wanna visit 
my regular family doctor, ‘cause like I can’t talk to her and blah blah blah’, so he was like ‘so 
you want to start T right?’ And I was like ‘Nooooo’, and he’s like yeah, ‘but T?’”646 Participant 
#4 was clear that they were not currently interested in medically modifying their body although 
their social and personal transness is very important to them.  
Two participants also identified doctors’ assumption that all of a trans person’s medical 
needs are transition-related when in fact, as Pogi commented, “Trans people have a butt load of 
health needs that are no different from cis people’s, like skin and feet etc.”647 This assumption 
made it difficult for them to obtain referrals for other health issues such as dermatology and 
physiotherapy. 
Furthermore, a common experience for participants was that straight and cis health care 
providers assumed that as trans people they were also gay based on their appearance or having a 
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“girlfriend”.648 As Participant #4 pointed out, transphobia and homophobia are codified at many 
levels, “It goes as deep as standardized checklists, that has [sic] the wrong questions, male, 
female, other, or like ‘who are you having sex with?’ that doesn’t even ask what kind of sex I’m 
having.”649 Assumptions made by doctors then limit the information and choices that are 
presented to LGBTQ youth eroding full expression of their own gendered and racialized 
selfhood. Participant #1 said: “I guess to them there are certain ways of being trans, like a lot of, 
I don’t know, if you can’t really be anywhere on the spectrum, like non-binary identities, and a 
lot of other identities, a lot of POC trans folks are just excluded from this.” Participant #4 
described being offered limited information about reproductive health because the doctor 
assumed they would not want to become a parent.650 They said, “And that sort of gets into like 
family building stuff because I think there's a particular perception about particular queer and 
trans communities that having kids isn't a thing they'd be interested in.”651  
All participants expressed the overarching critique that doctors expected that medical needs 
should be visible and able to be communicated in language that a cis straight and often white 
doctor could understand. For example, Pogi explained the dissonance of using technical and 
emotional language to get their GD diagnosis, “I just felt like I had to use language I wouldn't 
normally use? Like I had to figure out how to communicate all these things I had never properly 
articulated out loud to myself.” Participants were disappointed that doctors did not try different 
methods to elicit information from them after establishing a trusting clinical relationship. As 
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Participant #1 put it, “doctors don’t start by building trust they just start by asking a bunch of 
hard questions.”652 Similarly, Participant #4 commented:  
And so like, there needs to be better ways for healthcare professionals to be like getting 
this information, and I feel like part of this is just like ‘Oh no, it’s taboo to talk about 
unconventional things’ and so doctors want to navigate it in a weird way, maybe don’t 
feel awkward about it but they feel like the patient might feel awkward about it and so 
they’re trying to like keep it on the down low or something…653  
 
Inaccurate assumptions presented challenges to care, and as results suggest below, 
participants showed variety of responses. 
Racism 
 
Participants identified race/ethnicity as a determining factor in health care in several ways. 
Participants had all used queer and trans youth group programs at some point. They found that 
white youth dominated queer and trans spaces and group discussions at community centres and 
community health centres.654 Three of the participants pointed out that accessing programs, 
services and treatment appeared easier for white trans youth because of their greater numbers. 
Participant #1 described being lumped “together with white and binary youth”. The consequence 
of majority white spaces was as Sakura River observed “a lot of the spaces in which it’s for trans 
people and other people like that, it’s a lot of Caucasian or white people who speak over 
everyone else.” Regarding the whiteness of a queer drop-in space Participant #1 said: 
 
Because you need someone who knows what it’s like to be racialized and have not have 
that passing privilege. And just the fact that they didn’t have that at all, or recognize that 
they needed like one counselor at least, just for those folks. It was very upsetting. And 
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then the space quickly became much more like white, because it’s just like, you don’t 
seem to value the racialized communities coming here, so it’s not safe.655 
  
Despite the supportive presence of some BIPOC facilitators running groups like BQY (Black 
Queer Youth) and Transfusions Crew, the Sherbourne Health Centre’s Supporting our Youth 
programming and EGALE’s Youth Drop-In were mentioned as spaces where white dominance 
and racism were consistent.656 In terms of how race influenced the geographic placement of 
funded services for trans people, Participant #4 said, “I think specifically in the context of 
Mississauga, there’s a lot of people like, “Of course there’s no queer and trans services in Peel 
because there’s so many racialized people.”657 
According to participants, therapists and counsellors they encountered rarely demonstrated 
anti-racist approaches to therapy and sometimes displayed culturally inappropriative behaviour. 
Participant #1 described their search for a trans positive therapist this way: 
 
Like when I was like really new I was looking for counsellors, and I guess the first place 
seemed like a, like it seemed really good on the outside, then like my counsellor started 
like teaching me yoga, and all these appropriated methods to like be in the now and she 
started saying namaste a lot and it just got to this point where I was like, no. And I was 
here, looking all over town for like a counsellor who was POC who had immigrant 
experience, who was queer you know, and like it was really hard.658 
 
Two participants agreed that trans and gender terminology are culturally defined by white 
people. Participant #4 commented on how the diagnostic standards reflect this whiteness stating:  
 
I used to have this joke in the queer community where like ‘what does a non-binary 
person look like’ a skinny white person with like the side-cut and like they wear plaid 
button ups and rippy jeans and doc martens. This is what a queer looks like. Not just 
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what does it look like, but what does it mean to be this way. This is how we summarize 
what the experience is. They have just the right amount of dysphoria and this is how 
they do relationships and who they do relationships with. And this is not all people’s 
experience, and this is erasing a lot of people's experiences.659 
 
Results demonstrated that despite the struggle to find other trans racialized youth and anti-
racist service providers, the participants at least had a desire to connect with BIPOCs instead of 
assimilating into whiteness. 
 
Attitudes of Health Care Providers  
 
From participants’ experiences other health care providers like nurses, and emergency 
medical staff as well as technicians and receptionists appeared to be as racist and transphobic as 
doctors. Participant #1 described the attitudes of health care providers, “I feel like health care 
service providers get particular images in their learning, that’s centred from media, because 
they’re also immersed in popular culture too.”660 
One of the participants’ worst experiences was the constant misgendering and outright refusal 
to use trans inclusive language in public hospitals and in the emergency room. Despite gender 
dysphoria being an official mental health diagnosis, two participants encountered mental health 
professionals who refused to respect that diagonosis by using correct names and pronouns. 
Regarding the trans competency of technicians Participant #4 recounted this story:  
 
I took an MRI once and the person, and I was like there in like…this was forever ago 
when I used to bind so, the person asked me if I was like wearing a bra or whatever and 
I was like ‘Nope’ and the person was gendering me using like he/him pronouns, and 
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then like I gave them my health card and they were like ‘OH! You’re a girl!’ and I was 
just like, fuck this. Good thing I don’t have to talk to you ever again.661 
 
This experience also shows the long-term impact on Participant #4 and their resulting sense 
of futility in addressing and educating the MRI technician who appeared to be cluelessly 
transphobic and urgently needed some trans inclusivity training. 
Sakura River created their unsettling “Bloody Glove” photo series to depict how health care 
professionals destroyed their autonomy in health care decision making with their neglect, cruelty 
and shaming.662 Their triptych was shot in a graffiti covered alley in close proximity to CAMH 
using their cousin and partner as actors. In the first picture, a black-clad figure faces the viewer 
and pulls off a bloody medical examination glove. In the second picture, the clad figure has their 
back to the camera, as they hold a glove in their blood-covered hands. More bloody handprints 
move diagonally across the bottom right of the frame towards the creepy figure ending in a 
second discarded bloody glove. In the third picture the black clad figure chases another person in 
the alley. The images intended to show the fear and pain Sakura River experienced in almost all 
their experiences in health care: 
 
I wanted it to evoke strong emotions on people. It’s more so the neglect part, from the 
healthcare system. I just wanted to portray a very ominous mysterious, upsetting feeling. 
Uncomfortable feeling. When dealing with healthcare professional quote unquote. 
When dealing with them, they haven’t understood most of what’s going on with mental 
health issues or things related to my gender, and this represents the neglect that I felt 
with the healthcare system, see he’s turning away and just leaving a trail. Like, doctors 
have done this to me a lot.663 
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Two participants mentioned that non-medical staff in doctors’ offices and hospital clinics also 
displayed transphobic, racist and ableist attitudes.664 Another example of corollary office staff 
displaying oppressive attitudes was shared by Sakura River who had been extremely “excited 
and terrified” on Day 1 about an upcoming appointment with “a trans mental health friendly 
doctor, that I’m going to and finally I can be like, heeeeeeeeey doctor that can help me!”665 
However on Day 2 they reported back that because they were late for the appointment due to a 
panic attack they were told, by the receptionist they could not have another appointment.666 It 
appears that the receptionist for a mental health doctor would not accommodate patients who 
were tardy due to mental health issues. This incident suggests that the doctor’s office did not 
adequately accommodate non-neurotypical trans racialized youth like Sakura River. 
Health care providers that the youth encountered were not adequately trained about trans 
health care needs, which are not always different from cis people’s health care needs. That said 
Participant #4 also said that service providers need to become more knowledgeable about trans 
people’s experiences and their specific health needs.667 Participant #4 expressed the need for 
health care providers to see heterogeneity within social groups of people without simply relying 
on what they may have learned in a trans 101 training: 
 
I used to people watch a lot. What kind of music does this person listen to? What does 
their bedroom look like? Who are they talking on the phone to? And how we never 
know and make all these judgements because we see people as background characters 
in our stories instead of their own people with huge microcosms of stuff going around 
them.668   
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Participants’ discussions and their photographs reveal that their reactions to health care 
providers’ attitudes and behaviours ranged from dissatisfaction to trauma. And yet it is to this 
group of people that participants had to turn to for primary and gender-affirming care. In the next 
section will look at how well management took responsibility for addressing these deficiencies 
of health program delivery. 
 
Lack of Accountability from Service Providers 
 
Participants expressed dissatisfaction that organizations they visited for health care were not 
responsible to them about the quality of services provided in several ways. For example, some 
organizations did not explain programming changes and staff turnover in a transparent manner. 
Participant #4 suggested that the level of neglect is even higher when dealing with racialized 
communities in East Mississauga.  
Like the community health centre’s mandate was that it was supposed to be like, 
prioritizing newcomers and like trans folks and racialized folks, but that’s not actually 
what was going on… And then for an example they had a lot of people being accepted 
as new patients, most of them weren’t newcomers or racialized folks, and they were 
doing that on purpose, and no one was willing to say anything about that.669  
 
 
Participant #4 referred to the implosion of services for queer and trans BIPOCs at East 
Mississauga Community Health Centre in 2015 when management’s transphobia and racism 
resulted in the firing of non-binary POC workers and the loss of doctors serving trans patients 
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but “they didn’t tell patients that he had left” and “they haven’t actually addressed the shitty stuff 
they’ve done…so it’s like how are you expecting folks to come back to your space when you’re 
not willing to adjust the shit that you did in the past.”670 Participants experienced staff turnover 
and programming changes intensely because of their great vulnerability when faced with 
unknown health care providers.671 Similarly, Participant #1 spoke of feeling a loss when 
competent and racialized counsellors and workers of colour staffing the EGALE youth drop-in 
disappeared with no explanation when their services were deeply appreciated by trans racialized 
drop-in users.672 
Participants wanted organizations to take responsibility for properly training their staff to be 
adequately informed and comfortable with BIPOC trans people.673 Furthermore, participants 
suggested that regular mandatory intersectional anti-oppression training needed to be provided 
for front desk staff and health technicians.674 
Supporting our Youth (SOY) programming at the SHC was described as more responsive to 
trans racialized youth than other locations because they allowed for involvement of supportive 
family members through Gender Journeys program and the existence of two anti-racist trans 
facilitators. However, two participants mentioned the majority whiteness of the group’s 
participants as an alienating factor.675  
CAMH was considered useful because for many of the years it was the only place operating 
subsidized services.  However, only Pogi tried to use the CAMH GIC at age 20. Pogi said, “I was 
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looking for other ways to start HRT”, and they simultaneously attempted Planned Parenthood, “it 
was confusing for me to navigate” and the Sherbourne Health Centre, “there was the factor of me 
not living close enough”.676 Ultimately it was Pieces to Pathways who facilitated their gender 
affirming care through effective referrals to doctors. 
Impacts of Barriers on Participant Mental Health and Access to Care 
 
All of the participants described experiencing some type of anxiety related to the structural 
vulnerability of being a trans racialized youth Most significantly participants expressed anxiety 
about entering health spaces, for instance Participant #4 said:  
I believe my mental health is linked with anxieties around being misgendered or not 
respected because of the ways I’m visibly racialized or that I’m fat. I have a lot of 
anxiety about entering new spaces and needing to start from scratch with people; doing 
all the explaining and going through the steps of physicians pathologizing my identities 
or straight up not believing me like they’ve done in the past.677 
 
And Pogi said for example they consider “navigating potential services that won’t be trans 
friendly and being mindful of white dominated services” and spent energy “gauging how to 
present and if I can deal with the stress, impact, of uncomfortable conversations, confrontations.” 
Sakura River identified another way they experienced anxiety:  
So, the doctor decided to believe her [mother] over me when I was in the hospital one 
time, and I needed something to calm down my system because I was stuttering for six 
hours. But for the longest time the doctor was just like, ‘well you just need to eat better, 
you need to sleep better’ blah blah blah. ‘How’s your school life? How’s your family 
life?’ blah blah blah. And this continued on for every single doctor I’ve tried to have 
help with anything. They’re always like, ‘oh eat better.’678 
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Participant 1 said: “Those things are also usually small moments in passing that like, it’s not 
that it doesn’t affect you, because sometimes it does it like hits and then it’s there for like days 
and weeks and months afterwards. But for that person it’s just a moment in time and like…”679 
Finally, two participants made the choice to protect their mental health over addressing physical 
health. Pogi said: “I have been prioritizing mental health over physical, because navigating 
spaces semi-aware of my backgrounds is too much.”680 Sakura River said that their health 
concerns were “a lot of mental health things’ cause it controls my life”.681 This shows their 
struggle for autonomy to recognize and seek help for all their health issues. They have had to 
make the choice against their interests to leave aside physical health concerns because they felt 
their mental health had a greater urgency. These thematic results suggest that structural, 
systemic, professional, organizational and interpersonal barriers had a lasting impact on 
participants whose anxiety often kept them from accessing care in a timely fashion or at all. 
 
Protective Strategies 
 
Participants described agentic decision-making practices in health care to mitigate harm in the 
face of barriers. This next section unpacks those results. 
 
Performing Identities 
 
                                                 
679 Ibid. 
680 Day 2, supra note 607. 
681 Ibid. 
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As discussed earlier in Chapters 1 and 4, a gender dysphoria diagnosis is technically required 
before clinicians approve a trans person for puberty blockers or hormone therapy. Participants 
shared how gender role performance was required to convince gatekeepers of one’s gender 
dysphoria as Pogi explained:  
 
I really wanted to get on Testosterone, and I had heard that when it comes to CAMH 
there’s not a lot of room for exploring your gender if you want to get HRT or surgery 
anytime in the next three years. So, I had to develop and practice a narrative of gender 
dysphoria. I also was diagnosed with type one bipolar disorder, so there was some 
gatekeeping. I had to adhere to an image, and I still do, in order to get on T after three 
years and now to access medication. This is what the photograph Dick Pick is about.682 
 
Pogi further described their gender performance in order to get cross sex hormones:  
 
I just mean I had to do the typical FTM trans man, I've always known that I was this 
way, I'm a man trapped in this body so like I go in there and I'd never act feminine, my 
voice would be monotone. I had to play dude.683 
 
 
This is a perfect example of the simulacrum – the fraudulent imitation that comes to represent 
authenticity.684 These passages show that emancipated youth regulated their behaviour especially 
when attempting to obtain gender-affirming or mental health services. They had to repress 
feelings of anxiety, fear, anger and frustration when in front of health care providers thus being 
read a certain way and not having their underlying stress seen/heard or believed.685 
                                                 
682 Focus group participants, supra note 14. 
683 Ibid. 
684 Theorist Jean Baudrillard used the term simulacrum to mean false copies of a thing that come to precede the thing 
itself Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and simulation, The body, in theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1994); see also Thomas King who applies the simulacrum to the inaccurate stereotypes of Indigenous people that 
come to represent authenticity; Thomas King, The Inconvenient Indian: a curious account of native people in North 
America (Toronto: Anchor Canada, 2013) at 54. 
685 See Pogi below for supporting quote at 173.  
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Besides gender performance, youth identified a second type of identity related performance. 
Participant #4 described carrying their cane at all times so people acknowledged their disability. 
They explained using performance to access accommodations through the photo “Grounded”.686  
 
Sometimes like people’s inferences as to what that means um, like, makes different 
reactions. and yeah, like it’s a really really big thing about like talking about navigation 
and accessibility and like performance and stuff like that. Like this isn’t a thing that I 
literally need, all the time, every day, but I carry it with me, all the time, every single 
day, because one, you never know, and two, people get what this *Taps cane* means 
usually.687  
 
 
Participant #4 also tried to convey the performance of marginalized identity through the 
photograph “Discarded, Forgotten Hidden and Sometimes Compartmentalized”.688 In both 
photographs the cane is disconnected from the person holding it and it is not positioned in a 
typically recognizable way. In “Discarded” the cane lies on the ground like garbage making the 
viewer wonder about how it got there. In the photograph “Grounded” the cane is more assertive 
as it points to the feet of the person holding the cane as though to ground them.689 In both 
photographs I interpret Participant #4 as trying to share different internal and external meanings 
of themselves as a physically disabled trans racialized youth using the cane in different scenarios 
to signify disabling physical and social structures. 
Participant #4 also said they could still be disbelieved while using their cane. They recounted 
an experience of taking public transit with a group of BIPOCs who were all using mobility 
devices. Other transit users asked if their collective use of mobility devices was part of a trend. 
                                                 
686 Grounded, supra note 613. 
687 Day 2, supra note 607. 
688 Discarded, supra note 717. 
689 For another supporting quote on disability performance see Participant #4 below at 175.  
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Participant #4 thought that being racialized also contributed to people invalidating their access 
needs.690 
Three participants described how they were not believed and therefore not diagnosed by 
mental health service providers because they were not demonstrating recognizable indicators of 
“crazy”. For instance, Pogi recounted that:   
 
A psychiatrist doesn't think I have bipolar. Because I haven't had a manic episode in like 
3 years. Because I've been presenting very calm. I think it's the Asian in me that's like I 
have to put on my best face for this adult. Like “yes I’m stressed I do mindfulness 
yoga.691  
 
They explained that as trans racialized youth they did not feel safe entering emergency rooms 
or clinics in states of obvious distress.692 Generally the participants were adept at switching from 
one set of representations to the next in order to best succeed in obtaining what they needed. Yet, 
in the mental health context they did not reveal their distress, or perform crazy to get a diagnosis 
because they were afraid of the consequences such as being found incapable and being 
institutionalized.693 Performance so far has been explained as a way to obtain medical services 
and treatment; however it can also be a disidentification practice to resist the imposition of 
dominant categories, which I will turn to next. 
 
Disidentifying with the Gender Binary 
 
                                                 
690 Day 2, supra note 607. 
691 Day 1, supra note 588. 
692 Ibid. 
693 Ibid. 
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In their image creation process trans racialized youth infused their awareness of the influence 
of dominant social categories into their photographs. This act engaged what bell hooks calls the 
“visual politics of seeing” which goes beyond participants just packaging up good or bad images 
of themselves.694 Results showed different types of transphobic behaviour relating to 
experiencing gender dysphoria; here results reveal the impacts of overly rigid gender boundaries. 
Besides “trans” participants used terms like “gender non-conforming”, “non-binary” and 
“gender-weird” to describe themselves.695 Participants showed how they manipulated the gender 
binary imposed by law and medicine Pogi’s photograph “Dick Pick” depicts the act of resisting 
the gender binary while existing within the gender binary.696 At the centre of the photograph is a 
person’s hand holding their dick between their thighs. The viewer’s eye is drawn to the corridor 
formed by the person’s thighs leading to the row of clothes hanging across the back of the 
photograph. The row of clothes is divided into two sections. One section is masculine, and one 
section is feminine/gender neutral. The creation of this image is a disidentificatory act, because 
Pogi is aware of the falsity of the gender binary system and knows they must exist within it. 
Therefore, when in public they will choose their way of playing with this falsity. In addition to 
considerations in terms of finding the right biracial-shaded prosthesis, they are also choosing 
what type of clothes to wear from each side of the closet where their differently gendered clothes 
hang.697  
There were many situations when participants had to decide how to navigate spaces where 
they are not out as trans and they may not fully pass to cisgender people as a recognizable 
                                                 
694 hooks, 1995 supra note 201 at xii, 2. 
695 Focus Group participants, Pre-group survey supra 592, and Day 1, supra note 588. 
696 Pogi, Dick Pick (April 2017) in it Pogi is humourously playing on the cis male practice of sending people 
photographs of their genitalia, known as “dick pics”. 
697 See description of “Dick Pick” in section Performing the Simulacrum below. 
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gender. Pogi mentioned a time when at the dentist, they pretended to be sick to mask the way 
their voice changed once they started taking testosterone. As with other health service providers, 
they described gauging how binary female or male to look depending on how stressful being 
read as either gender identity would be for them in that space.698 
Disidentification behaviour could also manifest as deliberately trying not to pass as a binary 
gender. Participant #4 illustrated their strategy of wearing wigs in photo “Who goes out? Who 
gets to be seen? Who am I to you?”699 The photograph shows an open closet door on which three 
long-haired glamorously styled pink, purple and copper coloured wigs hang. The bright wigs 
contrast with the white closet door and the blue walls of the room. The caption and the empty 
closet ask the viewer to consider how much their own perceptions and experiences determine 
how to read a person they might see, because as hooks wrote, the way we see is overdetermined 
by our location.700 Participant #4 emphasizes their bodily absence by placing wigs against an 
empty closet in a room they said they barely use.701 They disliked their current hairstyle, and 
used hats and wigs. They also said they do not leave the house that much, and when they do, they 
wear sweatpants and clothes that conceal their body and gender.702 In this way, “Who goes out?” 
questions the viewer’s way of seeing the subject without the subject present. In fact, it functions 
as Participant #4’s distanced self-reflection.703 The photograph could also be read as way of 
showing the artifice of gender through the long-haired brightly coloured wigs and the limitations 
                                                 
698 Day 1, supra note 588. 
699 Participant #4, Who goes out? Who gets to be seen? Who am I to you? (April 2017). 
700 hooks 1995 supra note 201 at 2. 
701 Day 2, supra note 607. 
702 Ibid. 
703 Lutz & Collins, supra note 327 at 207. 
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of trans bodies to push the boundaries of gender. Participant #4 describes the use of tactical 
misrecognition:  
There's a YouTuber I really like who did a video talking about finding your new normal, 
and she's disabled but she looks able bodied, and in her videos, you see her like dancing 
around but that's not how she looks all the time. People don't like talking about 
performance in this way. Like today I decided to wear knee braces even though they're 
ugly and obtrusive, and how that changes how movement is physically and socially. 704 
 
In “Reading Between the Signs”, Pogi disidentified with the cis medical gaze by demanding 
that the viewer identify with an unfamiliar aesthetic.705 Pogi took a full-colour picture from 
across the street facing a small park near the CAMH facilities on Queen Street which they noted 
was spruced up in the last few years as part of a neighbourhood gentrification project.706 The 
viewer’s gaze is directed to a brick wall at the back of the photograph painted with the large 
white block letters “YOU CHANGE”. The rest of the photo shows the empty park with a 
recycling receptacle in the foreground. Pogi talked about how the park featured benches that had 
been designed to prevent people from sleeping on them. Pogi deliberately created the directive 
phrase “YOU CHANGE” by positioning of the camera in such a way as to block the last (and 
missing from the photo) letter “D” with a street sign. Pogi said that one meaning in this image is 
that the cisgender doctor requires the trans person to change in a familiar and recognizable way 
so that the cisgender doctor can approve of the trans person’s identity.  
Both Participant #4 and Pogi used photography not just to depict their own reality for the 
viewer’s consumption, but editorially to make the viewer think about how they see other people 
based on pre-existing categories and familiar narratives. In Pogi’s “Reading between the Signs”, 
                                                 
704 Muñoz, supra note 134; Day 2, supra note 607. 
705 hooks noted this same technique in hooks, 1995 supra note 201 at 4; Reading between the Signs, supra note 636. 
706 Day 2, supra note 607. 
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I saw Pogi using gentrification as a metaphor for the cisgender expectation of transnormativity in 
health care settings. By changing the mural for this photograph, Pogi defamiliarizes the cis gaze 
and thus forces the viewer to see the park, the trans person and themselves in a new way. I liken 
this editorial gaze to a disidentification with the cisgender viewer’s gaze. 
 
Avoidance of Medical Care 
 
 
None of the participants was accessing all of the health care services they needed and wanted 
however they described different degrees of access and for varying reasons. Of the four youth 
participants, two of them avoided medical appointments with doctors, nurses and health 
technicians because of prior experiences of transphobia and racism. The other two were dealing 
primarily with mental health issues that were not, in their opinion, solely trans related. Of the 
latter two participants, one had already secured their cross-sex hormone replacement therapy and 
wanted to be approved for top surgery once they had been on testosterone for the required length 
of time. The other participant was trying to socially transition before trying to access cross sex 
hormones which they had been refused more than once. 
Participant #4 was one of those who experienced multiple layers of oppression in health care 
settings and exercised their agency to avoid health care altogether. Their photo “We Spend Some 
Time Together and Avoid the Medical Gaze” shows a person from the neck down facing the 
viewer, wearing fitted brightly coloured clothes.707 The person is holding leash attached to a 
small dog that is standing on a low small wall as if around a pond. The lighting comes from 
natural sunlight. This picture showed a protective response to the total stress and exhaustion of 
                                                 
707 Participant #4, We Spend Some Time Together and Avoid the Medical Gaze (April 2017). 
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going to their family doctor for tests, a doctor who misgendered them and told them to lose 
weight.  Rather than start looking for a new doctor, they went for a walk with a friend and their 
dog. Participant #4 is not even in the picture, implying their own desire to disappear in the face 
of the doctor-induced stress. They remarked: 
 
The theme for these pictures is Me Avoiding Going to the Doctors.’ because, it’s 
[laughter] a real thing that’s happening right now, where I went to the doctor recently 
and the doctor was like ‘Okay we have to take a bunch of tests’…and then I was trying 
to get the doctor to like write a referral to me to get an assessment for a thing and she’s 
like, ‘I can’t write an assessment because we need to do these tests first, and also I lost 
some of your information because you haven’t been here in however many years’, and 
so, I was just like ‘This is me not going to the doctor’ because I don’t wanna do the 
hassle. 708 
 
Participant #4 stated that their health care priority was: “Feeling safe in accessing spaces 
regardless of how much they’re needed is extremely important to me and I cannot enter into a 
space without that understanding of safety from service providers.”709  
Sakura River also described attempting to avoid emergency medical care for financial 
reasons. They tried not to go to the emergency room after a fall at work: “And my brain 
immediately went to my finances, what if I have a concussion? What if I have to go to the 
hospital? WHAT IF I HAVE TO GO TO THE HOSPITAL?”710 Their boss insisted they get 
checked out and subsequently, their experience at the emergency room could be characterized as 
several hours of being continuously misgendered by each staff person they encountered even 
with their partner there to advocate for them.  
                                                 
708 Day 2, supra note 607. 
709 MC, supra note 603. 
710 Day 2, supra note 607. 
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In this thematic area, trans racialized youth participants described making agentic choices to 
protect themselves from further negative experiences with health care providers despite wanting 
medical attention for a number of health care issues. The way that Pogi described their mental 
health strategy was either to put off formally dealing with concerns until they had passed the 
thresholds for obtaining desired gender affirming treatments or to delay their medical transition 
until they felt their mental health issues were less of a priority. This is a very difficult decision 
for youth since gender dysphoria causes significant psychological distress. 
 
Hiding 
 
 
Participants used hiding as another agentic protective response to feeling a lack of autonomy 
in relationships and in relation to their own health and well-being. Participants hid in different 
ways and to different degrees. Whether they hid at home, from society, the medical world or 
their family of origin. This was due to the need to psychologically recharge from the multiple 
layers of oppression they experience daily. Hiding from doctors was best expressed above by 
Participant #4 in the photograph “We Spend Some Time Together and Avoid the Medical 
Gaze”.711  
Sometimes participants used baggy clothes to hide birth-assigned gender or as a response to 
fat phobia. While fashion was an extremely important interest of three of the participants, two of 
those who loved fashion often did not want to wear body conscious clothes that garnered 
attention when going to the doctor, for example. As Participant #4 described in an earlier quote 
how tight clothing exacerbated gender misrecognition problems at the doctor’s office. Sakura 
                                                 
711 Participant #4, We Spend Some Time Together and Avoid the Medical Gaze (April 2017) [Medical Gaze]. 
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River also said they wanted people to know they were gender fluid however in many situations 
they said they hid their gender identity like a “trans ninja” for their own safety.712  
For Participant #1, discomfort with public attention caused to them not to take pictures 
outside in a crowded street during the Day1 training shoot. They said that because they were 
already subjected to a lot of public scrutiny they did not want to take pictures in public.713  
Resilience Strategies and Autonomy Practices 
 
Through focus group discussions and photo analysis the following practices emerged: 
integration of self, self-advocacy, intentional social networks. 
 
Integration of Identities into Selfhood 
 
 
All of the participants referred to themselves intersectionally and strongly resisted being 
compartmentalized by single issue or identity. Participant #4 was adamant that the sum of their 
vulnerabilities made their experience of health care uniquely alienating: “being plus-sized person 
being BIPOC and crip and trans and all these things influences …experiences that happen and 
what I get in health care spaces because of a lot of fat phobia and racism.”714 In a similar vein, 
Participant #1 said: “…it’s not like cis people just see me as a Paki, or just as a feminine person, 
or non-binary. They [doctors] see me all at once; I mean they don’t ‘see’ me they ‘read’ me 
                                                 
712 Day 2, supra note 607. 
713 Day 1 Notes, supra note 593. 
714 Focus group participants, supra note 14. 
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through my clothes, my accent, my makeup.”715 Their desire to integrate their identities into their 
unique selfhoods is beautifully captured in Participant #4’s photograph “Discarded, Forgotten 
and Hidden. Sometimes Compartmentalized”.716 In this photograph, a cane lies askew in a 
parking lot near garbage and recycling bins. The cane symbolizes their experience of being 
disabled and of being read by others as disabled.717 
At first Sakura Rivers expresses the difficulty of their interlocking identities: “It is difficult to 
represent myself as a trans BIPOC person as well due to my having mental health issues, many 
don’t seem to want to believe that I do, most likely due to my being gender fluid as well as 
Hispanic.”718 Still, two of their photographs show their integration of identities as resistance: 
“Flags” and “Light after Dark”.719 In “Flags” Sakura River stands in full colour in centre frame 
addressing the viewer with their confident gaze. They might be riffing on the practice of flagging 
mentioned in Chapter 2 where a queer person reveals their queer identity using signals that only 
other queer people will notice. They signal their various identities and group memberships using 
referents such as the Pride flag, the Transgender Pride flag, and the Pikachu hat. In “Light” they 
captured a rainbow in a pink streaked sky from an apartment balcony. The rainbow arcing 
through the middle of the frame could represent Sakura River who incorporates several different 
elements in one charismatic personality. Sakura River seems to recognize that their interlocking 
identities and oppressions are key to their survival. Through these photographs and interviews 
participants express experiencing forms of violence in health-related contexts that cannot be 
reduced to silos of transphobia, ageism, racism, fat phobia or classism. Results show that the 
                                                 
715 Focus group participants, supra note 7. 
716 Participant #4, Discarded, Forgotten and Hidden. Sometimes Compartmentalized (April 2017) [Discarded]. 
717 Day 2, supra note 607. 
718 Focus group participants, supra note 7. 
719 Sakura River, Flags (April 2017), and Light After Dark (April 2017). 
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phenomenology of selfhood in health care is fundamentally intersectional for trans racialized 
youth. 
 
Selfhood and Representation of Self 
 
 
Self-image can be described as the way a person perceives themselves including their 
abilities, their physical presentation, and their mannerisms. It is the visual aspect of selfhood. 
Self-image can be especially revealing through photographs. Participants were not asked to take 
pictures of themselves but asked about how they tell their stories and their identities in health 
care contexts. As explained in these results, participants conveyed their self-image through 
images, symbols and omissions of themselves.  
Being photographed and even taking photographs was not a simple activity for focus group 
participants. For example, Participant #4 refused to take pictures of their face: “I like actually 
didn’t want to take any pictures of myself, I think I took one picture of my face and I was like, 
fuck that because I don’t like looking at pictures of myself”.720 At first, I perceived they had a 
negative self-image from internalized negative messaging. In reflection, I considered hooks’ 
essay on Black relationships to image production and aesthetics. hooks theorizes:  
 
Reflecting on the way black folks looked at themselves in those private spaces, where 
those ways of looking were not being overseen by a white colonizing eye, a white 
supremacist gaze, those images created ruptures in our experiences of the visual. Thy 
challenged both white perceptions of blackness and that realm of black-produced image 
making that reflected internalized racism.721  
 
                                                 
720 Day 2, supra note 607. 
721 hooks, 1995 supra note 201 at 61. 
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In addition, I considered Prosser’s statement that for trans people looking at their images 
could be both grounding and alienating depending on many different factors.722 The absence of 
their face in photographs seemed to say, “I don’t want to know how others see me.”723  
Participant #4 said: “And it’s just like, I don’t wear wigs most of the time, but I also don’t leave 
the house most of the time. So…”724 With these three observations in mind then, I saw that for 
this participant, who struggled with internalized racism, fatphobia and transphobia, creating and 
viewing self-portraits had the potential for painful self-criticism. And yet while their pictures 
contain no headshots they do feature legs, feet and belly shots because they felt their “tummy is 
important” and “powerful”.725 Through the “private space” of the focus group, they exhibited 
simultaneous negative self-image and resistance to it based on their understanding of internalized 
oppression. 
We see Participant #4 stake their claim to beauty and self-love through the photo titled “I 
never said I was ugly. It doesn’t make me sick”.726 In the photo their naked belly dominates the 
frame, within its own dark-skinned subjectivity. Their belly addresses the viewer directly as 
though it has its own gaze.  “I was specifically talking about how people are like ‘oh, I'm so fat’ 
or ‘Oh you're so pretty!’ like those are totally different things. No, I can be both fat and 
pretty.”727 This is an act of tactical misrecognition. Participant #4 is fat Black trans and disabled. 
They know that society tells them they cannot be pretty and yet they use the word “Ugly” to 
                                                 
722 Prosser, supra note 132 at 132 mentions factors such as whether the photographs depict pre or post transition and 
whether the trans person authored or commissioned the photographs. Prosser is notably silent on issues of race and 
ability. 
723 Ibid at 213-15. 
724 Day 2, supra note 607. 
725 Ibid. 
726 Participant #4, I never Said I was Ugly, It doesn’t make me Sick (April, 2017) [Ugly]. 
727 Day 2, supra note 607. 
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show the viewer they reject that label. That same participant shared their hope and self-love in 
captions for other photographs. They captioned their cane, legs and feet shot “It’s a long way 
down, but there is more than one way to be grounded”. I take this as a description of a resilience 
strategy, where what could be disabling becomes affirming. Thus, the act of taking and curating 
images allowed Participant #4 to disidentify with mainstream beauty norms and to see beauty in 
their self-image despite always having to buffer society’s negative framing of their identities and 
their bodies. 
Several of the youth’s resilience strategies were related to physical appearance. Participant #1 
said: “the way we present ourselves can be a form of protection. Like, I wear a lot of makeup 
when I’m really anxious, and you wouldn’t think that, but I find the process very calming. It’s a 
buffer, femme armour.”728 Sakura River, Participant #4 and Participant #1 placed a great deal of 
attention on what they and others wear, even when they are purposefully hiding. Sakura River is 
part of a specific femme fashion community in Toronto. Clothing was also important to Pogi in 
the way that clothing is mined for gender clues by other people. In their photo “Dick Pick” Pogi 
is playfully deciding who to be, and how to look based on the feminine and masculine clothing 
on either side of their “dick” which acted as the barometer for the way their gender needed to 
switch. Participant #4 is an accomplished seamstress who makes and sells cosplay costumes for 
large and trans bodies and yet Participant #4 said they normally wore shapeless sweatpants to 
hide their body when they left the house.729 They may have been hiding themselves, but they 
balanced their love of theatrical fashion by making costumes for other people. 
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In order to represent themselves as a trans BIPOC person, Sakura River created the 
photograph entitled “Light After Dark”730 to depict how they move through the world as gender 
fluid and how they try to “make light of dark situations”. Sakura River took the photograph from 
an apartment balcony overlooking a grey urban landscape juxtaposed against a rainbow-hued sky 
after a storm. They described themselves as a “special snowflake” and explained that it is very 
challenging to remain positive in a world that did not like them due to being Hispanic, trans, 
poor, having mental health illness and being a youth.731 Their self-conception involved beauty, 
positivity and playfulness. Despite daily attacks on their autonomy from structural inequity and 
their family of origin and they constructed their self-image by using contrasting colours, 
evocative lighting, multi-dimensional location and an optimistic caption. 
Sometimes participants chose to show their self-image by using a self-referencing object 
instead of placing themselves in the photograph. Participants used props such as canes, wigs, 
prosthetics, knee braces hats, megaphones, rainbows and birds. Pikachu shaped cosplay hats 
appealed to Sakura River because Pikachu is a cheerful creature due to its yellow colour and 
smile. Thus, it was an appropriate self-reference to them as a small but powerful being. Pogi on 
the other hand, liked Pikachu because it is the genderless mascot for Pokémon and its image is 
energetic (it can shoot electric sparks) but not intimidating. The use of Pikachu is also a self-
reference in “Alone Together” because Pogi is masculine but rejects stereotypically masculine 
aggression.732  
                                                 
730 Light after Dark, supra note 720. 
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732 Pogi, Alone Together (April 2017). 
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Other people appear in participants’ photographs such as the person in Pogi’s “Building on 
Health Care” and the person in Participant #4’s “Medical Gaze”. In both of those photographs 
the subject’s face is hidden. In “Building on Health Care” the subject is a feminine presenting 
woman of colour wearing sunglasses.733 There is toughness about her signified by her non-
smiling expression and her leather motorcycle jacket. She could be a version of Pogi’s feminine 
side that is openly challenging the medical industrial complex in a way that Pogi would not do as 
them self. Then there is the person photographed with a dog on a leash by Participant #4 in 
“Medical Gaze”. That person is the opposite of how Participant # 4 describes themselves and 
wears body conscious bright coloured clothing. The person is also Black and full-figured and is 
not hiding from the world. What participants choose about other people could also reflect what 
they like or do not like about themselves, and what they feel internally but do feel like they can 
externally embody in a photograph or in their daily lives. Photography then, has the potential to 
be a world-making act where hidden or aspirational elements of selfhood can be shown and 
therefore actualized.  
 
Self-Advocacy 
 
 
Youth outside parental control exhibited higher levels of self-advocacy and self-regulation in 
order to be seen as capable with respect to health-related decision-making activities, however all 
of the youth sought out health information and advocated for themselves which they found tiring. 
Participant #1 and Sakura River experienced the least family support. Participant #1 said:  
 
                                                 
733 Building on Health Care, supra note 639. 
 194 
It just feels like there’s so much more self-initiative that you need, when you don’t 
necessarily have support. So it’s kind of counter intuitive, like okay, I need people to 
support me because I can’t support myself, like I don’t have these people and the only 
way I can get to spaces that can support me, I need to be able to like, have enough self-
care to do it.734 
 
Pogi and Sakura River and carried out the most self-advocacy, and also were accessing more 
health care than Participants #1 and #4. Participant #1 remembered being discounted this way:  
This happened when I had to get a reassessment for ADHD for school, and I was 
stressed so dressed really fancy that day. I wore like a weird outfit. So, I was talking 
about how I'm shy and socially awkward. And she was like, you don't seem like you are 
and it's like what the fuck, I'm telling you and you don't believe me.735 
 
Sakura River related this experience: 
 
So as soon as like I started showing mental health issues, my mom she gas lighted me 
the entire time, no you don’t have these issues, blah blah blah, and when I went to the 
doctors for them, I tried my best to communicate what was going on.736 
 
Assertiveness and informed self-advocacy seemed to confuse health care providers who 
had specific expectations of trans or neurodiverse youth. To put it in Pogi’s words: “they 
[health care providers] don’t seem to have an awareness that people will present 
differently in different situations.737 
 
And finally, Participant #4 said regarding health care offices:  
 
But you can’t really go into that space without being informed. Because often they don’t 
know anything, so you have to come in and like bring a stack of paperwork. But if you 
come with a stack of paper work they are suspicious because you know too much.738 
 
Intentional Social Networks 
 
                                                 
734 Day 1, supra note 588. 
735 Day 1, supra note 588. 
736 Day 2, supra note 607. 
737 MC, supra note 603. 
738 Day 1, supra note 588. 
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Family of Origin 
 
In the literature, family or adult support is established as a protective factor for trans youth. 
In this sample, participants did not mention family members as a source of support. Sakura River 
was the exception. Despite being estranged from their nuclear family, they were very close to 
their cousin who picked them up from the hospital, supported them and took part in the 
Photovoice project.739 Family relationships were not conducive to autonomous decision making, 
which would have required: respect for boundaries, demonstrating self-awareness, sharing 
information, and practicing decision-making skills.740  
We know from the recent research reviewed in Chapter 1, and from anecdotal evidence from 
Drs. Bonifacio, Kaufman and Marasella that white trans youth and their families enjoy clinical 
and social service supports that BIPOC trans youth and their families do not.741 Two participants 
described their families as transphobic; still, participants were not aware of any resources for 
families of trans racialized youth. Participant #4, a Black trans youth observed, “I think there’s 
also an assumption from outside of BIPOC that because x person is from whatever racialized 
group, of course their family is going to be more queer or transphobic.”742 Participants also 
identified the same barriers noted in Chapter 1 by Dadui and Pyne that prevented BIPOC parents 
from supporting them as trans youth.743 The barriers for racialized families were English-only, 
culturally white uninsured services, with job precarity making it near impossible to take time 
from work to support children and youth with extra health needs.  
                                                 
739 Day 2, supra note 607. 
740 Ibid. 
741 Dadui, supra note 124; Lee, supra note 53, at 87; Pyne 2018, supra note 35. 
742 Day 1, supra note 588. 
743 MC Notes, supra note 621. 
 196 
Community 
 
On the other hand, all participants expressed the rewards of belonging or participating in 
community made up of friends, lovers, partners and acquaintances. Reliance on community is 
depicted in the photographs “Medical Gaze” (Participant #4), “Community Family Chosen or 
Otherwise Taking On The World Together”744 (Participant #4), “Flags” Sakura River and “Alone 
Together” Pogi. The photograph “Community” shows a group of ducks in a river under some 
hanging trees. Participant #4 compared the grouping of the ducks to members of their 
community where not everyone likes one another but people still try to help and support each 
other. Above the ducks, in the trees overhead, there is a large falcon that Participant #4 described 
as the common enemy. Eventually the ducks all made a big noise and stayed together and scared 
the falcon away. With this photograph they wanted to capture the dynamics of navigating 
difference and conflict within family and community groups and also collectively facing the 
common enemy who views all the ducks as the same.745 
In “Flags” Sakura River is centred in the frame. Their body takes up the height of the frame. 
They are outdoors in a public field. They refer to several strands of their identity by using flags 
and a hat. They wear their Pikachu rave hat, the rainbow pride flag and the blue and white 
genderqueer flag. They proudly show their membership in three communities as part of their 
sense of self and the act of belonging appears to be validating and dynamic because of the 
movement of the flags in the wind. 
Three of the participants were deeply engaged in cosplay communities. Sakura River and 
Pogi describe cosplay as an activity where they dress up in Japanese manga and anime costumes 
                                                 
744 Participant #4, Community, family, chosen or otherwise taking on the world together (April 2017) [Community]. 
745 Day 2, supra note 607. 
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with other similarly dressed players. Both use Pikachu hats in their photographs “Flags” and 
“Alone Together”. Sakura River describes their cosplay community as “caring, kind and fun-
loving people” and says: “They respect me no matter what gender I present as or feel. They use 
all the correct pronouns, plus my preferred name…”746 Finally in “Alone Together”, Pogi shows 
themselves and a friend sitting on a log in the woods with their backs to the viewer, both wearing 
Pikachu hats.747 Friendship is depicted as a place of solace. 
Peer Support Work 
 
Peer support is a relational practice that involves people with a shared experience supporting 
each other through life challenges, validating each other’s feelings, sharing information, and 
building community. Two participants found being members of peer support communities to be 
fulfilling. Pogi worked at a youth mental health services organization. Sakura River was a peer 
support volunteer at an organization run by LGBTQ+ youth. They said, “There are other people 
who are POC like me who I’ve found, like me…but I don’t have that group of people to be all 
like, ‘You’re doing it! You’ve got this!’ except with [name of peer support group]. That’s the 
only people who like, understand the stuff I’m going through mostly.”748 Participant #4 
repeatedly mentioned that they coordinated a monthly QTBIPOC youth meet up in a community-
based health organization outside Toronto. In those youth spaces there was mutual information 
and skill-sharing, community-building and reciprocal peer support.  
Finally, two participants made the choice to prioritize mental health over physical health. Pogi 
said, “I have been prioritizing mental health over physical, because navigating spaces semi-
                                                 
746 Ibid. 
747 Alone Together, supra note 733. 
748 Day 2. 
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aware of my backgrounds is too much.”749 Sakura River said that their health concerns were “a 
lot of mental health things cause it controls my life”.750 This shows their struggle for autonomy 
to recognize and seek help for all their health issues. They have had to make the choice against 
their interests to leave aside physical health concerns because they felt their mental health had a 
greater urgency. 
Discussion 
Participant’s interviews and photographs resonated with the challenges of existence within an 
impersonal capitalist society characterized by systemic hetero/cisnormativity and precarity of life 
outcomes. They felt that health care provision and discourses limited the full expression of their 
identities.751 This was in part as a result of the widespread use of versions of the acronym 
“LGBTQ” in health and social service fields lumps several sexual orientations and gender 
identities together for ease of service provision. As Han pointed out the resulting social grouping 
however ignores non-binary people, and Two Spirit people and forces straight identified trans 
people to obtain services in queer spaces. In addition to racism and transphobia, participants 
experienced differential access to care based on social determinants of health such as age, ability, 
body size, where they lived, citizenship status, class, income, and family support which supports 
Lee’s recent work on trans racialized youth.  
Their desire for gender autonomy and integration of their identity categories deeply affected 
their mental and physical health. They described a range of health care related activities beyond 
giving informed consent that constituted the exercise of decision making. Participants spent time 
                                                 
749 MC, supra note 603. 
750 Ibid. 
751 Sarkisova, supra note 329; Chang, supra note 120. 
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and care considering their gender identity related options and making decisions to minimize 
harm. They assessed providers, programs and physical spaces for safety and levels of racism, 
ageism and transphobia. Participants’ responses to the barriers fall into categories of short-term 
protective/agentic or longer-term autonomy-enhancing.752 Their agentic strategies were 
performance, disidentification, avoiding medical care, and hiding. Individual and collective 
autonomy-enhancing activities included integration of their identities, controlling their own self-
representation, self-advocacy, participating in community and sharing information amongst 
peers.753  
Participants preferred to make decisions with assistance from supportive and informed trusted 
people.754 They were afraid that doctors would allow unsupportive relatives to make health care 
decisions for them. When there were no trusted informed supportive adults to assist in decision 
making trans racialized youth relied on peers and community workers. They benefited greatly 
from safer, confidential and barrier –free health care services where they saw themselves 
represented.  
According to participants, health care providers routinely failed to abide by informed consent 
rules when dealing with patients of all ages. This concern relates partly to the lack of access to 
rights-based legal information about the HCCA raised by Justice for Children and Youth in the 
previous chapter, and also to health care providers’ insensitivity to issues specific to the 
autonomy of trans youth in decision-making such as hiding one’s gender identity from family or 
being estranged from family. 
                                                 
752 Sherwin 1998 supra note 157; Nedelsky 1989, supra note 157. 
753 Hammond, supra note 78. 
754 Paré, supra note 107; VanPragh, supra note 200; Geist, supra note 277. 
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Health care providers frequently breached confidentiality by seeking parental consent without 
a finding of incapacity and the resulting required notification process. Health care professionals 
held a number of pathologizing clinical stereotypes with respect to trans youth which worked 
against racialized and non-binary youth. Furthermore, participants knew that sometimes people 
do not want a physical change or that they cannot medically transition for physical and mental 
health reasons.755 Still others cannot medically transition for religious reasons.756 Participants 
were aware that medical transition was not approved for homeless or under housed youth, or 
those without the money for doctors’ letters, unsubsidized travel out of province or who lack 
support for pre-and post-surgical care.757 These results support the proposition that eligibility 
criteria deselect for structurally vulnerable trans racialized youth.  
Therefore, participants regarded doctors less as sources of support and information and more 
as gatekeepers. Clinical stereotypes and eligibility criteria coerced participants to implement 
agentic tactics. They described themselves to health care gatekeepers in terms matching the trans 
simulacrum in order to obtain diagnoses, hormone prescriptions and approvals for treatments. 
Doctors did not know how to broach topics of sexuality and gender e.g. safer sex practices with 
them. Participants also indicated that better listening skills and a patient-centred approach were 
needed to foster great autonomy in their decision-making. Their experiences suggest that the 
doctor’s gatekeeping role undermined true practice of autonomy and the related activity of 
informed consent.758 
                                                 
755 MC, supra note 603. 
756 Participant #1, Pre-focus group survey, supra note 592. 
757 Day 1 Notes, supra note 593. 
758 This confirms a finding about trans youth forming health information exchange networks in Hammond supra 
note 78 at 70 and 76. 
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While the participants had differing levels of insight about their own physical and mental 
conditions and the types of gender affirming treatments and services that exist in Toronto, they 
lacked important rights-based information about how to carry out the range of activities required 
for autonomous practice.Yet, in contrast to their lack of legal knowledge about health care 
consent and capacity, participants were well informed through peer community knowledge 
transfer about gender-affirming treatments, had adequate knowledge of services and had 
developed some strategies to address systemic barriers. Community knowledge transfer came 
through working and volunteering in peer support groups as well as participating in social 
communities that came together for art and performance. Others were compelled to self-advocate 
from a young age due to family conflict.759 Self-advocacy often was held against them, as it was 
not congruent with diagnostic criteria and paternalistic stereotypes that did not recognize the 
survival strategies of trans racialized youth and their families. 
All participants used photography as a method of world making and self-validation.  Art 
allowed them to employ the concept of disidentification by taking mainstream concepts, images 
and messages and reinterpreting them to be able to reflect themselves and critique those cultural 
products by making new ones. Sometimes not appearing in photos stemmed from participants 
discomfort with seeing themselves visually represented. In this Photovoice study the participants 
had complete control over what to show, what to share and what to release to me to use. So, 
while participants used hiding as an agentic strategy in Photovoice, in daily life that did not mean 
they wished to remain hidden. Hiding was a survival strategy that thwarted their autonomy.760 
                                                 
759 This supports Singh’s finding about trans racialized youth’s self-advocacy in the education system in Singh 
2013a, supra note 50 at 696. 
760Judith Butler, Excitable speech: a politics of the performative (New York, NY: Routledge, 1997) at 136-39; 
Sherwin and McLeod 2000, supra note 181. 
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Health care providers and their organizations could have instead helped foster a sense of safety 
and appreciation for youths’ integrated selfhoods.  
The ability to perform a clinically recognizable gender identity to gatekeeping professionals 
was an essential skill for youth who need subsidized gender-related health services.761  Put 
another way, the participants all donned the simulacrum of medically approved trans markers to 
access care. All the participants reported constantly feeling disbelieved by health care providers, 
which they attributed to a number of factors: the pathological combination of being trans 
racialized youth and in one case fat and with a physical disability and, in two cases due to mental 
illness. Furthermore, one participant said they deployed a stereotypical disability performance 
during interactions with most health care providers to counteract being disbelieved. Yet, while 
they perform, they do not necessarily conform. Their photographs show their critique through the 
disidentification process. 
Self-acceptance was a conscious goal and a practice for all participants. This came across in 
many of their pictures. Pogi’s “Reading between the Signs” and “Dick Pick” both reflect back 
agency and autonomy for what Pogi wants by questioning the normalcy of cisgenderness and 
declaring that gender is both relational and essential.762 Sakura River’s “Flags” exudes pride and 
unapologetic self-love in their engaged facial expression, direct gaze and confident posture.763 
Flags is a clear message of adaptability and optimism in the face of struggle.764 Participant #4 
resists internalizing racist, fat phobic and transphobic messages in “Ugly” and “Grounded”. As 
the photographer, they reframe images of their fat, Black, disabled trans body showing the 
                                                 
761 Denny, supra note 122, Namaste, 2000 supra note 75; Sarkisova, supra note 329, Chang, supra note 120, Thom 
supra note 132. 
762 Nagoshi and Brzuzy, supra note 135; Dick Pick supra note 697; Reading Between the Signs, supra note 636. 
763 Flags, supra note 720. 
764 Singh 2013a, supra note 50. 
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viewer constructions we may never have seen before but also forcing us to question our own 
application of mainstream beauty and ability standards. 
As this phenomenology chapter attests, the participants were less concerned with producing 
positive visual representations and instead demonstrated a sophisticated cultural understanding of 
the politics of representation that challenged me as the researcher/viewer.765 The participants’ 
marginalized positionality and their awareness of their own structural vulnerability compelled 
them to disidentify with dominant legal and medical narratives and mainstream aesthetic 
representations of them as trans racialized youth. They avoided reproducing stereotypes of 
authenticity that legal and medical constructions of autonomy would have ultimately painted 
them with. 
In addition to self-advocacy and self-representation, participants used several collective 
strategies to increase their sense of calmness, relieve stress, alleviate depression and reduce 
isolation resulting from their intersectional and structurally vulnerable daily lives. These 
strategies allowed participants to bounce back from their experiences with health care providers 
and health systems.766 These strategies were also local autonomy practices because through them 
they shared knowledge, increased their sense of security, validated participants’ selfhood and 
nourished their supportive relationships fostering interdependence.  
 
Particularity of the Research 
 
                                                 
765 hooks 1995, supra note 201, Muñoz, supra note 134. 
766 Singh 2013a, supra note 50. 
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Broad generalizations about trans racialized youth in health care cannot be made on the basis 
of this research. The results are specific to the experiences of youth who live in the biggest city 
in Canada in a province where health consent has a presumption of capacity. The focus group 
data was contextualized, transparent and rich because of the qualitative methods I chose and the 
research team’s success in building rapport and trust with the participants. Qualitative research 
does not aim to make empirical generalizations from field work, but rather, as in this study, to 
generate a phenomenology of autonomy in decision making by this group of four youth. These 
kinds of findings can be useful to other people as the findings can transfer new understandings to 
other people’s lives without universalizing to a whole demographic.767 The results offer 
transferability in part because of the research validation strategies I utilized at all stages of the 
process.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter illuminated the intimate decision-making experiences of four trans racialized 
youth through an analysis of their written and visual narratives. Their phenomenology revealed a 
dismal picture of health care for trans racialized youth in Ontario which contrasts with beliefs 
held by legislators about the autonomy-enhancing nature of the HCCA. They did not feel legal or 
medical practitioners or social service systems affirmed their autonomy. These findings are 
consistent with broader relational autonomy scholarship that points to the duty of government to 
actively support rights as relationships. Participants experienced autonomy as a process not as a 
                                                 
767 Chérie Moody et al, “‘Without this, I would for sure already be dead’: A qualitative inquiry regarding suicide 
protective factors among trans adults.” (2015) 2:3 Psychol Sex Orientat Gend Divers 266 at 277; Jonathan A Smith, 
Michael Larkin & Paul Flowers, Interpretative phenomenological analysis: theory, method and research (Los 
Angeles: SAGE, 2009) at 51. 
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moment of arrival based on turning 18. At times, their sense of powerlessness over traumatic 
health care services caused them to avoid health care altogether. And as a result, some did not 
feel adequately prepared to exercise autonomy when they reached the age of 18. Policy changes 
are needed at systemic and professional and organization levels to push societal and 
interpersonal awareness of barriers and how to eliminate them. This research also concludes that 
greater respect and attention be given to youth’s own autonomy-enhancing practices. 
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Chapter 6: Final Reflections and Recommendations 
 
I begin this conclusion by returning to my research question: How do trans racialized youth 
experience decision making in health care in Ontario? The short answer is - with great difficulty 
but showing deep resilience by relying on both agentic strategies and autonomy-enhancing 
practices. The long answer requires more space to synthesize the results of my thesis and to 
reflect on its findings. I applied the central insights of relational theory’s critique of traditional 
autonomy to paternalist concerns about health equity law, family law, and the formal 
gatekeeping role played by health care providers in Ontario. In addition, I brought a 
multidisciplinary methodological approach to the foreground of pluralist legal inquiry. This 
meant facilitating Photovoice focus groups, conducting empirical research, and analysing the 
results through transfeminist and performance theory in order to assess Ontario’s intersectional 
health care environment for decision making. 
Specifically, I examined the Health Care Consent Act, Regulation 552 of the Health Insurance 
Act against decisions from the CCB, the SBT, the HSRB and all levels of courts where trans 
minors and youth were present. I also contrasted the DSM- V’s psychiatric diagnostic criteria for 
Gender Dysphoria and the WPATH SoC with non-medical models of transness and community-
based primary care protocols from the Sherbourne Health Centre. A practical contribution of this 
research is its in depth analysis of the relationship between the consent, capacity and substitute 
decision making provisions of the HCCA in intention, on paper, and in application with OHIP 
coverage criteria for their combined impacts on the health care of trans racialized youth. 
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I asked corollary questions embedded in legal philosophy guided in part by Spade’s pluralist 
lens of laws as tactics.768 How do statutes interact with real life experiences? How do rights work 
across different areas of law and place where law happens? Are statutory rights effective if 
affected groups barely know about them? I found that the rights of minors to make their own 
decisions were ignored in family law custody and access cases. Even when the gender identity of 
a capable minor child was central to a conflict between parents, and medical testimony and 
future treatment plans were determinative, judges dismissed the HCCA rights of minors to be 
informed, to consult and to decide. This dismissal undermined the autonomy development of 
minors. My research illustrated the lingering paternalism of decision makers, especially judges, 
which manifests in cases involving mature minors and carries over to non-minor youth. Minors 
and youth are already largely unaware of their rights. This study found that judges tend to 
consolidate decision-making authority in legal guardians. Legal paternalism is especially 
dangerous for gender non-conforming minors and youth who might have greater need for 
medical interventions than cis counterparts and greater likelihood of conflict with guardians over 
gender identity. 
Demonstrating the benefits of interdisciplinary research methods is the third significant 
contribution this work offers. I stated my affinity for the frameworks of legal pluralism and the 
transformative paradigm early in my research process.769 Therefore, I considered the words and 
actions of legislators, lawyers, doctors, parents and administrators about health autonomy for 
minors and youth. I added the key phenomenological ingredient from discussions and 
photographs produced by trans racialized youth as legal actors themselves. This qualitative 
                                                 
768 Spade 2012, supra note 199.  
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aspect provided a unique angle on how statutes, case law, interviews and photographs intersect 
calling forth a richness and heterogeneity of data that is not typical of legal scholarship. Clinical 
texts and Hansard archives unfolded as subjects, which were intertwined with the first-person 
narratives of the participants. To further my methodological aim to share my own privileged 
access to legal information as a researcher, I provided participants with health rights legal 
information sheets in plain language. 
Indebted to the insights of critical race theory - my use of intersectionality extended beyond 
race and gender because my recruitment methods and analysis included factors of gender 
identity, disability and body size. Still, systemic and structural racism is extremely hard to prove 
and to isolate in health care when multiple oppressions are also at play. My findings provide 
usable evidence of the racism implicit in health care and law with specific references to diverse 
jurisprudence and several different authoritative clinical and diagnostic texts. I demonstrated 
what many trans people understand experientially: that the diagnostic criteria for Gender 
Dysphoria in the DSM-V and OHIP’s endorsement of the WPATH SoC v7 eligibility criteria 
have differential impacts on racialized youth due to their structural vulnerability. This work 
supports the scholarship on trans necropolitics and answers trans of colour scholars’ call to 
acknowledge the besieged material conditions of non- normative trans lives.770 
I gave current Canadian and Ontario context to the pioneering work of Singh, Gill-Petersen 
and Kwon in Child and Youth studies by showing the ways that law and medicine combine to 
create additional barriers for trans racialized youth beyond what white counterparts 
experience.771 These barriers continue beyond the traditional age of legal adulthood. 
                                                 
770 Haritaworn et al 2014 supra note 13, Ware supra note 53, and Bhanji supra note 49. 
771 Singh 2013a supra note 50, Gil-Petersen 2014 supra note 54, and Kwon supra note 15. 
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Furthermore, this research suggests that the legal age of majority has now become outdated as a 
marker for attaining adulthood status especially given the heightened obstacles that trans 
racialized youth must navigate in terms of health systems, professionals and service provider 
organizations. 
My work confirmed the findings of Pyne, Lee and Dadui in Trans studies, that trans racialized 
youth perceive themselves and their families as intersectional and distinct from white trans 
counterparts.772 I went beyond studies looking at barriers to health care access for trans youth to 
theorizing organic responses to coercive pathology from the perspective of agency and 
autonomy. Pathologizing medical models of transness were determinative in legal decisions such 
as ODSP appeals made by youth diagnosed with gender dysphoria especially where appeals were 
successful. I concluded that transphobia and lack of access to gender affirming care due to health 
care provider incompetence or gatekeeping, and related issues of geographic distance and wait 
lists were key contributing factors behind appellants’ mental health disabilities rather than simply 
being trans.  
I argue that the agentic or protective strategies used by participants in my study confirm 
findings from other studies about trans (such as Trans PULSE) and structurally vulnerable 
people’s decision making in health generally.773 As Sherwin notes, self-doubt and inability to 
challenge systems of oppression characterize their agentic strategies.774 These short-term 
strategies were marked by the kind of ambivalence towards power that Butler theorized: 
performing identities, disidentifying with the gender binary, avoidance of medical care, and 
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hiding.775 Participants may have performed to meet diagnostic and eligibility criteria but did not 
conform. My findings also revealed participants carrying out the following autonomy-building 
practices: self-advocacy, intentional social networks, self-representation, and integrated selfhood. 
I engaged with questions central to health equity law: How does the HCCA measure up in 
practice to its aspirations of autonomy for all capable people and streamline substitute decision 
making? Is health policy responsive to the wishes, bodies, and families of trans racialized youth? 
In answering these questions, I did not position “autonomy” and “informed consent” as 
synonyms. And rather than seeing the decision itself as the most important outcome of decision 
making, I applied Nedelsky’s relational autonomy theory.776 I agreed with her conception of 
rights as relationships that create duties for governments. Policy makers and health care 
providers cannot magically grant autonomy but can, and should, foster autonomy-producing 
conditions. I found however, that Nedelsky’s autonomy-producing conditions did not adequately 
theorize what trans racialized youth experienced. Autonomy is a socially and politically enabled 
practice. My findings support what Roberts and other feminists of colour have observed which is 
that justice is a crucial process that fosters autonomy.777 Therefore, my list of autonomy–
enhancing factors are information sharing, access to justice, transparency of power in 
relationships, personal responsibility, self-awareness, and interdependence. From this belief in 
justice and my desire to do justice by the courageous and resilient focus group participants I 
propose several recommendations. 
Based on the combination of my legal research and qualitative methods I have identified the 
following list of actions and policy interventions. I assert that these actions would greatly 
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improve the exercise of autonomy for trans racialized youth in health care decision making in 
Ontario. 
• Change OHIP’s policy so as not to require health care providers to strictly apply the 
Standards of Care v7 in order to approve subsidized treatments. 
• Broaden health care coverage for services affecting trans women the most such as 
electrolysis, voice therapy, and improve the coverage for top surgery. 
• Facilitate changing identification documents to match name and gender for those born 
outside Canada. 
•  Amend the Health Care Consent Act to allow young capable people to exclude specific 
family members from the automatic substitute decision maker hierarchy (s. 20) and allow 
for use of a community organization, or chosen family using a Power of Attorney for 
Personal Care (POA). 
• Mandate public legal education and advocacy support for youth about health care rights. 
• Do not repeal OHIP+ pharmacare for youth 25 years and younger who are covered by 
their parents’ private health insurance plans. 
My research findings in terms of heath consent statutes and jurisprudence are Ontario-
focused. Some issues however, such as the conflicts between family law and health law are live 
issues in British Columbia as well and will likely continue to be litigated across Canada until an 
appellate court sets a precedent. Furthermore, findings related to my focus group are urban and 
Greater Toronto Area specific and therefore not applicable wholesale to remote or reserve 
community youth experiences. In addition, I found the ability to consult with lawyers 
challenging these cases in three different provinces extremely helpful to understand what 
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arguments were made by counsel and rejected by judges. Therefore, an avenue for further 
exploration of progressive legal arguments would be through court transcripts in cases involving 
health rights of trans youth rather than just the final written decisions of judges. 
This project marks new directions for community-based research including how to design and 
deliver public legal education for minors and youth about health rights; more specific work to 
understand what doctors know and believe, and how to teach health care providers an 
intersectional approach to fostering the conditions of autonomy is needed. This further research 
is critical in the face of recent political acts to remove information about gender identity and 
sexual orientation formerly provided to elementary school minors through health curriculum. 
Curtailing health information sharing in schools means an even greater reliance on health care 
providers and other trusted adults to raise awareness that could save the lives of trans racialized 
youth. This research followed the path of possibilities for nourishing autonomy in decision 
making over the long term beyond just the assertion of rights. 
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Appendices  
Appendix A: Pre-Group Questions for Focus Group Participants 
 
1. What kind of role do health care professionals and social services workers play in 
your life? 
2. How do you tell your experiences in order to access health care? Use words and 
images. 
3. How would you describe the relationship between yourself and the communities 
you feel a part of /take part in? 
4. How would you describe and navigate the burden of representation of self as a 
marginalized person? 
5. What health services do you use? 
6. What health services do you need but do not have? 
7. Which services are transition-related, and which are not? 
8. What barriers exist for you in getting the health services you want? 
9. What solutions would you propose to policy makers? 
10. What solutions would you propose to service providers? 
11. How best would you like to receive, review and exhibit the results of the focus 
groups and research? 
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Appendix B: Photography Prompts for Participants 
 
The following prompts were used on Day 1 and left with the participants for their image creation 
week culminating in Day 2: 
1. How would you describe the task of representing yourself as a trans bipoc person?  
2. How would you describe the relationship between yourself and the communities you feel 
a part of /take part in? 
3. What kind of role do health care professionals (doctors, nurses, therapists) and social 
services workers (OW, ODSP, CAS) play in your life? 
4. How do you tell your experiences and your identity in order to access health care? Use 
words and images. 
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Appendix C: Photograph Analysis Rubric 
 
• What do we see/don’t see? 
• What is shown? 
• What do we feel? 
• (How) do we relate? 
• What does what we see/don’t see signify about us? 
• How would we use this picture? 
• What is the context for the photographer? 
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Appendix D: Discussion Questions for the Member Checking Session  
 
1. What elements did you emphasize in telling your story to health professionals? 
2. What did you hide or change when telling your story to health professionals? 
3. Did you manipulate (your understanding of) diagnosis to get what you needed? If 
so how? 
4. Were you allowed to make your own decisions or did someone else make 
decisions for you? If someone else made decisions, what did you think about the 
process? 
5. Have health practitioners consulted with your parents or other decision makers 
about your healthcare? 
6. When you were under 18 years did this happen and if so how?  
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Appendix E: Focus Group Agenda 
Consent and Coercion in Health Care Decisions   
2 Day Art & Discussion Workshop with Trans Racialized Youth April 2017 
Flexible Itinerary 
 
Day 1 (6.5 hrs) 
 
11:00-11:15     Intros of participants and ice breaking exercises 
11:15-11:30    Overview of project themes of consent and autonomy in health care decision 
making (recorded) 
11:30-12:15    Consent and confidentiality forms distribute supportive resources list with time   
for discussion of pre-focus group questions (recorded) 
12:15-1:00 Digital ethics exercise/games; include photo-composition, lighting, editing, 
consent, privacy (recorded); distribute and explain the consent form for photo 
subjects. 
1:00-1:45 Meal and fresh air. 
1:45-3:30 Sign out cameras using serial numbers; photography exercises in pairs with 
prompts 
3:30-3:45 Break 
3:45-5:30 Health care decision making autonomy discussion (recorded) 
5:30-6:00        Checkout using photos. Sign out cameras, honoraria and tokens.  
 
 
Day 2 (6.0 hrs) 
 
11:00-12:30 Check-in and review of consent issues and forms; look at art that people created 
12:30-1:30 Enjoy meal while participants present their art 
1:30-3:30 We link art to the themes of consent, representation, coercion 
  (recorded) 
3:30-3:45 Break and snacks 
3:45-4:30 Discussion of creative solutions to health barriers (recorded) 
4:30-5:30 Review of next steps such as member checking session 
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Appendix F: Information for Youth about Consenting to Treatment in 
Ontario 
 
According to the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, c. 2, sched. A, (HCCA) there is no fixed age of 
consent in Ontario when it comes to health treatments. Even children under the age of 12 can 
make decisions about their health care as long as they can demonstrate the capacity to make an 
informed decision. Ages of consent are different in each province. 
 
To ensure you make an informed decision, your doctor must tell you the following things in a 
manner, and using language, you can understand: types of treatment options, benefits, risks, 
short- and long-term side effects, and consequences of not having the treatment. Your doctor 
must also tell you about your right to a second medical opinion. 
 
Who determines if a person has the capacity to make a decision? Only a doctor or a health 
professional can find you incapable of making a decision.778 They must tell you if they make this 
finding. Social workers, teachers and parents cannot determine your capacity to make a treatment 
decision. 
 
Incapable means the doctor believes, after speaking with you, that you are not able to understand 
all the information about the treatment and/or you are not able to understand what might happen 
if you take or don’t take the treatment. 
 
A finding of incapacity does not act like a blanket covering all future treatment decisions. If you 
are found not to have capacity for a particular decision at a particular time, then the doctor will 
ask a Substitute Decision Maker (SDM) like a parent or caregiver, partner or Children’s Aid 
Society Worker to decide for you. You have the right to choose your SDM from a list of eight 
categories of people listed in s. 20 of the HCCA. Social workers, doctors and foster parents are 
not on that list, although they can help you to make the decision. 
 
Having a disability or being disabled does not automatically make you incapable. 
It does not matter if the SDM thinks your wishes are unreasonable or undesirable by their own 
standards. 
 
                                                 
778 The list of health professionals who can find you incapable is found in the Regulated Health Professionals Act 
1991. The rule is that a health doctor can only find you incapable of making a decision about a treatment they 
themselves can recommend. For example, a dentist cannot find you incapable of deciding to take a puberty blocker 
drug. That said, if you take a holistic view of your health you may find it useful to speak to different specialists 
about how the pieces of your healthcare fit together.  
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The SDM must be led by your values and your perspectives. If you are 16 or over the SDM has 
the additional rule to follow what your wishes were when you were capable, by checking what 
you wrote down or said to the SDM or other people. 
 
If you want to challenge your doctor’s finding of incapacity you can apply to the Consent and 
Capacity Board (CCB). The CCB can also change your SDM to a person of your choice, if that 
person agrees to that role and both of you are at least 16 years old. You will need to contact the 
CCB. Once you tell them why you are contacting them they will provide you with forms to fill 
out and sign in order to start your application. It is a very good idea to speak to a legal clinic or a 
lawyer about applications to the CCB. 
 
Creating a document called a Power of Attorney for Personal Care (POAPC)  
is another option for supported health care decision making. It does not require a court process. 
You must be at least 16 years old to appoint an attorney for personal care and do it while you are 
capable. The attorney that you give power to does not have to be a lawyer, and they should be 
someone you trust who knows your values and beliefs. The POAPC document requires your 
signature and signatures of two witnesses. If you are found incapable for a particular decision, 
the person you choose as your attorney for personal care would automatically become your 
SDM, trumping relatives and CAS workers. When you are capable again, the attorney does not 
make decisions for you.  
 
Speaking to a lawyer about the role of an attorney for personal care is highly recommended 
because their duties are quite a bit broader than those of an SDM and includes other areas of your 
life such as housing. 
 
If you want to cancel the POAPC, you can revoke it by writing down that you revoke the 
POAPC and have two witnesses sign that they watched you sign the revocation. All of you 
should include the date that you are signing. Keep the original POAPC and the revocation 
documents together in a safe place. 
 
Useful Resources 
 
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario 
Phone: Public Advisory Department at 416-967-2603 or 1-800-268-7096, extension 603 
Website: http://www.cpso.on.ca 
Contact them if 
• you have questions or concerns about how your doctor communicated with you, the 
information they kept or shared with others, the treatment you received, or how your consent was 
given or not given for treatment 
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Consent and Capacity Board 
Phone: 416-327-4142 or 1-866-777-7391 (toll-free in Ontario) 
Website: http://www.ccboard.on.ca 
Contact them if 
• your doctor has said you are not able to make a treatment decision and you disagree 
• you are at least 16 years old and want to change your Substitute Decision Maker 
 
Justice for Children and Youth 
Phone: 416-920-1633 or 1-866-999-5329 (toll-free) 
Blog: http://jfcy1.blogspot.ca/ 
Website: http://www.jfcy.org 
Contact them if 
• you want information or legal advice 
• you are looking for a lawyer to represent you in court or at a Board hearing 
 
Office of the Provincial Advocate for Children and Youth 
Phone: 416-325-5669 or 1-800-263-2841 (toll-free) 
Website: http://www.provincialadvocate.on.ca 
Contact them if 
• you have questions about health care rights 
• you feel that someone is violating your health rights  
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Table of Photographs 
 
Table 1. List of Photographs (see p.viii) 
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Creator Full Title 
Pogi Think Before You Scream 
(Photo has been pixelated to protect identifiable features) 
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Creator Full Title 
Pogi Reading Between the Signs 
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Creator Full Title 
Pogi Alone Together 
(Identifiable features in the photo have been blurred) 
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Creator Full Title 
Pogi Dick Pick 
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Creator Full Title 
Sakura 
River 
UHN Invoice 
(Photo has been pixelated to hide identifiable features) 
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Creator Full Title 
Sakura 
River 
Bloody Glove Series 1  
(Photo has been blurred to hide identifiable features) 
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Creator Full Title 
 
Sakura River - Bloody Gloves Series 2 
(Photo has been modified to hide identifiable features) 
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Creator Full Title 
 
Sakura River - Bloody Glove Series 3 
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Creator Full Title 
Sakura 
River 
Flags 
(Photo partially blurred to hide identifiable features) 
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Creator Full Title 
Sakura 
River 
Light After Dark 
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Creator Full Title 
Particip
ant #4 
The Ground is a long way down but there is more than one way to be grounded 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 250 
Creator Full Title 
Particip
ant #4 
Discarded, Forgotten and Hidden. Sometimes Compartmentalized 
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Creator Full Title 
Particip
ant #4 
Community, Family, chosen or otherwise taking on the world together 
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Creator Full Title 
Particip
ant #4 
I never Said I was Ugly, It doesn’t make me Sick 
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Creator Full Title 
Particip
ant #4 
Who goes out? Who gets to be seen? Who am I to you? 
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Creator Full Title 
Particip
ant #4 
We Spend Some Time Together and Avoid the Medical Gaze 
(Photo has been blurred to hide identifiable features) 
 
 
 255 
 
